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This dissertation analyzes public-intellectual work that deploys crisis tropes in its 
treatment of literacy, arguing that such work provides insight into the influence that 
intellectual engagement might exert on discourse in the public sphere. From A.S. Hill’s 
lament that freshman entering Harvard in 1874 could barely construct a legible sentence 
to Stanley Fish’s charge that millions of college graduates earning degrees in 2005 did so 
without learning what a sentence was, the relationship between literacy and the 
communicative skills required of productive citizens has been a constant source of 
concern. Between these two historical moments, this relationship has been an 
undertheorized feature of debates surrounding racial uplift, feminist protest, and 
America’s role as a world power. When interlocutors in such debates minimize the 
significance of literacy practices, they encourage rhetorical action driven by a coercive 
conception of social crisis that limits critical engagement on the part of the public. I argue 
that the public intellectual’s capacity to facilitate rhetorically literate discursive exchange 
at the level of the mass public can transform the paralysis of crisis into possibility. I 
reframe well-known debates between W.E.B. Du Bois and Booker T. Washington, Betty 
Friedan and Gloria Steinem, and Mortimer Adler and Glenn T. Seaborg in terms of the 
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As it was employed by historian and social critic Russell Jacoby in 1987, the term 
“public intellectual” emphasized a significant distinction between the academically 
minded intellectuals of Jacoby’s own time and the intellectuals of past decades: the latter 
actively contributed to and maintained public culture while the former left it to fend for 
itself, often just as actively. Although Jacoby’s The Last Intellectuals: American Culture 
in the Age of Academe reads much like an extended epitaph mourning a figure already 
lost, most current treatments of the public-intellectual subject adopt a less despondent, 
more resuscitative approach. Rather than write the public intellectual off as an academic 
relic, they explore strategies by which public-intellectual models for cultural engagement 
can be revived and put to good use. In addition to confronting the past models and 
enduring biases associated with public intellectuals and their social roles, these more 
recent efforts contend with shifts in the nature of academic institutions, the development 
of more participatory media forums, and the influence of both on the structure and 
function of public discourse.  
 While the expressive skills required for navigating academic and public contexts 
are a central concern in most recuperative projects, rarely is this concern put in 
conversation with an analysis of the discursive modes governing the response to public-
intellectual work within the public realm. This dissertation endeavors to characterize 
more fully this often overlooked relationship by examining public-intellectual work that 
responds to moments of “literacy crisis,” situations in which the public’s communicative 
abilities are described as ineffective or substandard. While relatively unconcerned with 




because they nonetheless structure public discourse and access to public debate. When 
intellectuals address the public, they engage in rhetorical action designed to conform to 
the public’s standards and expectations. In the process of adapting to a mass audience, 
intellectuals make assumptions about the norms governing public discourse. These 
assumptions are evident in the rhetorical work itself, and their accuracy can be judged on 
the basis of the work’s reception and influence. Public-intellectual work that responds to 
literacy crises is especially informative because it treats the possibility of public discourse 
directly while also enacting a particular style of public address and engagement. When 
responding to these “crises,” public intellectuals confront public discourse both explicitly 
and implicitly, describing the problems that they see while also modeling what they 
perceive to be more effective alternatives.  
 This dissertation analyzes public-intellectual work that responds to four literacy 
crises, three historical and one contemporary, in order to more fully understand the 
influence that public intellectuals have, or can have, on public discourse. It is concerned 
with the actual rhetorical functioning of public intellectuals and the ways in which this 
functioning might facilitate meaningful discursive exchange within the public sphere. 
Against treatments of the public intellectual that privilege direct social or political 
effectiveness and largely discount the impact of rhetorical engagement, I argue that 
effective public-intellectual rhetoric can itself be transformative due to its ability to shape 
public discourse by opening specific subjects to debate and by making particular 
rhetorical and discursive strategies available for public use.  
Ultimately, this dissertation recontextualizes public-intellectual work that actively 




that academic institutions and media forums have had on such work over time in order to 
account for the challenges facing would-be public intellectuals today. Of these 
challenges, I argue that the most inescapable is the influence of past models for 
intellectual engagement and their attendant biases. For this reason, I begin by considering 
the history of scholarship on the intellectual figure as a means of contextualizing the 
recent recuperative impulse. The dissertation engages with the variety of forms that this 
recuperative impulse takes within the field of rhetorical studies, and I argue that a number 
of the extant “rhetorical” models for public-intellectual engagement are, in fact, 
surprisingly un-rhetorical. By extending and supplementing the arguments that do 
advance rhetorically invested models of public-intellectual engagement, I develop a 
theoretical framework for assessing public-intellectual work on the basis of its rhetorical 
modeling, and it is this framework that informs my readings of the public-intellectual 
work treated in each chapter. 
    
The Public Intellectual Lives 
To situate my approach to the public-intellectual figure in relation to current work 
in rhetorical studies, I begin here by analyzing conversations and debates characteristic of 
the field’s larger treatment of the intellectual’s public role.  The most evocative of these 
conversations is Philosophy and Rhetoric’s 2006 forum titled “The Nature and Function 
of Public Intellectuals.” Consisting of three articles representing three distinct 
perspectives, the forum created space for what editor Gerard A. Hauser describes as a 
“conversation on the definitional question of what is a public intellectual and what role 




of these definitional concerns, the first of which is the physical location of the intellectual 
and his or her work. “Are these intellectual practices whose meaning lies in the 
academy,” Hauser asks, “or are they practices that come to fruition in the streets?”  The 
second component concerns the abilities or skills required of the public intellectual and 
the methods by which these abilities or skills are developed. Are intellectuals “prepared 
by training and, perhaps, temperament to address the contingencies of public issues”? 
(125-126). While the questions Hauser poses give the forum a goal-oriented unity, they 
are, perhaps, more interesting for how they build upon and redirect decades of 
scholarship on the intellectual. Given the journal’s own academic “location” and its 
disciplinary identity, the forum as a whole can be read as a reprisal of interest in the 
intellectual figure that has its own rhetorical function, namely the dual recuperation of the 
successful public intellectual as the master rhetorician and of rhetoric as a publically 
motivated academic discipline. 
 In terms of the forum’s relationship to the history of work on the intellectual 
figure, its interest in the location of intellectual effort most notably confronts Jacoby’s 
critique of the academic cloistered in the Ivory Tower. Arguing that the modern 
university system has effectively monopolized intellectual life, a consolidation with 
detrimental consequences for public culture, Jacoby contends that such intellectuals “no 
longer need or want a larger public,” as “they are almost exclusively professors. 
Campuses are their homes; colleagues their audience; monographs and specialized 
journals their media” (6). Academic intellectuals are not, then, public intellectuals. They 
are creatures defined by and confined to their natural habitats: the academic institutions 




intellectual existence are the interconnected forces of specialization, disciplinary identity, 
and job security. Operating within this system, the academic intellectual has little to gain, 
and more to lose, from public-intellectual work. 
The distinction that Jacoby makes between the new breed of academic 
intellectuals and the to-be-mourned public intellectuals of the past replicates earlier 
taxonomies of the intellectual figure attributed to Antonio Gramsci and Michel Foucault. 
Gramsci makes the distinction between “traditional intellectuals,” those bound to existing 
power structures and whose interests remain in the cerebral realm of truth and reason, and 
“organic intellectuals,” those who are relatively autonomous and whose interests concern 
specific class or labor conditions (12). Making a slightly different distinction, Foucault 
offers the “universal intellectual” and the “specific intellectual,” but characterizes the 
universal intellectual, the intellectual acting as the “bearer of universal values,” as 
outmoded and largely ineffectual (Power/Knowledge 132). Both offer models that 
differentiate between an intellectualism aspiring to transcendent truth and an 
intellectualism derived from and attentive to specific conditions and contexts. Both also 
favor the organic or specific model, portraying the traditional or universal as 
irresponsibly detached and incapable of exerting real influence. The enduring effect of 
this shared preference forcefully structures contemporary treatments of public-intellectual 
work, particularly those concerned with what makes public-intellectual work “public” 
and those asking whether academic intellectuals seen as operating within traditional or 
universal modes can, in fact, have public influence.  
Unsurprisingly, each of the contributors to the Philosophy and Rhetoric forum 




an academic context.  All three rhetoricians argue that accounting for the role of public 
communication might neutralize the charge that modern academic life is necessarily a 
limiting force for intellectuals who wish to engage wider publics. When rhetorical 
modeling and ethical argumentation are seen as effective methods for intervening in and 
encouraging public deliberation, the academic intellectual can have meaningful influence 
in public matters. Despite their shared interest in rendering the work of public 
intellectuals in terms rhetorical activity, however, contributors Nathan Crick and Steve 
Fuller give somewhat un-rhetorical accounts of public-intellectual work. Within the 
context of this forum, neither confronts the challenges of addressing a public audience or 
characterizes direct public address as necessary.1 Despite moving in a productive 
direction, rhetoric-based approaches to public-intellectual work do not immediately free 
academic intellectuals from the philosophical weight of the Gramsci-Foucault bias, as 
closer examinations of the forum’s content will reveal.  
Crick’s contribution to the forum offers the most direct assessment of the 
distinctions drawn between the philosophical and the rhetorical as they align with 
conceptions of academic work and public influence. He begins with sociologist Stanley 
Aronowitz’s Gramsci-centric intellectual model and argues that Aronowitz’s notion of 
the public intellectual suffers from “an acceptance of an eviscerated conception of 
rhetoric that ends up separating the theoretical work from the larger sociohistorical 
situation to which it responds.” Such a conception assumes that “rhetoric, by its nature, is 
particular, practical, stylistic, whereby theory is universal, contemplative, and 
substantial,” and “consequently, rhetoric gets drained of content while theory becomes 
                                                          
1 In subsequent work, both Crick and Fuller correct for this particular limitation in their initial treatments. I 
am less concerned with the limitation itself, however, than I am with the ease with which rhetorical 




pure meaning awaiting relevance” (129-130). On the basis of such an interpretation, 
neither rhetoric nor theory readily contributes to public-intellectual work, as the first is 
rendered superficial and the second characterized as detached, which again privileges an 
activist, rather than an academic, conception of “public” work. Crick attributes the 
pervasive nature of this bias to an Ivory Tower model of academia that preserves the 
Aristotelian tension between “epistēme (contemplative knowledge such as science and 
philosophy) and technē (productive knowledge such as art and rhetoric)” (130). For 
Crick, one strategy for resolving this tension is to conceive of public-intellectual work as 
work that responds to an extended, rather than an immediate, rhetorical situation. 
Drawing on Lloyd Bitzer’s model of the rhetorical situation, Crick challenges reductive 
notions of “kairos” that serve, again, to privilege particularity and immediate action, 
suggesting that kairotic exigency can, in fact, extend over time and space.2 While Crick 
refers to such situations as “philosophical situations,” they maintain their rhetorical 
function in the sense that they are structured by versions of Bitzer’s three rhetorical 
preconditions: exigence, constraint, and audience. In this sense, public-intellectual work 
is a rhetorical act that responds to and is structured by a set of conditional forces, but it 
need not be restricted to a single event or individual moment.  
In addition to providing a recuperative framework for understanding public-
intellectual work capable of transcending the theory/praxis binary, Crick’s assessment 
gives specific insight into public-intellectual work surrounding literacy crises. Based on 
his understanding of “philosophical situations,” Crick contends that public intellectuals 
                                                          
2 Bitzer’s conception of the rhetorical situation is canonical within both rhetorical theory and composition 
pedagogy based on the framework it offers for assessing the forces structuring rhetorical action. Equally as 
well-known, however, is Richard Vatz’s response to Bitzer’s work, which argues that rhetoric itself has the 
power to shape situations and to influence its context. Vatz’s critique seems to be more in line with my 




are those who “produce work that conceptualizes and provides direction for longstanding 
and pervasive problems and are then successful in helping change the habits and practices 
of a public” (138).  Although individual literacy crises are rendered as products of 
particular historical moments, the idea of a literacy crisis, and much of the rhetorical 
force derived from it, is grounded in a more general and pervasive sociocultural context. 
Conceptually, the “literacy crisis” is a prime example of a lingering kairotic context never 
far from public consciousness. Mistrust of public education, for example, is as American 
as public education itself.  Additionally, public-intellectual work responding to literacy 
crises is certainly interested in influencing “the habits and practices of a public,” as it 
necessarily defines and classifies modes of literate action while typically advocating for 
certain forms of literacy instruction. For these reasons, Crick’s approach to the rhetorical 
nature of public-intellectual work is important to my own, despite the fact that he does 
not contend directly with the how the rhetorical nature of the work manifests in specific 
forms of public address.  
Like Crick, Steven Fuller is concerned with the influence of public-intellectual 
work on public “habits” when he defines the public intellectual as “an agent of 
distributive justice;” the public intellectual’s function is to advocate for ideas or concepts 
that the public overlooks on the basis of other ideas’ or concepts’ being too dominant or 
otherwise overwhelming within the context of public discourse. “The task for the public 
intellectual,” Fuller writes, “is clear: To construct situations that enable the balance to be 
redressed, to reopen cases that for too long have been closed” (148). Fuller’s model is 
similar to Crick’s in that it, too, conceives of public-intellectual work as work that 




Fuller, however, seems even more concerned with the public-intellectual’s role in 
constructing the rhetorical situation than he is with the public intellectual’s role in 
responding to it. What defines successful public-intellectual work for Fuller is the way in 
which it challenges norms and opens accepted practices to criticism, not the particular 
agenda or alternative model it proposes. 
While both Crick and Fuller make productive contributions to a rhetorical model 
for public-intellectual work capable of transcending academic contexts, neither privileges 
the communicative function of such work. Crick contends that ideas themselves can serve 
as public-intellectual work and do so regardless of the forms their expression and 
circulation take (135), and Fuller ultimately shifts focus away from mass-audience 
communication, arguing that classroom-based pedagogical practice can have comparable 
influence on the habits and practices of the public sphere (153). Given the emphasis that 
both Crick and Fuller place on rhetoric, their disavowal of public rhetorical acts as the 
public intellectual’s primary mode of influence would be unexpected if not for the very 
real challenges facing academics in search of a public voice. The two models suggest that 
academic intellectuals can function “publicly” in relatively passive ways that are more 
directly in line with their positions in the academy than is cultivating a public presence. 
 In his response to the forum’s contributors, Scott Welsh clears a similarly 
comfortable space for the academic intellectual based on Jürgen Habermas’s conception 
of the relationship between scholarly work and political consequences. This work 
conceives of such “consequences” not as “the effective political agency of scholars” but 
as “the effective democratic agency of citizens” (14). In my assessment, Crick and Fuller 




conditions he creates for public agency. By offering models of rhetorical intervention that 
do not require direct discursive contact, both distance the public intellectual from the 
public realm in a way that puts more pressure on the social actors who receive his 
messages  than it does on the public intellectual himself. I, however, wonder whether this 
is a sustainable and productive shift in moments of literacy crisis. When the status of 
public communication is itself at risk, it is irresponsible for a public intellectual to 
assume that her ideas and contributions will have the effect that she intends without her 
engaging directly with her audience and with the discursive challenges that they face. 
Public intellectuals should instead be attentive to these challenges and consider how their 
own rhetorical acts might intervene in and transform public deliberation for the better, on 
both the level of content and the level of form.  
Given that democratic and social participation requires certain levels of basic 
literacy and rhetorical ability, direct engagement in the public realm gives public 
intellectuals an opportunity to model such participation and the skills it requires. The 
challenges that they face in doing so from an academic context might even be seen as an 
advantage. As “outsiders” working in discursive modes that are not their own, they are 
afforded a unique opportunity to shed significant light on the rhetorical and literacy-based 
requirements for effective public participation more generally. Additionally, direct 
involvement in public forums gives public intellectuals more power to shape these 
forums and to further ensure that they are, in fact, facilitating productive deliberative 
discourse. When discussions of literacy expectations take place in specialized forums 




that such opportunities for reevaluation can have in reconceptualizing literacy instruction 
at a more expansive level.  
Ultimately, I suggest that intellectuals participating in and directing public 
discourse can function as “sponsors of literacy,” even when they do not address the 
subject of literacy directly. Deborah Brandt defines sponsors as “any agents, local or 
distant, concrete or abstract, who enable, support, teach, and model, as well as recruit, 
regulate, suppress, or withhold literacy—and gain some advantage by it” (19). 
Responsible for rhetorical action capable of influencing the structure of public discourse, 
public intellectuals functioning in this capacity both model and enable public 
participation. From this position, they support and advocate for the literacy-related skills 
that this participation requires. Within such a model, the most successful rhetorical modes 
of public-intellectual work shape conceptions of functional large-scale public 
participation. While these modes might include the structuring of rhetorical situations that 
both Crick and Fuller suggest is central to public-intellectual practice, they must also 
attend to strategies for engaging the conflict and disagreement at the heart of a truly 
deliberative public sphere. Public-intellectual work capable of accounting for these 
elements as a means of addressing an audience can productively contribute to public 
discourse in ways that are themselves a form of political action. Brandt contends that 
sponsors of literacy gain advantage by their sponsorship, but for the academic intellectual 
pursuing public-intellectual work, that advantage will not be tenure or disciplinary 





In his contribution to the Philosophy and Rhetoric forum, Steven Mailloux offers 
a model more invested in the type of direct rhetorical intervention and modeling that I 
consider here. Unlike approaches that repackage the everyday work of the academic in 
terms of the public contributions it makes, Mailloux reserves the title of “public 
intellectual” for “thinkers who directly engage with and are engaged by nonacademic 
publics” (144). Importantly, the relationship described here is multidirectional, requiring 
a communicative give-and-take that the intellectual can initiate but cannot sustain on his 
or her own. Mailloux also suggests that rhetorical studies provide academics working in 
other disciplines with a metacritcal resource for engaging public audiences because the 
field has a longstanding interest in audience analysis and in cultural rhetorics that 
circulate within the public sphere, a point which further underscores his discipline’s  
investment in the public-intellectual figure.  
Adopting Mailloux’s more selective characterization of public intellectuals, I 
extend his argument by examining what, specifically, rhetorical studies has to offer 
models of public-intellectual engagement. In what follows, my approach supplements 
Mailloux’s perspective with Barbara Misztal’s sociological account of the intellectual’s 
relationship to the public good3 and with Dick Pels’s study of intellectual 
spokespersonship.4 My analysis of the public-intellectual work at the center of my 
                                                          
3 Misztal’s account of the public intellectual’s role is the closest to my own in the way that it emphasizes 
the discursive contributions that intellectuals can make to public discussion and debate. Seeing the public 
intellectual as a force in establishing social well-being, Misztal argues that healthy democracies depend 
upon public intellectuals with specialized background knowledge in relevant content areas, rhetorical 
savvy, and personal values and moral leanings that guide their judgment. While she recognizes the 
challenges that academic specialists face in speaking to non-specialized audiences, Misztal also sees the 
public-intellectual position as one that requires professional upkeep in the sense that the individual must 
consistently reaffirm his or her authority, and this point in particular informs my assessment of 
contemporary intellectual work.  
4 At the center of Pels’s assessment of public-intellectual work is the intellectual’s status as an outsider, a 




chapters combines all three treatments of public-intellectual work to develop a model of 
intellectual engagement that is grounded in direct public address but attendant to the 
multiplicity of ways in which this address intervenes in and influences the subsequent 
course of public discussion. I argue that the academic intellectual’s most significant 
public role might not be to influence political or social change directly, but rather to 
facilitate rhetorically literate discursive exchange at the level of the mass public. Based 
on this model, I consider how public intellectuals respond to literacy crises that are 
structured by race, gender, and national identity. In order to respond to public concern 
surrounding these issues, public intellectuals employ different rhetorical strategies in 
each of these contexts, and these strategies create different conditions for the public 
discussions that follow.  
 
The Public Intellectual and the Literacy Crisis: A Selective History 
Before moving to consider the literacy crises at the center of each chapter, I offer 
here three separate but surprisingly similar literacy-crisis narratives as exemplars of the 
genre and as models of this type of discursive intervention. The first of these exemplars is 
Stanley Fish’s May 2005 New York Times Op-Ed “Devoid of Content.” In this column, 
Fish described the impending graduation season as “that time of year when millions of 
American college and high school students will stride across the stage, take diploma in 
hand and set out to the wider world, most of them utterly unable to write a clear and 
coherent English sentence.” Speaking to a large public audience, Fish characterized 
                                                                                                                                                                             
influences my assessment of the means by which an academic intellectual might position himself relative to 
a non-academic audience. Additionally, Pels considers the ways in which intellectual figures speaking for 
or about particular groups face challenges associated with representation and identity, a conversation that is 




students’ transitions from educational institutions to the public realm in terms of failure 
and frustration, effectively warning the wider world to prepare itself for an influx of 
illiterate degree holders.  
In addition to a strategic emphasis on the present moment and the rhetorical 
exigence thus attached to the critique it offered, the op-ed tapped into a significant 
historical trend. It derived much of its persuasive power from a mode of crisis rhetoric 
that surfaces again and again in discussions of public literacy. In 1874, Harvard’s 
Boylston Professor of Rhetoric A.S. Hill and others issued similar public statements 
concerning the difficulty that would-be freshman had completing the writing portion of 
the University’s newly instituted entrance exams. More than half of the prospective 
students taking the exam in 1879 failed, and Hill’s reports explained most of these 
failures in ways that prefigure Fish’s concern with grammatical correctness. He noted 
that many of the exams exhibited “grossly ungrammatical or profoundly obscure 
sentences; absolute illiteracy” (Hill 10 qtd. in Crowley). Both Hill and Fish ultimately 
assess students’ capacity to function as citizens based on their structural knowledge of the 
English language. Their critiques set particular standards for literate action based on the 
authors’ understandings of the skills that public life requires.  
As I mentioned above, the narrative structure of such critiques is repeated again 
and again in discussions of public literacy. This repetition has only strengthened the 
narrative’s persuasive appeal, which is why it originally moved beyond strictly academic 
contexts and continues to circulate more freely in mass media forums.  Almost exactly a 
century after the first round of Hill’s entrance exams, for example, Newsweek ran the 




and academic audiences alike. “If your children are attending college,” read the opening 
line, “the chances are that when they graduate, they will be unable to write ordinary, 
expository English with any real degree of structure and lucidity” (58). And the situation 
grows grimmer when the article turns to earlier education. “Willy-nilly, the U.S. 
educational system is spawning a generation of semiliterates” (58). As in the other two 
instances, the distance between the public’s literate ability and the communicative 
capacities expected of productive citizens signifies a social crisis. In each narrative, 
however, the particular form of the crisis and its fallout reflect historically and culturally 
relevant values. The slightly different narratives attached to these crises emphasize how 
these values influenced conceptions of public participation across time.  
For Hill, what was at stake was the academic rigor associated with the Harvard 
experience and the identity that this experience conferred upon the University’s 
graduates. How could the University adequately prepare America’s future leaders for all 
of the responsibilities that the position entailed if it needed first to make sure that the 
young men in question could write legibly in their native tongue?  In sparking the 
consolidation of freshman composition as a required course, the exam system put 
pressure on the preparatory schools feeding the University students and worked to isolate 
this more remedial model of instruction, but it was also a reaction to the more diverse 
student population that many colleges faced following the Civil War. With the exams and 
freshman composition functioning as gate-keepers, though, Harvard as an institution 





While the signs of illiteracy take similar form in “Why Johnny Can’t Write,” the 
decline in literate skill is the result of the increasing influence of the audio-visual and its 
relatively lawless approach to language. The decrease in time spent reading and the 
intellectual passivity encouraged by television-viewing both threaten the strength of the 
written word by favoring more fluid and ephemeral modes of communication. “If the 
written language is placed at the mercy of every new colloquialism and if every fresh 
dialect demands and gets equal sway,” the article concludes, “then we will soon find 
ourselves back in Babel” (64). Here, the prevalence of new technologies and 
communicative modes undercuts the stability of the past in the process of subverting a 
more traditionally literary approach to language. And, as we might expect, the result will 
be nothing short of a linguistic chaos bound to thwart collective human endeavor. Placing 
the Newsweek article within its historical context, one can begin to understand why a 
nation divided by linguistic infelicities might be troubling. Facing the external threats 
associated with the Cold War, including the fall of Saigon months earlier, could the 
American public risk anything less than direct and productive communication? 
Fish was similarly invested in linguistic correctness, but he focused more on the 
instructional failure of the institutions tasked with imparting this knowledge to students. 
Both Hill’s account and the Newsweek article contend directly with major social shifts, 
but Fish’s op-ed considers specific pedagogical trends that he sees as counterproductive. 
The inability of college composition courses to prepare students for the real world 
diminishes the value of the college degree and should make the larger public wary of the 
degree holder’s abilities. In Fish’s version, the public execution of grammatical 




approaches to the subject are not achieving this goal underwrites the alternative 
pedagogical model that he offers.  
These three examples show how crisis narratives become one of the dominant 
communicative modes governing public discussions of literacy. Given the central role 
that public-intellectual figures like Fish or Hill often play in the construction of these 
crises, it is from within this crisis context that particular rhetorical modes of public-
intellectual engagement could more productively facilitate effective discursive exchange 
within the public sphere. When such crisis narratives gain momentum and when 
responses to them proliferate in the public realm, praise and blame become the dominant 
rhetorical registers, leaving us in the realm of epideictic persuasion and often foreclosing 
opportunities for deliberative engagement with the issue at hand. Fish blamed 
compositionists who privileged content over form, A.S. Hill blamed the preparatory 
schools, and Newsweek blamed audiovisual forms of communication. In each case, the 
finger-pointing not only identifies the responsible parties but also characterizes the 
author’s investment in a particular form of literacy. In demonizing content-driven 
composition instruction, Fish suggests that public participation requires linguistic 
correctness and grammatical knowledge. Hill offers a similar assessment, but he ties his 
model of correctness to a very specific educational trajectory and the related public 
identity. Finally, Newsweek privileges a more conservative, literary mode of public 
literacy. Again, what is at stake in all three accounts is the health of a public realm 
dependent upon functional communication, and all three offer diagnoses that give this 
health a very particular form based on the authors’ social investments. Public literacy is a 




fact that literacy itself is a fluid concept and can take a variety of forms based on these 
communities’ varying interests and potentially divergent ends can have the effect of 
thwarting meaningful public deliberation within such crisis-driven contexts.  
Even in the face of crisis, however, all need not be lost. In fact, it is possible to 
view the crisis moment as an opportunity for functional and meaningful change. In her 
1954 essay “The Crisis in Education,” Hannah Arendt considers America’s “recurring 
crisis in education that, during the last decade at least, has become a political problem of 
the first magnitude, reported on almost daily in the newspapers.” Despite its relatively 
benign exterior, particularly when placed alongside contemporary crises plaguing other 
parts of the world following the global warfare and genocide of the previous decade, the 
educational crisis in America, Arendt contends, is more complex than it appears and 
worth attention. In part, such crises warrant intellectual investment, even from those not 
directly involved, solely because they require new modes of thinking and judging. Arendt 
writes of the “opportunity, provided by the very fact of crisis—which tears away facades 
and obliterates prejudices—to explore and inquire into whatever has been laid bare of the 
essence of the matter” (174). Here, Arendt emphasizes that crisis moments offer access to 
those who take them seriously and suggests that this access can lead to productive 
rethinking that extends beyond the individual crisis’s concerns. Arendt describes the 
influence of crisis on intellectual engagement as follows:  
The disappearance of prejudices simply means that we have lost the answers on 
which we ordinarily rely without even realizing they were originally answers to 
questions. A crisis forces us back to the questions themselves and requires from 




disaster only when we respond to it with preformed judgments, that is, with 
prejudices. Such an attitude not only sharpens the crisis but makes us forfeit the 
experience of reality and the opportunity for reflection it provides (174-175).  
Based on Arendt’s perspective, crisis itself can be decoupled from its seemingly 
inevitable negative fallout and might be approached instead in terms of its potential. By 
forcing us back to original answers and assumptions, crisis allows us a chance to redress 
past wrongs and to free ourselves from oppressive or outdated systems of thought and 
limited discursive modes.  
While Arendt wrote from a moment very different from our own, her observations 
about the centrality of educational crises within American political thought and discourse 
are just as cogent today. The educational crisis is a widely deployed trope, spanning a 
range of journalistic and academic registers while serving the purpose of scapegoat, of 
justificatory context, and of weapon. A decline in academic achievement, alongside the 
shadowy methods used to quantify it, is to blame for everything from teenage pregnancy 
to inflation, and there is no shortage of groups and institutions to hold responsible. 
Today, literacy crises appear to have the most rhetorical force, as well as the widest 
breadth. Technological literacy, scientific literacy, medical literacy: America’s children 
and young adults can be found lacking in any or all. In contrast to a more traditional or 
general educational crisis, a literacy crisis usually highlights a skill set responsible for the 
individual’s or group’s participation in society. Literacy is active and connective, and 
literacy crises typically reflect upon some sort of relationship to be cultivated or role to 




As Arendt noted, however, these crises are revelatory in terms of what they show 
us about our society’s discourses and value systems. When literacy crises are deployed 
within discussions of schooling or culture or international relations, they speak to issues 
of citizenship and public participation, revealing assumptions about both that are most 
frequently left unexamined. Given the contested nature of literacy itself, literacy crises 
also function as points of discursive intersection at which a number of interested parties 
collide. Often, these interested parties can be approached in terms of public and private 
interests, or in terms of mass and specialized audiences. For these reasons, public-
intellectual work frequently emerges out of these contexts, and it is because of this that 
public-intellectual work can be one of the most fruitful objects of analysis. At the same 
time, I argue that public-intellectual work itself can do much to facilitate, or hinder, the 
type of rethinking that moments of crisis make possible and that the rhetorical structuring 
of this work can itself be reflective of strategies for shifting definitions, challenging 
assumptions, and exploring new lines of inquiry. 
In what follows, I consider specific intellectual debates surrounding the issue of 
literacy and the influence that these debates had on public discourse. The first chapter 
sets the debate between W.E.B. Du Bois and Booker T. Washington against 
institutionalized, primarily “white,” models of public participation. I consider the 
rhetorical strategies that each thinker employed in characterizing his preferred mode of 
public engagement as the solution to the race crisis. Both men recognized education as 
integral to equality, but their pedagogical premises selected for drastically different 
modes of public participation, modes which informed each man’s own public-intellectual 




discouraged rhetorical action but required his univocal defense, Du Bois functioned as a 
facilitator, opening outlets for public discourse and topics to debate. 
Expanding on the previous chapter’s interest in specialized forums, the second 
chapter considers how public-intellectual work contributing to the feminist movement of 
the 1960s and 1970s framed access to such outlets as crucial to the development of 
counterpublics. Less invested in academic literacies, the work examined here made 
productive use of the rhetorical tropes associated with literacy crises to support what 
Adrienne Rich called the “women’s university-without-walls,” an extra-academic realm 
built from women’s literate acts. With Betty Friedan and Gloria Steinem as my primary 
models, I consider how public-intellectuals might challenge normative discursive 
structures and conventions in order to create space for productive dissent. In particular, I 
consider the role that these women played relative to the development of a counter-sphere 
produced from feminist publishing and periodicals.   
Returning to more conventionally academic concerns, the third chapter examines 
the National Committee on Excellence in Education’s 1983 A Nation at Risk: The 
Imperative for Educational Reform. I place this document and its reception in 
conversation with earlier wartime pedagogical debates in order to consider how 
educational investments in American identity and American culture during the Cold War 
influenced the form of public discourse. I then read the chemist Glenn T. Seaborg’s 
investment in the project alongside the alternatives that the humanist Mortimer Adler set 
forth in The Paideia Proposal to suggest that what was at issue was the very nature of 




The final chapter maintains the pedagogical focus of the previous but accounts for 
the role of mainstream media, returning to Stanley Fish’s 2005 op-ed “Devoid of 
Content” and its reception. Fish’s critique of college composition prompted debate 
among academics, but this debate was confined to specialized forums to which Fish’s 
large public audience had no access.  While I acknowledge the rhetorical mastery 
underlying Fish’s column, I characterize it as an irresponsible piece of public-intellectual 
work based on its failure to cultivate productive discourse at the level of the mass public. 
Fish opened a topic for debate, but he foreclosed opportunities for equally public 
responses in the process. He emphasized linguistic correctness over critical engagement, 
thereby privileging a model of participation by which one earns the right to a public voice 
based solely on adherence to convention and excluding the very voices his criticisms 
targeted.  
Ultimately, my characterization of Fish’s piece allows me to transition from 
analytical engagement with such work and leads to a series of recommendations for more 
responsible public-intellectual work within new media contexts. The dissertation 
concludes with a discussion of the opportunities offered and challenges posed by these 
contexts in terms of their public-intellectual use-value and alongside the perpetual 
concern over the influence of technology on traditional literacy. As the public realm 
merges with the digital and character is measured in fewer and fewer characters, 
sustained intellectual intervention in public discourse becomes one means of ensuring 
that this transition preserves rhetorical models capable of facilitating conscientious and 





CHAPTER II  
MARKETING THE TALENTED TENTH: W.E.B. DU BOIS AND PUBLIC-
INTELLECTUAL ECONOMIES 
 On November 1st, 1902, William Monroe Trotter’s Boston-based newspaper The 
Guardian attributed the following statement to Booker T. Washington: “One thousand 
bushels of potatoes produced by the hands of an educated Negro are worth more in 
solving our problems than dozens of orations or tons of newspaper articles.” 
Characteristically Tuskegeean, the claim exemplifies Washington’s approach to the 
“problems” associated with the color line at the turn of the century. Preferring trade-
based training over more liberal models of education, Washington saw economic industry 
as key to racial equality and largely discounted the intellectual labor favored by Trotter 
and his college-educated Boston Radicals. Forgoing the potatoes, Trotter looked to the 
printed page, criticizing Washington’s accommodationist policies in editorial after 
editorial and cultivating instead a black readership and a market for public debate 
concerning the ideological differences between the two factions. Wary of his own 
rhetorical force, however, Trotter sought the support of W.E.B. Du Bois. In response to 
Trotter’s call, Du Bois’s rhetorical intervention interrupted the dominant Washingtonian 
discourse, directly advocating for educational programs that would enable black men and 
women to take advantage of newly emerging discursive spaces while also modeling 
rhetorical activities geared toward promoting similar capabilities in one’s audience. Du 
Bois’s democratically oriented rhetorical engagement, I argue, speaks to the influence 
that public intellectuals can have on the modes and forums governing public discourse. 




model suggests that such public-intellectual work cannot discount the influence of 
audience supply and demand; this work must attend to its own economics, even as it 
aspires to more transcendent ends. 
 Describing Trotter’s pursuit of Du Bois, their contemporary Kelly Miller wrote 
that Trotter himself lacked the “felicity of utterance requisite of ostensible popular 
leadership” and “began to cast about for a man of showy faculties who could stand before 
the people as leader of his cause,” ultimately weaving “a subtle net about W.E.B. Du 
Bois, the brilliant writer and scholar” (16). Given Trotter’s opposition to industrial 
education, Du Bois’s academic experience was a functional component of his 
participation in Trotter’s movement. In addition to this scholarly ethos, Du Bois offered a 
set of rhetorical skills that the similarly educated Trotter did not possess, and it was the 
combined force of academic achievement and public rhetorical performance that shaped 
the space that Du Bois and Trotter created for a new black public intellectual. Miller’s 
assessment of the movement’s leadership needs speaks to a common challenge facing 
public-intellectual work in its reference to Du Bois as a man of “showy faculties.” As we 
are too well aware, intellectual achievement itself is unlikely to move a public, but in Du 
Bois’s case, intellectual achievement was a significant part of what situated him to 
convey the movement’s message. In the process of packaging an intellectual perspective 
and specialized set of concerns for an audience with multiple voices clamoring for its 
attention, Du Bois negotiated many of the same tensions plaguing would-be public 
intellectuals today. 
 Ultimately, assessing Du Bois’s interventionist rhetoric through the lens of 




tension between the universal and the particular, the transcendent and the situated, that 
permeated his writing. Such an assessment also encourages re-examination of 
contemporary public-intellectual work. I frame Du Bois’s rhetoric as a particular example 
of public-intellectual work that was committed to opening discursive arenas for debate 
and in challenging the ideological assumptions and structures that threatened 
opportunities for productive public deliberation. As the intellectual’s contribution to the 
public realm remains a contested topic, models that emphasize her ability to reinvest in 
the authority of the people and to facilitate meaningful deliberative exchange on the part 
of the mass public stand as curatives to models informed by more cynical or elitist 
notions of intellectual work. By presenting Du Bois as an example of the responsible and 
engaged public intellectual reacting to significant social crisis, we might begin to see 
ourselves and our roles as scholars of rhetoric differently. 
  
The Intellectual Problem: An Economic Solution 
 To approach Du Bois’s project for racial uplift as a particular iteration of public-
intellectual work, I begin with an overview of the standard theoretical models applied to 
intellectual work more generally. Scholarly treatments of the intellectual span a healthy 
range of academic disciplines. As I have already mentioned, most start with one of two 
dialectical models concerned with the figure’s social function, both of which are worth 
recounting here briefly. Antonio Gramsci distinguishes between “traditional 
intellectuals,” those bound to existing institutions and power structures and whose 
interests remain in the cerebral realm of Truth and Reason, and “organic intellectuals,” 




conditions (Modern Prince 119). Michel Foucault makes a slightly different distinction 
and offers the “universal intellectual” and the “specific intellectual.” He characterizes the 
universal intellectual as outmoded and largely ineffectual from the perspective of his 
postmodern moment, and he argues that all intellectuals should be understood as specific 
intellectuals in the sense that they and their work are conditioned by their “three-fold 
specificity;” they are the products of their class positions, their work and life 
circumstances, and the “politics of truth” structuring the epistemes dominant within their 
social environments (132). As discussed above, both Gramsci and Foucault favor the 
organic or specific models, and this preference continues to inform assessments of 
intellectual production today, manifesting in a widespread preference for “on-the-
ground,” local, and direct intervention in public social issues.  
 Although not interested in the public intellectual specifically, Ross Posnock 
confronts this Gramsci-Foucault bias in his work on the “impossible life” of the black 
intellectual, illustrating the degree to which the thinkers’ foundational class-based 
concerns extend to race. He argues that renewed attention to the cosmopolitan 
universalism previously “stigmatized by the bias of the postmodern toward the particular 
and the local” might be especially “salutary for the study of African American 
intellectual history” (324). Because black intellectuals such as Du Bois and Franz Fanon 
operated between the particular and the universal, Posnock suggests that the conventional 
privileging of organic and specific intellectual models obscures a significant portion of 
black intellectual development. Given that the “black intellectual at the turn of the 
century emerged as a social type by resisting the lure of the prevailing ideology of the 




insisting on the implicitly Dreyfusardian notion of the intellectual as bearer of the 
universal or, in Du Bois’s terms, as ‘co-worker in the kingdom of culture’” (324-325). To 
create opportunities for such intellectual activity, Du Bois’s own engagement with the 
public realm defied a specific model of intellectual work defined by the politics of racial 
identity and aspired toward a more universal model unmarked by race, but it nonetheless 
directly confronted and even worked within this more common specific model.  
The question of race was unavoidable in public matters during Reconstruction, 
and engagement with almost any intellectual orientation or philosophical project 
confronted its influence. In his study of black pedagogical philosophies, educational 
historian Derrick P. Alridge considers how both Du Bois and Anna Julia Cooper5 worked 
within the constraints of Victorianism, Civilizationism, and Progressivism, modes of 
thought that dominated American public discourse during much of their lives. These 
intellectual movements often produced arguments for black inferiority and conflicted 
with programs that Du Bois and Cooper championed, which insisted on the potential for 
achievement among black men and women as a means toward social equality. Alridge 
argues that Du Bois and Cooper selectively reconfigured the major tenets of these 
dominant intellectual movements to suit their own aims, thereby working both within and 
against potentially constricting modes of thought. These two figures expose “the 
complexity and dialectical nature of black thought” and reveal “that black educational 
thought in late nineteenth and early twentieth-century America was often adapted from 
                                                          
5 Although this chapter confronts the role of the public intellectual through the debate between Washington 
and Du Bois, I acknowledge the significant contributions made by black female intellectuals working 
within similar contexts. Black women like Cooper, Ida B. Wells, Mary Church Terrell, and others 
addressed audiences on a range of issues, and they shaped the discursive space available to other black men 
and women in the process. Here and at subsequent points in my discussion, I include these women and their 
work in order to emphasize how their strategies for negotiating the conditions of publicity and challenging 




the larger constellation of ideas to fit the realities and circumstances of black life” (417). 
Alridge’s conception of how dominant philosophical programs could function as 
resources for black intellectuals invested in racial uplift despite furthering racist social 
distinctions emphasizes the tension inherent in the public performances of black 
intellectuals. When they were addressing audiences already familiar with these 
background discourses, thinkers like Du Bois and Cooper could not afford to ignore the 
persuasive potential of their significant topoi. Instead, they repurposed the already-
circulating premises in service of their projects by stripping useful portions from their 
racist contexts. For example, while Victorianism furthered racist views of black men and 
women as savage or barbaric, it also supported a conception of social uplift similar to that 
for which Du Bois and Cooper advocated. Du Bois and Cooper were able to exploit this 
internal tension and appeal to Victorians on the basis of the discourses and value systems 
that they already found persuasive.  
 That black Americans addressing multiracial audiences during and after 
Reconstruction confronted rhetorical norms disposed toward upholding white supremacy 
has been well documented. Nahum Dimitri Chandler contends that this same pressure 
informs African American studies today in terms of how the field negotiates the role of 
racial identity. Chandler characterizes the effect of what he refers to as an “economy of 
desedimentation.” Since the dialectical denial of difference, racial or otherwise, 
reinscribes the hierarchies it attempts to deconstruct, truly oppositional discourses must 
“produce a displacement of the distinction in question,” and this displacement “can be 
made general or decisive only through the movement of the production of difference” 




infrastructure that itself essentializes the difference, and it is by introducing the creative 
force of difference that one might shift the existing epistemological frame in a 
meaningful way. When interventions “desediment” constrictive background frameworks 
determining race-based discourse, they function both critically, challenging “an existing 
project of [white] purity by the elucidation of a differential presence,” and affirmatively, 
recognizing “the production or setting loose of something new or original in the carrying 
out of this critical operation” (88). Efficient intellectual intervention, then, is both double 
and recursive; it invokes but suspends certain notions of difference until making its way 
back around to overwrite them with more expansive alternatives. 
 This form of discursive negotiation operates “economically” in the sense that 
multiple discourses circulate through the same channels and compete for the same 
audiences. Particular modes of intellectual engagement should be approached similarly. 
Such an approach allows for a fuller understanding of how black intellectual figures 
staged their interventions within highly contested and often hostile public realms. 
Reading Du Bois’s intellectual stance as a response to economic forces certainly 
emphasizes a central ideological tension underlying his body of work, but it also stresses 
how his intellectual position was rhetorically constructed and textually mediated. Given 
that Du Bois’s participation in the debate surrounding racial uplift required that he 
respond not only to the arguments advanced by Washington and his supporters but also to 
the public-intellectual models that earned these arguments credibility, his performance of 
a public persona becomes a significant component of his strategy. The point at which 
these two public-intellectual models intersected with each other in the discursive sphere 




of how this competition influences the viability of ideas and in terms of how it structures 
the forms of intellectual participation itself.  
Steven Fuller advances a similarly market-focused model of public-intellectual 
activity when he characterizes the public intellectual as “an agent of distributive justice” 
and defines her primary function as offering marginalized ideas the time and resources 
necessary for them to compete with more dominant ideas. Such an understanding of 
intellectual responsibility assumes that the public realm operates on a scarcity principle 
and that ideas only circulate at the expense of other ideas. In Fuller’s words, “no idea is 
innocent of the fate of others,” which means that “ideas are never judged exclusively on 
their own merits but primarily in relation to other ideas” (147). Intellectual intervention, 
then, redirects attention. The public intellectual invests, or reinvests, in ideas that have 
not yet generated their own following or that have fallen out of favor but which might 
have something to offer nonetheless. In this sense, she consistently confronts the force of 
what Chaïm Perelman and Lucia Olbrechts-Tyteca refer to as “inertia.” Inertia “makes it 
possible to rely on the normal, the habitual, the real, and the actual and to attach a value 
to them, whether it is a matter of an existing situation, an accepted opinion, or a state of 
regular and continuous development” (106). Remarking on the strength of existing 
opinions about race, Du Bois notes that a “Nation naturally skeptical as to Negro ability” 
tends to “assume an unfavorable answer without careful inquiry and patient openness to 
conviction.” He warns his audience that they “must not forget that most Americans 
answer all queries regarding the Negro a priori” (Souls 68).6 Always moving against the 
                                                          
6 While I focus on Du Bois’s rhetorical interventions, his work as a researcher also contributed to his 
project, providing direct evidence countering prevailing racial prejudices. This work included sociological 
studies of black populations, including those which had benefitted from educational programs like those for 




current, the public intellectual works to call attention to opportunities for change that 
would otherwise go unnoticed or undeveloped under such circumstances. As Perelman 
and Olbrechts-Tyteca’s note, however, change must be addressed and justified, whereas 
inertia is at its strongest when left unexamined and undiscussed. This places an additional 
burden on public-intellectual intervention, particularly given that change “always has a 
somewhat devaluating effect because it shakes social confidence” and can, thus, be seen 
as a threat to the very systems of socially constituted public participation and discourse 
upon which the circulation of public-intellectual work depends (106). It is at this point in 
the discussion of public-intellectual work that rhetorical persuasion becomes central and 
that the economic force of direct competition can be seen as structuring the models of 
public-intellectual engagement.  
Just as ideas become dominant and force other ideas from public consideration so, 
too, might specific public-intellectual models accrue enough social capital to foreclose 
opportunities for alternative models to function as persuasively. The aforementioned 
Gramsci-Foucault bias favoring organic or specific intellectual models over traditional or 
universal is itself an example of how certain assumptions about the public function of 
intellectuals select for certain modes of participation. Legal theorist Richard Posner offers 
an economic model for intellectual work that mediates this bias by explaining how all 
public-intellectual work is subject to the traditional market forces of supply and demand. 
While Gramsci’s own model is economic in that organic-intellectual work includes labor 
or industrial organization, Posner is concerned with intellectual work in the form of 
“symbolic goods,” discrete and self-contained pieces of oral or written expression (40). 
                                                                                                                                                                             
Pennsylvania, is one example of such work. It combined first-hand interviews and census data to speak to 




Within Posner’s framework, the organic intellectual who organizes laborers is not a 
public intellectual until she writes an article or delivers a speech on her methods and their 
underlying principles. Washington’s public-intellectual work would, thus, be contained in 
the expressive acts by which he represents his Tuskegee program and not in his day-to-
day operation of the school itself. The capacity for intellectual work to function as public-
intellectual work depends upon the reception and circulation of these symbolic goods in 
the public sphere, and it is the market demand, not the inherent quality or type of the 
work, that determines reception and circulation.  
In order to emphasize the multiple ways symbolic goods produced by public-
intellectuals might function, Posner differentiates among “entertainment goods,” 
“solidarity goods,” and “credence goods.” While entertainment goods are valued for the 
pleasure that audiences take in them and solidarity goods are valued for their ability to 
serve as a “rallying point for the like-minded,” credence goods, the type most often 
associated with public-intellectual work, are valued for their informational nature and 
capacity to generate belief (42). In more traditionally economic terms, credence goods are 
distinguished from inspection goods, the latter of which can be “inspected” and judged 
for quality in advance of purchase while the former can only be judged on the basis of 
external factors, such as advertisements or testimonials. The same principle holds true for 
public-intellectual work; public intellectuals are typically called upon to address issues on 
which there is no inherently right answer. The fact that change as a product in itself 
cannot be judged prior to its “consumption” suggests the significance of this 




Olbrechts-Tyteca’s inertia. It is nearly impossible to judge the value of a symbolic good 
in isolation from surrounding contexts and removed from the conditions of its production.  
On the basis of this credence-governed symbolic production, public-intellectual 
work seems to rely on an almost exclusively ethos-driven rhetorical model. “Unable to 
monitor the quality of public-intellectual work reliably,” Posner argues, “the public—and 
its agents, the media—pay close attention to the quality of the inputs, that is, of the public 
intellectuals themselves.” Here, public-intellectual work takes another significantly 
rhetorical turn. Given that “consumers do not make a direct assessment of whether what 
the public-intellectual says is true but instead decide whether the public intellectual is 
persuasive,” Posner characterizes rhetoric’s relationship to symbolic goods as akin to 
advertising’s relationship to more traditional consumer products, pointing out that ‘the 
classical devices of rhetoric are well understood by Madison Avenue” (49). Significantly, 
the persuasiveness of public-intellectual work depends upon the persuasiveness of the 
public-intellectual persona as it corresponds to the public’s expectations and needs. This 
is especially true given the socially destabilizing potential of change; the public must 
trust the public intellectual enough to risk the unknown consequences of her 
recommendations. As Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca note, though, advocating for 
change can, on the basis of change’s relatively weak innate rhetorical force, “be 
appreciated as proof of sincerity” (106). In the process of producing symbolic goods 
designed to intervene in and circulate within the public sphere, the public-intellectual 
constructs a public persona that corresponds to his or her particular project, and 
successful public-intellectual work relies on a seamless and functional conflation of these 




negotiate his role as a representative of his race’s potential and his own distinctive 
intellectual capacities in terms of the ethotic potential each had for the arguments he 
advanced. 
When approached in terms of rhetorical self-positioning, the public intellectual’s 
task might be understood as finding ways to speak to, speak for, and speak about 
simultaneously. This is particularly true for intellectuals like Du Bois whose projects both 
depended upon and challenged race-based conceptions of community.  Just as Posnock 
characterizes the pressure of authenticity as it structures the work of black intellectuals, 
John Michael notes that the supposition of an authentic subject position presents a 
problem for African American intellectuals, “a problem involving their identities as 
organic intellectuals linked to a specific ‘community’ and their relation to their varied 
audiences within and beyond the pale” (33). While the influence of identity and its 
potential to subsidize one’s authority to speak on behalf of her community is central to 
work on black intellectuals and their publics, the influence of identity on rhetorical 
performance has been especially prominent in work on black women writers and orators.  
In their study of African-American women activists, for instance, Jacqueline Jones 
Royster and Mary Cochran consider the pressure that Mary Church Terrell felt 
representing colored women in a global context at the 1919 International Congress on 
Peace and Freedom held in Switzerland. While addressing issues of human rights that 
extended beyond racial discrimination and inequality, Terrell included direct statements 
about the injustices perpetrated against non-whites both at home and abroad. As a light-
skinned black woman, she worked to make her racial identity clear within her speeches 




Based on Royster and Cochran’s reading of the event, the persuasive power of Terrell’s 
rhetorical performance on this international stage required that she speak about how her 
experiences related to the experiences of all non-white women while at the same time 
enacting the differences that qualified her to speak to her mostly white audience.  
In part, the attention paid to the identity-based negotiations undertaken by black 
women rhetors responds to their being doubly disqualified from certain modes of public 
performance due to the forceful combination of race and gender.7  Vivian A. May argues 
that Anna Julia Cooper’s work frequently contended with gendered distinctions carried 
over from white patriarchal constructions and applied to black women. These included “a 
small-minded interpretation of womanhood, restrictive philosophy of the purpose of 
home life, and narrow definition of the domestic realm as a distinct and separate sphere” 
(“Race” 134), all of which served to isolate women from the public and the political. 
Finding space for oneself in the public realm required that black women contend with 
both the aforementioned discourses of white supremacy and the equally pervasive force 
of still-circulating patriarchal scripts.  
In “Our Raison d’Ȇtre,” which opens Cooper’s 1892 A Voice from the South, 
Cooper characterizes this compounded challenge as it determines access to the public 
realm for black American women. The introduction begins by describing the Negro’s 
contribution to the “clash and clatter of the American Conflict” as “a muffled strain…a 
jarring chord and a vague and uncomprehended cadenza.” An even further marginalized 
part of this “muffled strain,” black women remain the “one mute and voiceless note,” a 
claim that Cooper underscores with lines from Alfred Lord Tennyson’s “Oh Yet We 
                                                          
7 For an account of the educational and literacy-based challenges faced by black women entering public 
realms, see Jacqueline Jones Royster’s Traces of a Stream: Literacy and Social Change among African 




Trust:” “An infant crying in the night,/ an infant crying for the light;/ And with no 
language—but a cry” (i). Among the chaos of the black response to the race problem, the 
black woman has been unable to speak to her experience, and Cooper describes this 
inability first in terms of volume, “one mute and voiceless note,” and then in terms of 
expressive capacity, “no language—but a cry.” Black women face not only the challenges 
of access and audience attention, but also issues surrounding their ability to articulate the 
reality of their experiences within public contexts.  
In the process of shifting from this initial auditory conceit, Cooper further 
characterizes the absence of the black female voice in national discourse by representing 
the nation’s race crisis as a courtroom trial. Cooper contends that “one important witness 
has not yet been heard from” and that this witness is the “Black Woman.” Including this 
witness’s testimony is in the interest of the trial’s judiciary success. “It is because I 
believe the American people to be conscientiously committed to a fair trial and ungarbled 
evidence,” Cooper writes, “and because I feel it essential to a perfect understanding and 
an equitable verdict that truth from each standpoint be presented at the bar,—that this 
little Voice has been added to the already full chorus” (ii).  Here, Cooper creates a 
situation in which the voices of black women are integral to the nation’s aims and cannot 
be excluded lest American ideals be perverted. Black women in general and Cooper in 
particular are painted as significant contributors to a national public capable of upholding 
an American identity founded on the ideals of justice and equality. Importantly, black 
women only serve this function to the degree that their own identities and perspectives 
are not wholly subsumed by this predominately white and male American character. 




for them. Just as the “Caucasian barristers are not to blame if they cannot quite put 
themselves in the dark man’s place, neither should the dark man be wholly expected fully 
and adequately to reproduce the exact Voice of the Black Woman” (iii). It is the public 
performance itself, the rhetorical intervention, and not just the experiential data or 
narrative that the nation requires, and Cooper presents her essays, the textual 
manifestation of her voice, as a first step. 
Ultimately, the model that Cooper offers speaks to the production of difference 
from within existing philosophical infrastructures in ways that elucidate Du Bois’s 
project. While Cooper situates her work in terms of its contribution to the preservation of 
American ideals in the face of social challenge, she does so in a way that makes the 
public dependent upon her alternative perspective. The “open-eyed but hitherto voiceless 
Black Woman of America” offers insight that it would be un-American to ignore (ii). 
Describing this woman as “delicately sensitive at every pore to social atmospheric 
conditions,” Cooper links this insight to the black woman’s marginal position, suggesting 
that her exclusion makes her especially qualified. Vivian M. May describes this stance as 
an early approach to intersectionality which posits that the experience of marginality 
enhances one’s rhetorical authority. In terms of her own critical perspective, Cooper 
acknowledged a triptych of marginal identities: “woman,” “black,” and “Southern,” each 
of the three contributing to a valuable situatedness in ways that made it impossible to 
approach any one in isolation. Actively occupying the role of outsider or embracing the 
critical capacities supposedly strengthened by the experience of life on the social margins 
has long been a hallmark of the intellectual8. Black women like Cooper who engaged 
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similar strategies for negotiating their positions relative to their racial and gendered 
identities, therefore, provide models for negotiating such challenging rhetorical contexts. 
For Cooper, like for Du Bois, the key was to maintain the critical perspectives and 
orientations that their social experience afforded while also reframing these perspectives 
and orientations for mass audiences in ways that earned both speaker and message 
rhetorical authority.  
 
Consuming Crisis, Selling History: Washington versus Du Bois 
 While the public intellectual is a social constant, especially today given that our 
contemporary moment defines influence in terms of sustained, simultaneous engagement 
with multiple media, she is most in demand during times of social crisis. When there is 
widespread disagreement or discontent, the public intellectual has a ready audience, and 
the rhetorical exigency attending the crisis creates additional demand for the credence-
type goods she offers. In some instances, the construction of crisis is part of the public 
intellectual’s role. Intervening in inertia-driven public discourse means uncovering a 
problem requiring a solution, and this leads to the articulation of crisis narratives that 
identify and contextualize the problem relative both to its origins and to the future-
oriented action the public intellectual hopes to inspire. Crisis narratives, then, are an 
integral part of the public-intellectual product, particularly in the way that they contribute 
to a sense of intellectual authority in the process of positioning the public intellectual as 
the figure with the necessary historical knowledge and insight. Asserting that “crisis texts 
are a veritable industry,” Janet Roitman defines crisis as a “non-locus from which to 




mobilized in narrative constructions to mark out or designate ‘moments of truth’” (3), and 
the control over the moments of truth that these narratives give their public-intellectual 
authors contributes to the public intellectual’s ethos-driven rhetorical project.  
In the process of characterizing the public intellectual as an agent of distributive 
justice, Fuller emphasizes the public intellectual’s function as a “professional crisis-
monger,” thus inviting consideration of the role that the rhetorical construction of crisis 
plays in the distributive process, too (148). Crisis provides opportunity for rethinking, but 
this is only true if the crisis itself sells and creates additional demand for alternative 
perspectives and intellectual approaches. If the crisis narrative is persuasive, it will 
suggest its own solutions in the form of the values, emphases, and topoi structuring its 
arc. Historian Reinhart Koselleck has detailed the role of crisis in the ordering of 
historical periods and events. Drawing on the etymological progression of the term, he 
offers two conceptions of crisis that are oriented toward the modern period. First, is 
“crisis” as a “permanent or conditional category pointing to a critical situation which may 
constantly recur or else to situations in which decisions have momentous consequences,” 
and second is “crisis” as a “historically immanent transitional phrase,” the timing and 
effect of which “depends on the specific diagnosis offered” (372). Given the emphasis on 
historiography, crisis is relatively malleable in terms of whether it is rendered as an 
enduring unity linking historical periods or as an epochal rupture ushering in revolution 
and change. Each rendering, though, depends on associational structures of thought, and 
any functional response to the crisis must appeal to the logic of these associations.9 While 
both Du Bois and Washington responded to the crisis facing the nation as a result of 
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unmediated racial tension, each cast the crisis differently in terms of how it corresponded 
to and fit within larger histories.10 The debate between the two thinkers took the form of 
dueling crisis narratives, and each of their programs and respective modes of public 
participation reflected strategies for the preservation of the narratives’ rhetorical force 
and strengthened the relevant public-intellectual model.  
If, as I have argued, the already available models of black intellectual engagement 
structured Du Bois’s own public participation, then understanding the rhetorical efficacy 
of his intervention requires accounting for these models as they were embodied by 
Washington. As was the case with Du Bois’s, Washington’s public-intellectual model 
was inextricably linked to the educational policies that he supported, policies which 
earned him and Tuskegee wealthy white benefactors and powerful political affiliations. 
By the time Trotter founded The Guardian in 1901, Washington’s model of industrial 
education had become standard for young black men and women, rendering other models 
the exception. In “Of Mr. Booker T. Washington and Others,” which appeared as “The 
Evolution of Negro Leadership” in the July 1901 issue of The Dial, Du Bois exercised his 
historiographic faculties with a reconstruction of the conditions surrounding “the 
ascendency of Mr. Booker T. Washington,” referring to Washington’s rise to 
unprecedented power as “easily the most striking thing in the history of the American 
Negro since 1876” (Souls 34). Du Bois attributed the success of Washington’s 
“programme of industrial education, conciliation of the South, and submission and 
                                                          
10 In her reading of Anna Julia Cooper’s doctoral thesis, Vivian M. May makes similar claims about the 
revolutionary potential of historiography. By reframing the French and Haitian revolutions, Cooper 
“develops narrative strategies that allow her to push for a more three-dimensional and inclusive 
understanding of history and humanity,” and these strategies create space for non-white people as 
historically significant political actors and more fully explicate the relationships between slavery, 




silence as to civil and political rights” to the strategies it deployed in responding to and 
mediating the doubt of a divided people facing a debilitating impasse. Arriving at the 
“psychological moment when the nation was a little ashamed of having bestowed so 
much sentiment on Negroes, and was concentrating its energies on Dollars,” 
Washington’s industrial model, founded on compromise and faith in the natural 
progression toward full civic participation, addressed immediate needs and their attendant 
anxieties, thus having the forceful rhetorical advantage of meaningful exigency for both 
black and white audiences. “It startled the nation to hear a Negro advocating such a 
programme after so many decades of bitter complaint,” wrote Du Bois of Washington’s 
plan; “it startled and won the applause of the South, it interested and won the admiration 
of the North; and after a confused murmur of protest, it silenced if it did not convert 
Negroes themselves” (34-35). Appearing as a radical shift in thinking about the race 
problem from the perspective of the black population, Washington’s solution, in fact, 
reinvested in the “practical” economic concerns that had informed a large portion of 
proslavery rhetoric.11 It grounded itself in a set of values already recognized as important 
among relevant audiences. Offering some measure of assurance to those on all sides of 
the race question, the Tuskegee program appeared to many as the only viable answer, and 
its principles effectively dominated discourse on the subject of civil rights for a number 
of years.  
On the basis of the accommodationist policies to which his educational model 
adhered, Washington argued that the rights associated with full civic participation would 
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treatment of the similarities is just outside the scope of the current project, that Washington’s rhetoric 
perpetuates lines of reasoning foundational to proslavery rhetoric is nonetheless significant in terms of his 




be earned not as the result of direct debate but through productive involvement in biracial 
economic systems. According to Washington, this was especially true in the South: “The 
Negro in the South has it within his power, if he properly utilizes the force at hand, to 
make himself such a valuable factor in the life of the South that he will not have to seek 
the privileges, they will be freely conferred upon him” (485). By accepting the service 
and industrial positions already available to him, the black man could make himself as 
indispensable to the white economy as many argued he was during slavery. After proving 
his value by contributing to economic growth from these positions, the black man would 
be granted social and civil rights by the grateful white men and women already in 
possession of them. At the center of this economic program was a performative and 
exploitative acceptance of racial difference. Washington’s list of viable occupations 
reflected skill sets or characteristics that had been fostered among the “Negro race” 
historically. He claimed, for instance, that “since the bulk of our people already have a 
foundation in agriculture, they are at their best when living in the country, engaged in 
agricultural pursuit” (486). The implication was that black men and women should be 
confined to certain spheres and types of work based on race. Given Washington’s specific 
preference for potatoes over newspaper articles and orations, for commercial production 
over the “abstract eloquence that can be summoned to plead our cause” (32), the realms 
closed to black participation within his model were those which included forums for 
public discussion.  
In contrast to Du Bois and his particularly ambivalent relationship to the 
authenticity associated with the specific intellectual, Washington, whom Posnock 




a mode of self-representation rooted in a black identity and community.12 Additionally, 
Washington’s concern with industrial training largely aligned with Gramsci’s treatment 
of the division of labor as a central component of organic-intellectual work, and 
Washington himself effectively embodied Gramsci’s conception of the organic 
intellectual as “constructor and organizer” of economic production (Prison 10). 
Returning to Posnock’s characterization of the specific or organic intellectual as the 
preferred model, we might also read Washington’s unparalleled influence as evidence of 
this preference as it informed black intellectual development.  
The contexts surrounding Du Bois’s public participation in the movement for 
racial uplift makes a market-based model a productive means of assessing this 
participation through the lens of public-intellectual work. Du Bois’s public-intellectual 
participation was in direct competition with Washington’s, and addressing this 
competition in terms of public supply and demand frames the two very different models 
on the basis of the comparable symbolic goods each produced. Such an approach puts Du 
Bois’s more universal model on equal footing with Washington’s more specific model 
and speaks to the potential for Du Bois’s model to function just as publicly on the basis 
of its persuasive symbolic power. In addition to negotiating the influence of the Gramsci-
Foucault preference for organic or specific intellectual labor, economic models offer a 
means of interpreting the relationship between the distinct public-intellectual models that 
Du Bois and Washington deployed and the educational policies each supported. Posner’s 
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necessary to address the issue of their relationship to other black Americans because the desire for organic 
intellectuals still persists and tends to attach itself to these ‘authentic’ voices from the African American 




contention that “public-intellectual work could be seen as constituting a market and a 
career and could be analyzed in economic and sociological terms and compared with 
other markets and other careers” frames the production of public-intellectual work so that 
it can be considered alongside the more traditional economic production associated with 
Washington’s Tuskegee plan (2). This comparison attends to the relevant training and 
skill sets associated with each mode of production, inviting consideration of how the two 
competing educational programs prepared young black men and women for certain types 
of public participation and of how each type of public participation reflected back on the 
public-intellectual model associated with it.  
While Washington built his educational policy on the belief that social equality 
could only be achieved on the basis of industry-related proficiency, Trotter and Du Bois 
saw more value in rhetorically conscious self-representation in public realms and 
supported education that trained men and women to participate in these realms, believing 
that it was from such participation—and not from the fields or factories—that competent 
and persuasive leaders would emerge. Just as Trotter saw potential in the well-educated 
and rhetorically competent Du Bois, Du Bois saw potential in similarly trained black 
youth. Offering his “Talented Tenth” model as an alternative to Washington’s Tuskegee 
program, Du Bois argued that providing one in ten young black men and women with a 
college education and training them to function as capable teachers and leaders would be 
more effective than preparing them for trades. Du Bois conceded that industrial training 
had its benefits, but he was quick to differentiate between “the temporary and contingent 
in the Negro problem” and “the broader question of the permanent uplifting and 




right to inquire, as this enthusiasm for material advancement mounts to its height, if after 
all the industrial school is the final and sufficient answer in the training of the Negro 
race” (Souls 65). While Washington’s educational model might have addressed the 
immediate needs of the country, and particularly of the South, Du Bois’s model aspired to 
more sustainable progress, placing the burden of such advancement on the ability of the 
race’s most gifted to assume positions of public leadership.   
In so responding to Washington’s model, Du Bois challenged the foundational 
premise that black men and women were to be confined to certain social roles and 
allowed to influence matters of social equality only indirectly. Characterizing the 
dominant modes of thinking about race that resulted from Washington’s program, Du 
Bois wrote that “race-prejudices, which keep brown and black men in their ‘places,’ we 
are coming to regard as useful allies…no matter how much they may dull the ambition 
and sicken the hearts of struggling human beings.” Viewing race-prejudices as useful in 
the ways Washington’s model encouraged, Du Bois added, had made common the belief 
that “an education that encourages aspiration, that sets the loftiest of ideals and seeks as 
an end culture and character rather than bread-winning , is the privilege of white men and 
the danger and delusion of black” (Souls 65). Du Bois, however, saw just such an 
education as the only possible means of securing political rights and achieving an 
enduring racial equality.  
At the center of Du Bois’s educational model was his conception of “culture,” 
which he argued was the crucial component of racial uplift.  In “Of Our Spiritual 
Strivings,” a revised version of an article published in the Atlantic Monthly in 1897, he 




“this, then, is the end of our striving: to be a co-worker in the kingdom of culture, to 
escape both death and isolation, to husband and use his best powers and his latent genius” 
(Souls 71). In this context, cultural production was figured as a means of mediating and 
moving beyond the limitations of racial difference, as a way of contributing to human, 
rather than race-based, achievement. While Du Bois never explicitly defined the forms 
that this cultural production and progress should take beyond equating it with a college 
education and “the sovereign human soul that seeks to know itself and the world about it; 
that seeks a freedom for expansion and self-development” (73), he did describe the 
privilege that his own education and cultural growth had afforded him. “I sit with 
Shakespeare and he winces not,” wrote Du Bois. “Across the color line I move arm in 
arm with Balzac and Dumas…I summon Aristotle and Aurelius and what soul I will, and 
they come all graciously with no scorn nor condescension. So, wed with Truth, I dwell 
above the Veil” (74). In so rendering the results of his educational experience, Du Bois 
characterizes it as communion with an intellectual lineage typically denied to black men 
and women. Having pursued the greater Truth, a truth like that associated with universal 
intellectual work, Du Bois lives above “the Veil” that separates the white world from the 
black and, despite the color of his skin, is welcomed by the patriarchs of a European 
cultural tradition. 
In addition to characterizing the pursuit of culture in terms commensurate with a 
more universal mode of intellectual work, this description of Du Bois’s own experience 
traces a cultural ancestry specifically through writers and rhetoricians. Given his 
emphasis on being a “co-worker in the kingdom of culture,” in actively laboring above 




the form of written rhetoric can be read as part of a conscious effort to further cement his 
connection to the prominent historical figures whose legacies he invokes. In this sense, 
Du Bois’s rhetorical skill, his being able to express the Truth with which he was wed, is a 
primary condition for his active participation in this cultural tradition. The particular 
mode of public-intellectual work in which he was engaged, then, can be read as one of 
the desired ends of the educational model he supported.  
While this understanding of culture requires further analysis of the particular 
rhetorical skills Du Bois himself employed, it also emphasizes the differences between 
Du Bois’s educational model and Washington’s based on the skill sets necessary for 
productive “work” in each. For Washington, work took a more traditional form, and 
trade-based education provided black men and women with the skills they needed to 
contribute economically. For Du Bois, work was figured as cultural, rather than 
economic, production and required intellectual exercise and the related expressive talents. 
The persuasiveness of each conception depended upon a particular teleological approach 
that rendered the needs of the current moment in terms of a history that suggested its own 
future. Importantly, the educational model espoused by Washington within the context of 
this historiographically determined public-intellectual participation effectively limited 
possibilities for additional public-intellectual participation. Whereas Washington himself 
might have been capable of producing functional symbolic goods, the same could not be 
said for all of the men and women trained at Tuskegee, who would have been more adept 
at tending the fields or keeping homes and were encouraged by Washington to avoid 
forums dedicated to public deliberation.13 In this way, Washington’s model created a 
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closed market in which his voice dominated, while the educational model that Trotter and 
Du Bois preferred had the potential to cultivate in black youth the expressive skills active 
participation required.  
In establishing Du Bois’s model of public-intellectual work and educational 
programs as viable alternatives to Washington’s, Du Bois and Trotter contended with this 
closed market model that Washington had constructed. Founded as “an organ which is to 
voice intelligently the needs and aspirations of the colored American” (qtd. in Fox 30), 
Trotter’s Guardian sought to create a forum capable of sustaining public discussion of 
social and civil rights. In Trotter’s estimation, the absence of such active forums was one 
of the conditions underlying Washington’s unprecedented influence. In a December 1902 
editorial entitled “Why be silent?,” Trotter admonished the black institutions and 
individuals he held responsible for this debilitating lack of discursive activity. Implicating 
writers and editors associated with other black periodicals, Trotter claimed that the 
“Negro race” had effectively “endorsed” Washington’s statements “by its silence,” and 
he expressed disappointment that it “occurs to none that silence is tantamount to being 
virtually an accomplice in the treasonable act of this Benedict Arnold of the Negro race” 
(501). As his economically-minded policies continued to earn Washington and Tuskegee 
wealth and influence, public expressions of disagreement certainly carried risk, but 
Trotter maintained that such risk was necessary if true social equality were to become 
reality; his own arrest at a public meeting of the Boston branch of the National Negro 
Business League at which Washington spoke in 1903 attested to this commitment.  
                                                                                                                                                                             
fallacy, intellectuals succumb to “the universal danger that resides in speaking for others: which is to 
disregard the inevitable hiatus between representers and represented, or the specific sociological 




Despite being less extreme in his objections initially, Du Bois agreed with Trotter 
that the lack of public debate surrounding strategies for uplift as a result of Washington’s 
celebrity was a serious limitation. In “The Evolution of Negro Leadership,” Du Bois 
made similar claims about the danger of silence in the face of Washington’s work, and he 
identified specific groups and individuals whom he knew to disagree with Washington 
but who had remained publically reticent. The first of these groups was a “small but not 
unimportant” group “who represent the old ideas of revolt and revenge,” but Du Bois was 
more concerned with the second group, a “large and important group represented by 
Dunbar, Tanner, Chesnutt, Miller, and the Grimkes.” Although this second group was 
“without any single definite programme, and with complex aims,” they “seek 
nevertheless that self-development and self-realization in all lines of human endeavor 
which they believe will eventually place the Negro beside the other races” (94). In the 
revised essay that appears in The Souls of Black Folk, Du Bois lists the Grimkes, Kelly 
Miller, and J.W.E. Bowen as the representatives of this second group, but in both 
versions Du Bois’s second group is a group of black intellectuals similar to Du Bois 
himself, well-educated men associated with academic institutions and involved in 
pedagogical practice.  
According to this characterization, it is no surprise that Du Bois’s intellectuals 
challenged Washington’s program based on their belief “in the higher education of Fisk 
and Atlanta Universities,” “in self-assertion and ambition” and “in the right of suffrage 
for blacks on the same terms with whites” and that they saw the Tuskegee model as 
largely foreclosing opportunities for such achievements (94). Albeit relatively 




group of intellectuals not in the racialized terms associated with Washington’s 
educational model, but in terms of universal human achievement similar to those 
employed in his discussion of culture. Arguing that all “lines of human endeavor,” not 
just those available during slavery, be open to black men and women and seeking full 
political participation not as a result of programs rooted in racial difference but on the 
basis of “true” equality, Du Bois’s rendering of the intellectuals associated with his 
second group exhibits his universal-intellectual leanings. This mode of intellectual 
engagement with the problems of the color line, however, remained, as Du Bois reminds 
readers, largely unvoiced in the public realm, opposing Washington’s program only from 
behind closed doors. 
Given the particular structure of Washington’s accomodationist model, the silence 
to which Trotter and Du Bois objected did, indeed, signify complicity. Washington 
argued that social equality was not to be obtained directly, through debate or public 
protest. Thus, an unwillingness to engage in discussions of social equality, even to the 
relatively minor extent of offering an alternative model, aligned with Washington’s 
objectives.14 On the basis of the Tuskegee model, the ideal representative of the black 
race was the industrious man who worked hard and produced goods or capital that 
circulated within and contributed to a biracial economic system. It was unlikely that such 
a man would have access to or be prepared to participate in the vigorous public forums 
Trotter imagined, and he was certainly not the type of man Du Bois would count among 
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the black intellectuals of his second group. With Washington as his spokesperson, 
however, this man needed not to speak for himself; he required neither access to public 
forums nor the rhetorical skill required to make use of such access. In contrast, the ideal 
black leader for whom Trotter and Du Bois advocated depended upon both. While Trotter 
argued for the importance of public forums like newspapers and other periodicals, Du 
Bois advocated for the active participation of the intellectual community, but neither 
would be influential on its own. If public silence on matters of social equality was to be a 
marker of Washington’s model, then public expression was a central mode of anti-
Washingtonian action, and if this action was to come from the intellectual community, 
academic achievement alone would not be enough. What became important was that Du 
Bois’s model of black intellectualism find a public face and that this public face be in 
public demand and able to circulate freely within the public sphere.  
Demand for public-intellectual work comes most directly from editors and 
publishers, as was the case with Trotter’s soliciting statements from Du Bois, but the 
underlying requirement is that there be a matter of public concern on which there is no 
academic consensus, or “right answer,” but to which academic knowledge might apply 
(Posner 45). Given the prominence of Washington’s program, the first task for both 
Trotter and Du Bois was to deconstruct the façade of consensus to which the 
aforementioned public silence contributed. While Du Bois certainly played a part in this 
process, Trotter’s more aggressive methods were most effective in calling attention to the 
fact that there was debate surrounding Washington’s model. Stephen A. Fox notes the 
challenges Trotter faced in acquainting the public with the central objections to 




arrest as a significant moment that forced a number of news outlets, both black and white, 
to finally recognize the reality of anti-Washingtonian sentiment (49). The more widely 
accepted it was that there was no consensus surrounding the issue of racial uplift from the 
perspective of black Americans, the greater the demand for a variety of public-
intellectual work on the issue, and it was this demand, once established, that Du Bois’s 
work could fill.  
As previously mentioned, however, establishing public demand for alternative 
models of public-intellectual work was important to Du Bois’s public participation, but 
not in itself enough to guarantee that his participation would be effective. While the 
ideological content of Washington’s message was fairly well-received by a range of 
audiences, appealing to the immediate needs of the country and trading on a number of 
commonly held assumptions that already circulated within public discourse, Du Bois’s 
model required that the nation’s thinking about race undergo a significant paradigm shift. 
Du Bois faced the additional challenge of directly confronting not only Washington’s 
model, but also the long history of racial prejudice in which Washington’s model was 
complicit. In her work on Harlem Renaissance periodicals, Anne Elizabeth Carroll argues 
that black writers and editors were engaged in projects similar to Du Bois’s, constructing 
alternative textual representations of black identity to counter a long history of racist 
stereotypes that were created and circulated by the American popular press. Beginning in 
the eighteenth century, negative representations of black men and women were widely 
disseminated in books, newspapers, and other print-based mediums, many of them being 
used to justify slavery and racial violence. These text-based representations, Carroll 




and as incapable of significant intellectual, economic, or moral advancement, and thus 
incapable of assimilation” (5-6). Given the rate at with which these messages 
accumulated and circulated, particularly among white readers, they were extremely 
persuasive. They constructed an image of a black population that was “so significantly 
behind white Americans in intellectual development and so without a cultural past that 
they could make no contributions to American culture or society” (6), an image that black 
artists, editors, and patrons confronted during the Harlem Renaissance and continued to 
confront for many years after. While Du Bois’s influence on the development of black 
artistic expression during the Harlem Renaissance has received a good amount of 
scholarly attention, much of which focuses on the literary work he published during his 
tenure as editor of The Crisis, less attention has been paid to the ways in which his earlier 
public-intellectual work, his essays in particular, negotiated similar challenges in terms of 
representing black men and women.  
The assumption that black men and women were incapable of acting as “co-
workers in the kingdom of culture” because of an innate intellectual inferiority was the 
exact type of racial prejudice that Du Bois’s faith in higher education challenged. 
Arguing that black men and women were not excluded from participating in the 
development of American culture on the basis of essential or natural deficiencies, but 
rather due to a long-standing social conditioning resulting from the lack of adequate 
opportunities for education and intellectual development, Du Bois effectively 
reconfigured racial inequality as the result of a national literacy crisis. Representing the 
issue in this way emphasized the failings of Washington’s program; if the issue was the 




and women to the social roles granted them during slavery would change very little. The 
most effective solution and the one that spoke most directly to the problem as Du Bois 
represented it was to provide the black Americans with access to an education that would 
enable their full participation in cultural production and, ultimately, citizenship 
practices.15 Based on his rendering of the problem, Du Bois himself became one version 
of the solution. Because of his own educational background and efforts in cultural 
production, Du Bois was not only the most vocal proponent of this particular model of 
racial uplift, but also the leading example of the model’s potential.  
Due to this conflation of product and producer, Du Bois consistently confronted 
challenges associated with what Posnock refers to as the “threatening oxymoron” of 
black intellectualism. Just as public-intellectual work within Posner’s model depends on a 
characteristically ethos-driven rhetoric dominated by appeals to authority, many of the 
earliest attempts at positive textual representations of black Americans relied on the 
strength of their writers’ reputation and backstory. Within the genre of the slave 
narrative, for instance, authorship was rigorously interrogated. As Carroll explains, 
portraits of the former slave responsible for the account were considered a requirement of 
the genre because they verified the text’s authenticity (9). Within this particular mode of 
ethos-based appeal, however, the efficacy of the argument presented by the written work 
still depended on racial difference and essentialist notions of abilities shared on the basis 
                                                          
15 In their work on Ida B. Wells-Barnett, Royster and Cochran and Maegan Parker consider how arguments 
similarly grounded in discourses of citizenship contributed to her anti-lynching campaign. Representing 
themselves as full citizens contributing to American culture, black men and women could emphasize the 
“disconnect between the national belief in America as the land of the free and the home of the brave and 
the national policy and practice, which permitted mob rule against its citizens to go uncontested” (Royster 
and Cochran 220). Additionally, Parker contends that the debate between Wells and Frances E. Willard 
over lynching was directly related to concerns over the expansion of citizenship in the face of both the 15th 
Amendment and the women’s suffrage movement. In both of these cases, Wells arguments against racial 
violence depend upon new understandings of citizenship within a newly emerging and controversial 




of racial identity; the author’s own identity as a black man or woman determined whether 
the narrative effectively spoke to the potential of the race as a whole and, thus, whether it 
functioned persuasively as it circulated among a primarily white readership. Deriving 
persuasive power from a sense of racial authenticity, such representations were more in 
line with Washington’s model of public-intellectual work than with Du Bois’s, but Du 
Bois’s public-intellectual work necessarily confronted the audience-based expectations of 
authenticity to which many similar textual representations, both past and current, 
responded.   
 Over the course of his early career, Du Bois’s own racial identity contributed to 
ethos-based appeals that functioned much like the images of Phyllis Wheatley in the act 
of writing or of Frederick Douglass’s “authentic” signature that travelled with each 
writer’s respective work.  Despite his adherence to an intellectualism capable of erasing 
racial difference in the interest of universal human endeavor, race never ceased to 
influence the reception of his work. In responding to a speech Du Bois delivered at an 
event for the Boston Literary Association in 1903, Trotter wrote that “the presence of this 
educated Negro must have won over every one present to the positive advocacy of the 
higher education of the race, through Prof. Du Bois said nothing of the subject” (qtd. in 
Rudwick 68). In this case, Du Bois’s intellectual work could not be divorced from his 
racial identity. In fact, his status as an “educated Negro” and the way that this status 
appealed to the significance of higher education replaced the message he actually 
delivered, speaking more loudly than his own words. Shirley Wilson Logan addresses 
similar responses to the oratorical performances of Frances Ellen Watkins Harper, noting 




century Black speakers as if those reactions originated solely within a group of self-
regulated hearers responding to passive subjects” (21). Rather than responding to the 
content of the speaker’s message, a large portion of such reports recounted the visual and 
auditory characteristics of the delivery, including the speaker’s physical presence as well 
as his or her control over language. Given that speakers like Harper challenged the very 
racial stereotypes or assumed deficiencies that effectively disqualified black men and 
women from public performance, a number of these reports reveal the audiences’ efforts 
to reconcile expectation with reality. As Logan describes, one common solution was to 
“praise the performance as the exception that proved the rule of inferiority,” and another 
was to “call into question the identity of the performer” (27). Both of these strategies 
were applied to Harper. Some reports of her performances responded with surprise to her 
composure and intellect, remarking with disgust that such a woman might have lived as a 
slave. Others denied her race or gender in their descriptions of her; Logan provides an 
example that refers to Harper as “not colored” but “painted” (27), diction which reflects 
the respect for craft and purposeful artistry that attended nineteenth-century conceptions 
of oratory generally.  
While these two modes of audience response did challenge assumptions of racial 
inferiority, they did so in ways that either acknowledged an exceptionality in the 
performer that might not immediately carry over to the race as a whole or that linked the 
performance to an element of identity that distanced the performer from his or her race or 
gender. Neither of these responses necessarily opened the public sphere to other voices, 
unless the power of those voices could be understood in similarly conservative ways. For 




difference in ways that were less easily co-opted or explained away. One way of 
approaching the symbolic production of black writers working during this time is in 
terms of how text-based strategies that gave the performer more control over the 
relationship between identity and argument were deployed in the service of creating a 
more inclusive public sphere. Pushing against traditional genres and constructing a public 
rhetorical space for the black body and voice by forcefully subverting audience 
expectations, such work provides insight into the strategies available to intellectuals who 
negotiate similarly challenging publics today. 
First published only months before Trotter’s arrest brought real attention to the 
anti-Washingtonian movement, Du Bois’s The Souls of Black Folk, his most prominent 
piece of text-based public-intellectual work, can be seen as reacting to the conditions 
outlined above. A collection of thirteen essays, nine of which had known former lives in 
periodicals, and a single short story, Souls addressed the condition of black Americans at 
the turn of the century, reaching across conventional genres and methodologies in order 
to do so. In his exhaustive biographical study of Du Bois, David Levering Lewis defines 
the book as “an electrifying manifesto, mobilizing a people for bitter, prolonged struggle 
to win a place in history” (277), a description that attests to the collection’s 
unprecedented influence in the years following its appearance. One of the book’s most 
significant contributions was its aforementioned treatment of “double-consciousness,” a 
persuasive and enduring framework for understanding the complex experience of black 
men and women in America. “It is a peculiar sensation, this double-consciousness,” 
writes Du Bois, “this sense of always looking at one’s self through the eyes of others.” 




thoughts, two reconciled strivings; two warring ideals in one dark body, whose dogged 
strength alone keeps it from being torn asunder” (11). Caught between his black identity 
and white society, the black American is “gifted with second sight” (10), a cognitive 
rupture that allows him to see himself both from within and from without.  
In addition to functioning as a central metaphor within the context of Souls, the 
principle of double-consciousness influences the rhetorical construction of the book 
itself. Susan Wells argues that “double consciousness was also a technique of writing, 
shaping the ironic and urgent voice of the book, by turns indignant and tender, eloquent 
and colloquial, a form of double address to both African American and Caucasian readers 
that allowed Du Bois to be in two places at once” (120). Double-consciousness as a 
communicative methodology allows for a particular model of the racial transcendence 
that Du Bois linked to more universal modes of intellectual work, especially given that 
the cognitive effect would be most forcefully felt among those participating in 
universities and other dominantly white institutions. If, as Wells argues, the book’s 
formal enactment of double-consciousness contributes to a “discursive mobility” that 
allows Du Bois to speak with a single voice to a double audience, to speak above the 
racial particular, the function of the symbolic good itself might be capable of 
characterizing the public utility of the more universal intellectual. “If African Americans 
were veiled off from a public sphere,” Wells writes, “double consciousness meant for 
them a painful awareness of what went on in the discursive space they were forbidden to 
inhabit bodily, a space that Du Bois’s writing entered and transformed” (130)16. Elizabeth 
                                                          
16 Melvin L. Rogers characterizes this transformation in terms of how the work empowers its audience. For 
Rogers, Souls crafts a relationship between sympathy and shame that strengthens its audience’s power of 
judgment. Importantly, this influence is not manipulative or overly directive. Rather, it emerges from a 




Alexander makes a similar case concerning how Anna Julia Cooper’s written work 
moves among various linguistic modes, effecting a double-voicedness by switching 
between first-person and third and crafting a hybrid text that exists between “the first-
person confessional of the slave narrative or spiritual autobiography and the third-person 
imperative of political essays” (338). Such work achieves in its rhetorical structure 
identification and dissociation simultaneously. The symbolic good produced by the 
aspiring universal intellectual, then, has the capacity to go where the intellectual cannot 
and to do work the intellectual himself cannot do; it can employ a rhetoric of the 
universal and aspire to labor within the realms of Truth and Knowledge, but in the 
process, it might influence the realms of the real and the particular. Through the 
discursive mobility afforded the in-demand symbolic good, Du Bois’s black intellectual 
makes progress toward “the end of his striving: to be a co-worker in the kingdom of 
culture” (Souls 11). 
 
From the Classroom to The Crisis: Barrett Wendell, Du Bois, and the Education of the 
Intellectual  
Even within the contexts of written rhetoric, the relationship among Du Bois’s 
model of ethos-based rhetorical production, his own racial identity, and his conception of 
the universal intellectual remained fraught. While the resulting tension remains evident in 
much of his work and its reception, Du Bois’s rhetorical style can be read as an attempt at 
                                                                                                                                                                             
rhetorical persuasion, noting that manipulation moves a listener to adopt beliefs inconsistent with his or her 
own reasoning or thinking, thus violating what Rogers calls an “identifiability condition: Persons who are 
manipulated cannot recognize themselves in the belief that they now come to hold. And it is this violation 
that undermines one’s reflective agency.” On the other hand, true persuasion requires that an audience “will 
assent to the particular views in question as being their own, so that they will comport their political and 




mediation, particularly when traced to the training in composition he received while one 
of few black students at Harvard University. After graduating from Fisk University in 
1888, Du Bois travelled north to pursue the Harvard education he had always dreamed of, 
but based on the many written descriptions of his time there, his experience of 
Cambridge’s ivy-covered campus was less than idyllic. Consistently confronting racial 
tension and carefully negotiating his relationships with white and black students alike, Du 
Bois focused his energy on his studies and coursework, but in some cases even this 
required that he be particularly attentive to the ways in which the act of mediating racial 
difference inflected the college’s academic expectations, which proved to be exactly the 
case in his classes in composition and rhetoric.  
 In “A Negro Student at Harvard at the End of the 19th Century,” an essay 
published in The Massachusetts Review in 1960, Du Bois reflects on his experience at 
Harvard, dedicating a relatively significant portion of the piece to his composition and 
rhetoric coursework. Despite the relative ease with which Du Bois completed the 
majority of his classes after having already completed his degree at Fisk, he writes that “it 
was in English that I came nearest my Waterloo at Harvard.” In contextualizing the 
difficulty he had in his first composition course, Du Bois explains that he had 
“unwittingly arrived at Harvard in the midst of a violent controversy about poor English 
among students,” noting that “a number of fastidious scholars like Barrett Wendell, the 
great pundit of Harvard English, had come to Harvard about this time” and that “New 
England itself was getting sensitive over western slang and southern drawls and general 
ignorance of grammar” (450). As a result of such issues, freshman English had become 




junior, was exempt from the requirement. These conditions, Du Bois suggests, set the 
stage for what he remembers as the singular and most shocking academic failure of his 
many years as a student and scholar.  
What Du Bois describes as a “violent controversy” was the result of a perceived 
literacy crisis not completely unrelated to that which Du Bois himself believed to be the 
cause of racial inequality. In 1879, Harvard’s Adams S. Hill, who would hold the 
Boylston Chair of Rhetoric by the time Du Bois attended the school, publicly decried the 
fact that the majority of student writing that instructors encountered was “disfigured by 
bad spelling, confusing punctuation, ungrammatical, obscure, ambiguous, or inelegant 
expression” and contended that many college graduates were incapable of producing 
written work without “making blunders which would disgrace a boy twelve years old” 
(qtd. in Connors 185). In part, this crisis was seen as connected to the larger than normal 
influx of new and first-generation students from more diverse backgrounds that enrolled 
in colleges and universities following the Civil War. “From the province of a small group 
of elite students,” writes Robert J. Connors of the transition, “college education became, 
during this time, much more available to the masses. The colleges were flooded with 
students who needed to be taught to write, who needed to be taught correctness in 
writing, who needed to know forms, and who could be run through the system in great 
numbers” (9). The result of these changes was a drastic shift in university curriculum that 
many contemporary composition scholars identify as the source of current models of 
writing instruction and which led to the ascendancy of a mode of rhetorical instruction 
referred to today as “current-traditional.” At the center of current-traditional rhetoric’s 




and identity, and these issues were exactly those Du Bois confronted in the his 
composition class.   
Current-traditional rhetoric addressed the needs of overworked instructors 
contending with overwhelmingly large groups of students by focusing largely on issues 
of style and surface correctness, thus speaking directly to Hill’s characterization of the 
literacy crisis the nation faced. As a rhetorical mode, however, current-traditional rhetoric 
carried with it a set of epistemological assumptions, discourse rules, and characterizations 
of the public sphere, and these attendant principles are what can be seen as having most 
influenced Du Bois’s own rhetorical style and model of intellectual production. Due to 
the transition from instruction in oral rhetoric, which required more time and 
individualized instruction than the conditions that Connors describes allowed, to 
instruction in written rhetoric, instructors turned from more traditional rhetorical treatises 
to composition textbooks tailored to writing instruction. Meant to streamline teaching by 
excising the now unnecessary canons of memory (memoria) and delivery (actio), such a 
transition also distanced current-traditional rhetoric from other elements of its rhetorical 
heritage. Offering an example of this very process, James A. Berlin contends that the 
American imitations of the rhetorical treatises of George Campbell and Hugh Blair, 
imitations written by early compositionists such as Harvard’s own A.S. Hill and 
Amherst’s John Genung favored a strictly positivist epistemology. “In this approach,” he 
writes, “truth in written discourse is conceived exclusively in empirical and rational 
terms” (8). The view of written discourse Berlin describes here, in combination with the 
large class sizes, also popularized and justified the pedagogical practices associated with 




and returned for correction. Such practices further conflated rhetorical instruction with 
exercises in grammar and other means of producing writing that  was “correct” and, 
therefore, linguistically neutral.  
In his assessment of the various epistemological models underlying the three 
primary categories of rhetoric, Berlin classifies current-traditional rhetoric within the 
class of “objective rhetorics,” theories of rhetoric which adhere to a positivist 
epistemology and which, thus, define truth as knowledge that can be located in the 
material world and empirically verified. On the basis of this epistemological structure, 
such rhetorics characterize discourse as a neutral process requiring that the rhetor 
accurately transmit the experience of truth so as to recreate the experience for the 
audience. Given that truth and knowledge are located in the experience itself and pre-
exist the communicative act, all elements of the communicative act have the potential to 
interfere with accurate transmission. To limit the potential for interference or distortion, 
both rhetors and audience must be neutral and objective, and language must function only 
as a “transparent device” (7-8). Providing a similar characterization of the rhetorical 
mode, Patricia Roberts-Miller contends that current-traditional rhetoric assumed a liberal 
public sphere structured by the “Enlightenment values of civility, rationality, neutrality, 
and autonomy” and in which “a good argument is presented in a rational, decorous, 
impartial manner, and appeals to universal principles” (18-19). As is the case with 
Berlin’s description, the success of a communicative act in Roberts-Miller’s requires that 
the inherent truth of the message be preserved in the process of communication. Both 
theorists, then, describe a system in which neutrality and objectivity are key. On the basis 




colleges with a necessary means of confronting an increasingly diverse student 
population. Grounded in positivist and Enlightenment values, current-traditional rhetoric 
lent itself to the discourses of equality and inclusion underlying mass education. In her 
assessment of current-traditional rhetoric as the “pedagogical enactment of liberal 
political theory,” Roberts-Miller considers that “the pedagogical tenacity of current-
traditional rhetoric may well be the result of people’s desire not to abandon the goal of a 
rational, critical, and inclusive form of policy discourse” (18). Understood in these terms, 
current-traditional rhetoric promises a mode of discourse accessible to all, requiring only 
knowledge of conventions and the ability to remain neutral and objective—neither of 
which are necessarily impossible on the basis of socioeconomic, gender, or racial 
difference. 
When Du Bois first encountered this mode of rhetorical instruction, however, he 
was unaware of the relevant discourse rules and unsure of how to communicate the 
messages he wanted to communicate within them. In describing the challenge, Du Bois 
wrote that “I was at the point in my intellectual development when the content rather than 
the form of my writing was to me of prime importance. Words and ideas surged in my 
mind and spilled out with disregard of exact accuracy in grammar, taste in word or 
restraint in style.” In this sense, Du Bois own immediate interest in expressive production 
conflicted with the college’s concern with linguistic “accuracy” and neutrality, and his 
writing style, by the college’s standards, required refinement.  “I knew the Negro 
problem,” he added, “and this was more important to me than literary form” (450). In 
further reflecting on his trouble with his first composition course, Du Bois recounts the 




I knew grammar fairly well, and I had a pretty wide vocabulary; but I was bitter, 
angry and intemperate in my first thesis. Naturally my English instructors had no 
idea of nor interest in the way in which Southern attacks on the Negro were 
scratching me on the raw flesh…Senator Morgan of Alabama has just published a 
scathing attack on “niggers” in a leading magazine, when my first Harvard thesis 
was due. I let go at him with no holds barred. My long and blazing effort came 
back marked “E”—not passed! 
Given Du Bois’s own investment in the “Negro problem” and the bitterness and anger he 
felt in regard to the situation during his time at Harvard, it is, perhaps, no surprise that his 
first theme did not adhere to the college’s standards of objectivity and linguistic 
neutrality by which they judged a piece of writing successful. In order to succeed under 
the current-traditional model of composition instruction, Du Bois needed to find a means 
of mediating his investment in his message and the college’s investment in particular 
stylistic expectations. 
 Ever the dedicated student, Du Bois was committed to learning from the 
experience of failing his first theme and worked tirelessly to eventually pass the class 
with a “C.” Over the course of the term, Du Bois “realized that while style is subordinate 
to content…solid content with literary style carries a message further than poor grammar 
and muddled syntax” (451), thus seeing the prime value in the current-traditional 
rhetorical mode as being its ability to “carry” a message further and potentially earn the 
message an audience otherwise unavailable to its author. Important, however, is the fact 
that “style” in this context remains tied to a perceived objectivity and neutrality, which at 




male. In this sense, Du Bois can be seen as having arrived at an appreciation of a style 
that could be seen as distinct from his message on the basis of its ability to assume an 
explicitly racial neutrality.  
 Having arrived at this appreciation, Du Bois elected to continue his training in 
composition and rhetoric and enrolled in Barrett Wendell’s English 12 in the fall of 1890. 
In the same 1960 Massachusetts Review essay, Du Bois includes the nearly full text of a 
theme he submitted to Wendell and which Wendell chose to read aloud to the class. The 
fact that Du Bois had kept the theme and then dedicated half a page of his article to it 
more than fifty years later speaks to the significance of the achievement in Du Bois’s 
eyes and suggests that the rhetorical training he received was, in fact, both memorable 
and influential. The theme, included below as Du Bois included it, describes Du Bois’s 
reasons for enrolling in the Wendell’s course: 
Spurred by my circumstances, I have always been given to systematically 
planning my future, not indeed without mistakes and frequent alterations, but 
always with what I now conceive to have been a strangely early and deep 
appreciation of the fact that to live is a serious thing. I determined while in high 
school to go to college—partly because other men did, partly because I foresaw 
that such discipline would best fit me for life…I believe, foolishly perhaps, but 
sincerely, that I have something to say to the world, and I have taken English 12 
in order to say it well. (451) 
While not responding to an issue necessarily related to the “Negro problem” and, 
therefore, treating a potentially less challenging topic in terms of mediating content and 




results from its avoidance of race. Given Du Bois’s previous education at Fisk, his later 
work on the Talented Tenth model, and his experience of racial difference at Harvard, it 
would not be unexpected that race factor into his discussion of his attending the 
University and of his choice of classes. On the basis of this theme, however, Du Bois 
could be mistaken for any one of his white classmates. While his “circumstances” and the 
“something” he has to say to the world might refer to race-related elements of his life and 
education, the theme itself, existing as a textual representation of its author, is effectively 
whitewashed as a result of its objective style. 
 If Du Bois’s inclusion of the theme in the retrospective essay is a sign of its 
significance to him as both an achievement and as a learning experience, it becomes 
necessary to consider the particular influence that Barrett Wendell had on Du Bois’s 
rhetorical development. Often in line with the rhetorical theories of Hill and Amherst’s 
John Genung, Barrett’s own work was founded on a conception of the elements and 
qualities of styles. The elements of style referred the components of written discourse 
(words, sentences, paragraphs, and whole compositions), while the qualities of style 
described the character of the written work (clearness, force, elegance). In his English 
Composition, which consisted of eight lectures he delivered at the Lowell Institution in 
1891 and which was published in the form of a textbook in 1908, he defines style as the 
“expression of thought or emotion in written words” and argues that its purpose is to 
convey “the thought and emotion of every living being…an immaterial reality, eternally 
different from every other in the universe” (6-7). On the basis of this definition, he adds 
that “the task of the writer, then, is a far more subtle and wonderful thing than we are apt 




eternally immaterial reality” (7). In this sense, style becomes the means by which the 
“eternal difference” of every individual’s experience can be given form and 
communicated to others. Within this description, current-traditional rhetoric and its 
concern with style is characterized as a means of encouraging true communication 
capable of moving beyond the limiting experience of difference and facilitating shared 
understanding.  
 Given Du Bois’s experience of racial difference during his time at Harvard and 
his later characterization of the soul unmarked by race that transcends physical confines 
and lives above the Veil, Wendell’s sense of composition as the construction of a 
“material body” for individual experience was likely compelling. In such a model, written 
rhetoric gave Du Bois the tools for a productive self-fashioning in the sense that the 
textual body he created could, in theory, communicate what his physical body could not. 
Returning to the efforts of Harlem Renaissance artists to re-represent black men and 
women through visual and verbal art, this engagement with written rhetoric can be read 
as a similar effort, but one in which the racial particular would more readily give way to 
an unraced, human universal. Such an approach to rhetorical style within the context of 
intellectual production, however, would undoubtedly call attention to the ways in which 
the textually mediated body remains, to use Wendell’s words, “an imperfect symbol,” 
contributing to the duality of self-awareness that Du Bois’s refers to as “double-
consciousness.” 
In the end, assessing Du Bois’s contributions to the movement for racial uplift 
from the perspective of public-intellectual work accounts for how Du Bois negotiated the 




respond to the “Tuskegee Machine,” Du Bois could not merely counter Washington’s 
programs and their underlying ideologies. Rather, effective response required that he and 
Trotter challenge Washington’s dominant rhetorical mode and means of representation: 
his closed-market model of public-intellectual work. As a result of the public demand for 
alternative models, Du Bois’s The Souls of Black Folk achieved a discursive mobility 
unknown to its author. Operating on the principles of supply and demand, the same 
principles Washington’s industrial education programs took advantage of, the symbolic 
good circulated, and still circulates, within the public sphere, accruing additional 
symbolic capital and doing real, public work along the way. Part of this work was the 
creation of additional opportunities for discussion and deliberation among black men and 
women. By countering the inertia-driven silence on which the success of Washington’s 
public-intellectual work depended, Du Bois’s work opened the public sphere to 
discursive activity and, in the process, spoke to the significance of an educational model 
that would prepare all populations for this level of civic participation. That he named his 
paper The Crisis suggests that he saw the productive capacity of the crisis moment as an 
opportunity for meaningful and varied discursive exchange. That the voices populating 
The Crisis could do so only on the basis of the race crisis as he rendered it speaks to the 
influence of the public intellectual on the structures of public discourse.  
Ultimately, this communication-based understanding of the public intellectual’s 
social function is one of the most important for our contemporary moment. When they 
are attentive to the challenges facing free and productive public deliberation, whether 
these challenges are grounded in racial difference, literate ability, or some conflation of 




challenges rather than adapt to them. The rhetorical construction of public-intellectual 
work can itself intervene in social issues by altering the form and function of public 
discussion. Du Bois used his position and the attention it afforded him to create forums 
for debate and conditions for public participation that welcomed black men and women 
who had previously been excluded. Today’s public intellectuals can conceive of their 
roles in similar terms, asking whether their interventions create opportunities for 
additional discussion on the part of the publics that they address. The following chapter 
considers how Betty Friedan and Gloria Steinem interacted with the feminist 
counterspheres created by women-run presses and periodicals in the 1970s, offering a 
further example of how public-intellectual figures either create or deny opportunities for 







SISTERHOOD’S SUPERSTARS: FEMINIST PUBLICS  
AND THE PARADOX OF PERSONALITY 
 
In September of 1972, the feminist periodical off our backs confronted 
complications associated with the prominence of individual personalities within the 
women’s movement with an article titled “twinkle, twinkle…the great superstar fiasco.” 
Credited to regular contributor Georgia Jones, the piece took up the debate between Betty 
Friedan and Gloria Steinem. Jones argued that this particular “difference of opinions” 
distinguished itself from previous ideological conflicts within the movement and was, 
thus, worth attention for two significant reasons: “One, that it is public—that is, receiving 
publicity—and two, beyond the personalities and issues involved, it gives us good reason 
to examine what and why movement superstars are” (2). While Jones’s initial articulation 
of these two issues represents them as separate, her extended treatment emphasizes that 
they are integrally linked. The concern over publicity is almost exclusively a concern 
over publicity controlled by the “establishment press,” and she contends that it is the 
mainstream media that has strategically selected for and made use of Friedan and 
Steinem as the faces of the movement. The particular modes of publicity responsible for 
the isolated debate’s status, both among movement women and among their critics, are 
controlled by and reflective of forces external to the movement itself. In this way, they 
represent a type of discursive interference which Jones ultimately argues that the 
movement must recognize and actively resist.  
In addition to revealing the magazine’s own values and strategies for positioning 




claims about the role of public-intellectual figures within the women’s movement of the 
1970s, claims reflective of the movement’s efforts to complicate and offer alternatives to 
more “masculine” authority-driven models of public communication. By setting the 
magazine’s characterization of the Friedan/Steinem debate alongside larger concerns 
surrounding the alternative literacies and media practices associated with the women’s 
movement and feminist press, I suggest that the movement experienced a “paradox of 
personality” as a result of the rhetorical strategies it deployed in cultivating its own public 
forums and modes of active citizenship. As an example of the complicated relationship 
between a community’s discursive practices and its publically visible leadership, this 
paradox offers productive insight into the challenge of public-intellectual intervention in 
social issues more broadly and emphasizes the central role of literacy practices in 
moments of social shift.  
According to Jones, off our backs’s treatment of the Friedan/Steinem debate was 
meant to overcome the influence that the establishment press had on the women’s 
movement and on the public reception of the intellectual work associated with the 
movement’s efforts. As “two of the media’s favorite women’s liberation superstars,” 
Friedan and Steinem had been “pictured as generals in opposing camps” in its coverage 
of their activities. “Because the publicity comes from the establishment press,” Jones 
writes, “it is neither sympathetic nor objective. Women are being affected by these 
stories, though, so we felt it was necessary to examine the issue from the viewpoint of the 
feminist press” (2). The discursive practices that Jones associates with mainstream media 
coverage have misrepresented the tension between Friedan and Steinem to the general 




within the movement and those the movement hopes to reach. In raising them to the level 
of “superstars,” the media isolates Friedan and Steinem from the large numbers of 
women who comprise the movement, and in rendering the debate as a stand-off between 
“generals in opposing camps,” it grounds this treatment in an analogy that masculinizes 
their work in the process of privileging conflict-driven hierarchical models of authority 
over inclusive and cooperative alternatives more characteristic of the movement’s own 
rhetoric. Off our backs’s intervention, therefore, takes the form of rhetorically minded 
revision, revision which grounds itself in the discursive norms and topoi representative of 
and dependent upon the alternative media forms at the center of the women’s movement. 
In the process of “correcting” the mainstream account of the debate between two of the 
movement’s most visible leaders, Jones asserts a discursively mediated authority that is 
based on her knowledge of the rhetorical practices of feminist discourse communities, 
and this more collectively constructed authority stands in contrast to the individualistic 
authority ascribed to both Friedan and Steinem in the mainstream press.  
In what follows, I first examine off our backs’s understanding of its role as a 
movement periodical contributing to the formation of feminist textual networks in order 
to account for Jones’s assessment of Friedan’s and Steinem’s public-intellectual models 
as each relates to the movement’s own communicative practices. Given Jones’s interest 
in the particular discursive and rhetorical strategies characteristic of each women’s public 
participation, I argue that her assessment speaks to the means by which public-
intellectual work might contribute to the cultivation of functional literacies and rhetorical 
practices that are attendant to the goals of specific publics. The cultivation of such 




on Ronald Walter Greene’s treatment of rhetorical materialism and its relationship to the 
rhetorical subject and social knowledge. Noting that the materialist turn in rhetorical 
studies has largely encouraged the uncovering of “a generalized rhetoricality inherent in 
cultural forms and objects,” he advocates for a different approach, one which would “pay 
closer attention to the emergence of a more concrete rhetorical subject, a subject that 
speaks and is spoken to, and the different techniques and technologies organized to 
transform individuals into a communicating subject.” Within this model of analysis, 
Greene contends, “the rhetorical subject should be approached less as an effect of the 
constitutive process of a generalized rhetoricality and more from within a specific 
apparatus of production” (44). Such a model provides a productive lens for engaging with 
the feminist periodicals of the 1970s because it forces an awareness of the strategies that 
the women’s movement employed for cultivating alternative literacies among its ranks 
and the ways in which its own rhetorical models became functional components of the 
social and ideological work it did.  
For the purposes of the current project, the relationship between movement 
periodicals and the “superstars” associated with the movement in the mainstream press 
allows for consideration of how the movement’s own “techniques and technologies” 
understood its contact with mass public discourse and of how the superstars accounted 
for this understanding. Offering two very different modes of public-intellectual 
engagement, Friedan and Steinem also modeled two distinct rhetorical approaches to 
movement discourse, and Jones’s article characterizes these approaches from within the 
framework of a feminist press especially concerned with the pedagogical function of the 




intellectual models is, thus, linked not to direct social intervention, but to the discursive 
spaces and structures that each makes available for movement use. As this understanding 
of public-intellectual work pushes against contemporary biases favoring more tangible 
models of on-the-ground involvement,17 it emphasizes the revolutionary potential of 
rhetorical intervention capable of creating and transforming discursive communities in 
the process of encouraging public discussion. Given this discursively focused conception 
of public-intellectual work, I begin my assessment of Friedan and Steinem as feminist 
public intellectuals with a discussion of the language’s role in the formation of functional 
counterpublics, first generally and then in the specific case of consciously feminist 
publics. While I draw on general discussions of the “feminist press” at large, I ultimately 
ground my account in off our backs’s own understanding of its mission and place within 
movement networks. To do so, I look specifically at the editorial statement appearing in 
the magazine’s first issue in an effort to avoid homogenizing the vast array of varied 
voices and perspectives contributing to the larger networks. I work here to arrive at an 
understanding of the movement’s literacy needs and of how the public-intellectual 
models Friedan and Steinem employed responded—or did not—to those needs.   
 
Speaking to Others as Other: Counterpublics and Counterdiscursive Practice 
The idea that language-use contributes to the formation of functional publics is by 
no means new, and that there exists a significant relationship between the two is more or 
less taken for granted  in contemporary rhetorical scholarship. Jürgen Habermas laid the 
                                                          
17 When considered in relation to the Gramsci/Foucault models surveyed earlier, Stanley Fish’s Save the 
World on Your Own Time might be the most familiar example of contemporary work adhering to this 
perspective. In his characterization of what constitutes appropriate work for academics, Fish separates the 
cultivation and transference of knowledge from social change and political agency in a way that 




groundwork for such claims in his characterization of the press’s role in the development 
of the early capitalist commercial system responsible for the emergence of the bourgeois 
public sphere. His work suggested that such developments in the “world of letters” 
ultimately facilitated a discursive relationship between traditional authorities and the 
people over whom they exercised control (20).What becomes important in Habermas’s 
treatment are the particular forms governing these interactions. “The medium of this 
political confrontation,” he writes, “was peculiar and without historical precedent: 
people’s public use of their reason” (27). Here, political action is tied to the public 
performance of reason, and it is the “publicness” that lends both credibility and a sense of 
instrumentality to the performance itself. In emphasizing the means by which socially 
mediated concerns and interests infiltrated the public realm within the context of such 
performances, Habermas considers the role of the audience in the cultivation of the public 
voice. As culture circulated initially as a commodity and, in the process, created 
discursive spaces capable of sustaining public discussion and debate, it became a “topic 
of discussion through which an audience-oriented (publikumsbezogen) subjectivity 
communicated with itself” (29). In this sense, the bourgeois public sphere evolved out of 
a self-fulfilling process of community formation which assumed audience buy-in while 
creating audience demand in the very formation of the self as a publically-reasoning 
force. The performance of reason within these structural contexts responded to and 
initiated discourse with an audience, and the publicity of this performance, hopefully, 
resulted in discursive linkages connecting the speaker to the audience.  
As an initiating model for the transformative possibilities of public discussion and 




of language in the public realm. Nancy Fraser notes that his model, which  “designates a 
theater in modern societies in which political participation is enacted through the medium 
of talk…the space in which citizens deliberate about their common affairs, hence, an 
institutionalized arena of discursive interaction,” goes a long way toward countering 
work that unproductively conflates the realm of public discussion with the state and work 
that uses the term “public sphere” as a catch-all for anything outside of the familial or 
“private,” household realm  (58, 56-57). In her oft-cited “rethinking” of Habermas’s 
public sphere, however, Fraser contends that his treatment is limited by its historicity and 
does not adequately respond to the political needs of the contemporary moment. In part, 
Fraser’s critique responds to the somewhat Utopian inclusiveness Habermas assumes 
with his characterization of productive discursive interaction. For Habermas, Fraser 
argues:  
…the public sphere connoted an ideal of unrestricted rational discussion of public 
matters. The discussion was to be open and accessible to all; merely private 
interests were to be inadmissible; inequalities of status were to be bracketed; and 
discussants were to deliberate as peers. The result of such discussion would be 
"public opinion" in the strong sense of a consensus about the common good. (59) 
Operating under the auspices of an all-encompassing equality, Habermas’s public 
discussion offered participants a way to shared and collectively productive conclusions.18   
In so defining itself on assumptions of access, parity, and consensus, the public 
sphere as Habermas articulated it effectively perpetuated, and even created, systems of 
                                                          
18 Within the context of political theory, this equality is maintained on the basis of impartiality among an 
active citizenry that is committed to furthering general interests rather than their own. Nadia Urbinati treats 
such forms of political judgment in Democracy Disfigured: Opinion, Truth, and the People, emphasizing 





exclusion and inequity that rendered opposition and disagreement invisible. Importantly, 
the public sphere’s more sinister effects could frequently be tied to language-use itself.  
As Fraser notes “discursive interaction within the bourgeois public sphere was governed 
by protocols of style and decorum that were themselves correlates and markers of status 
inequality. These functioned informally to marginalize women and members of the 
plebeian classes and to prevent them from participating as peers” (63). In this sense, the 
access and inclusivity at the center of Habermas’s model are, in fact, dependent upon a 
certain mode of linguistic conformity, which means that status inequalities can only be 
“bracketed” to the degree that one’s public voice aligns with dominant norms. 
Participation in the public realm becomes a language game, and not every public citizen 
as access to the rulebook.  
The discursive practices of the public realm influence literacy instruction and 
related pedagogical methods, which partially accounts for their conservative force. 
Patricia Roberts-Miller contends that a similar phenomenon is at work in conceptions of 
the liberal public sphere that inform the teaching of argumentation today. She argues that 
Enlightenment models of reason and rationality had the effect of rhetorically neutralizing 
certain linguistic and discursive modes in ways that obscure the value systems adhering 
to them and denigrate alternatives on the basis of their being inherently “irrational” (14). 
These value systems infiltrated schools and, consequently, continued to be associated 
with and characteristic of an educated populous. If participation in the public sphere is 
limited in such ways, however, public discussion and debate can be nothing other than 




institutions already in place.19 Despite its potential as a critical forum, a public sphere so 
dependent upon normative discursive conventions is, by design, nugatory, a point which 
further emphasizes the role of language itself in social intervention.  
In attempting to recuperate some of the more productive aspects of Habermas’s 
model in the process of addressing its shortcomings, Fraser offers critical theorists the 
notion of “counterpublics,” suggesting that one major issue in the original model is the 
fact that it imagines a wholly singular public sphere and characterizes the emergence of 
secondary publics as a sign of political decline. Maintaining that a unitary discursive 
arena would be the mark of a prosperous and functional public system ignores the 
realities of stratified societies in which dominant and subordinate groups exists. Within 
such systems, the public sphere would necessarily adhere to the values of the dominant 
groups while further subordinating groups with unequal access by denying them “arenas 
for deliberation among themselves about their needs, objectives, and strategies.” 
Subordinate groups “would have no venues in which to undertake communicative 
processes that were not, as it were, under the supervision of dominant groups…This, 
would render them less able than otherwise to articulate and defend their interests in the 
comprehensive public sphere” (66). Once again, power and influence are tied to 
language-use in the sense that a comprehensive public sphere would impose limitations 
on the discursive access of subordinate groups and would foreclose opportunities for 
alternatively structured discourse more attentive to the needs of such groups.   
                                                          
19 This particular limitation is especially significant in relation to Jean Jacques Rousseau’s model of 
republicanism, which understood freedom in terms of relative independence from such institutional rule 
and which invested in a communitarian form of authority. Political theorist Philip Pettit considers the 
degree to which this model is elaborated in Habermas’s conception of a public sphere which relies on 




Counterpublics capable of sustaining alternatively structured discourse reflective 
of non-dominant values and perspectives are, however, very much a part of progressive 
social evolution. Fraser originally refers to these communities as “subaltern 
counterpublics” in order “to signal that they are parallel discursive arenas where members 
of subordinated social groups invent and circulate counterdiscourses, which in turn 
permit them to formulate oppositional interpretations of their identities, interests, and 
needs”(67). In the process of creating new modes of communicative action, such groups 
arrive at a greater understanding of their shared social positions and the related realities 
of their lived experiences. In some ways, the formation of these counterpublics replicates 
the processes involved in the original formation of the discursive communities that would 
grow into Habermas’s bourgeois public sphere, but the difference is that counterpublics 
work to resist institutionalization, to remain fluid enough to account for new needs that 
might arise, and to remain aware of their relative social status.  
While Michael Warner is critical of some elements of Fraser’s conception of 
counterpublics, he emphasizes the critical function of a counterpublic’s oppositional self-
positioning. In maintaining an awareness of its subordinate status, a counterpublic defines 
itself against a dominant “cultural horizon,” and this “conflict extends not just to ideas or 
policy questions but to the speech genres and modes of address that constitute the public 
or to the hierarchy among media. The discourse that constitutes it is not merely a 
different or alternative idiom but one that in other contexts would be regarded with 
hostility or with a sense of indecorousness” (119). Operating within this understanding of 
counterpublic discourse, language-use is itself an exercise in critical agency to the degree 




that are reflective of the dominant conventions’ shortcomings in the process of creating a 
community among otherwise isolated individuals.  
Fraser offers the feminist movement as an example of a counterpublic that relies 
on such strategies, noting that “in this public sphere, feminist women have invented new 
terms for describing social reality, including "sexism," "the double shift," sexual 
harassment," and "marital, date, and acquaintance rape" (67). Jane Mansbridge makes a 
similar point about the power of counterdiscursive terminology to aid in identity and 
community formation: “Key texts and phrases by feminist writers have often framed 
certain issues, such as Betty Friedan’s (1963) ‘the problem that has no name,’ Jane 
O’Reilly’s (1972) ‘click’ in the first issue of Ms. magazine, or Audre Lorde’s (1984) 
pithy conclusion, “The master’s tools will never dismantle the master’s house’” (27). 
Within the context of the feminist counterpublic, the oppositional self-positioning to 
which Warner speaks serves as an inventional topos. The terms and phrases that arise 
from feminist counterdiscourse point to absences within traditional discourse that are 
reflective of a social inequality perpetuated by language, and the invented terms and 
phrases respond to these absences in ways that open up discursive space for new lines of 
inquiry.  
Such an understanding of the motives underlying the discursive activities of 
counterpublics would suggest that the ultimate goal is to intervene in and transform the 
larger public structures responsible for their subordinate status. As Fraser writes of the 
activities of feminist counterpublics, “armed with such language, we have recast our 
needs and identities, thereby reducing, although not eliminating, the extent of our 




“dominant publics are those that take their discourse pragmatics and their lifeworlds for 
granted, misrecognizing the indefinite scope of their expansive address as universality or 
normalcy,” “counterpublics are spaces of circulation in which it is hoped that the poesis 
of scene making will be transformative, not replicative merely” (122). For Warner, the 
transformative dimension of counterpublic discourse is tied to the “expansive nature” of 
public address generally, which he defines in relation to sociability and circulation. First, 
the “expansive force” attributed to public discourse is the result of its dependence on 
social bonds and on the creation of these bonds among strangers; publics “cannot be 
understood apart from the ways they make stranger relationality normative, reshaping the 
most intimate dimensions of subjectivity around co-membership with indefinite persons,” 
and this mode of subjectivity is tied to the fact that “the address of public speech is both 
personal and impersonal” (76).  
At a very basic level, Warner suggests that discursive interventions that hope to 
transform public speech at any meaningful level must be born of social connectivity. 
They must speak to someone, and they must express something which resonates with that 
someone on the basis of the speaker’s own position. This community-oriented 
understanding of transformative public discourse aligns with Mansbridge’s assessment of 
the ways in which the linguistic contributions of Friedan, O’Reilly, and Lorde mentioned 
above were dependent upon their communal context. Despite the fact that the phrases can 
be attributed to single individuals, the “discursive process is always collective. Producers 
of words choose their words by what they think will make sense to others. An author’s 
anticipation of her audience already shapes the earliest version of what she says” (27). 




allows the prospective speaker to intuit the needs of her future audience in the process of 
crafting her particular modes of self-expression. The ultimate result of this dependence 
on community and sociability is that the counterdiscursive realm itself has an informal 
judicial role in decisions about what linguistic offerings it finds useful or necessary. As 
Mansbridge describes it within the specific context of the feminist movement, once the 
individual commits the intervention to public address, “the movement then sifts and 
either discards or keeps and cherishes her words. The ‘movement’ is made up of women 
figuring out and telling one another what they think makes sense, and what they think can 
explain and help crack the gender domination that they feel and are beginning to 
understand” (28). Though the words themselves can be traced back to individual authors, 
their use-value within movement discourse is tied to their collective resonance and their 
ability to construct social bonds on the basis of shared sense-making.  
Paul Strob emphasizes the transformative nature of this type of linguistic 
intervention in his assessment of the social role of language in the work of Kenneth 
Burke and John Dewey. While contemporary interest in the public sphere focuses on 
identity, access, or power, these same aspects of the public sphere might be more fully 
addressed by an analytical approach based in language and focusing on a “linguistic 
community coming together.” Strob argues that both Burke and Dewey saw the ideal 
function of public discourse as answering “the call to alleviate the public's problems 
through a reconstruction in language”. Recognizing that “the public faces a number of 
problems in circumstances continually born anew” and that “there is no way to deal with 
all of the public's problems in one Perfect Discourse,” the public’s task, as Strob 




with an intimate understanding of the needs of the particular situation. To solve 
problems, the task is to reconstruct a specific thread in the discursive fabric that unites 
person to person in the public sphere” (43). The creative capacity of language becomes 
responsible for the social cohesion on which a functional public depends, but this 
ameliorative dimension of language is activated only by difference and disagreement, a 
point which speaks again to the significance of counterpublics and their discursive 
activities.  
While counterpublic discourse does, as Warner notes, define itself in opposition 
to mainstream discourse and resist its governing norms, it is not without its own rules and 
legitimating standards. Daniel C. Brouwer and Robert Asen make a similar point about 
the “constraints” governing public engagement in any form, invoking Judith Butler’s 
conception of gender performance as “improvisation within a scene of constraint” to 
suggest that all public participation is similarly determined by a set of rules and strict 
boundaries (Butler qtd. in Brouwer and Asen 10). Brouwer and Asen write that “social 
actors sometimes may loosen constraints on publicity—reforming institutions, removing 
exclusions, reshaping norms,” but they emphasize that at other times, “these constraints 
may sustain privilege, maintain marginalization, delimit modes of action,” concluding 
that “public engagement is shaped by the specific conditions of its emergence even as it 
seeks to refashion these conditions” (10). In the process of resisting mainstream norms 
and standards, that is, counterpublics are actively shaped by the conditions of their 
discursive interventions, and attempts at inclusivity and collectivity can just as easily lead 
to the further marginalization of certain voices and perspectives or the mere substitution 




with counterdiscursive movements and counterpublics must remain as aware of this 
possibility as they are of the transformative potential of rhetorical intervention in public 
discourse. I turn now to consider the ways in which women contributing to feminist-
movement periodicals saw these periodicals relative to the discursive arenas constructed 
in their pages and in their networks of circulation.  
 
Wresting a Women’s World: Counterdiscursive Literacies and the Feminist Movement 
As they worked to create discursive spaces suitable for feminist discourse, 
women’s movement activists were well aware of the possible influence of such existing 
conditions on public engagement, particularly in terms of the material conditions 
associated with media outlets so thoroughly embedded in a capitalist system. One of the 
central goals of the feminist press was to offer outlets that existed outside of such systems 
and were capable of connecting and communicating with women. In large part, feminist 
organizations were not confronting complete exclusion from the discursive realms 
governed by these systems, but a more sinister partial and externally controlled inclusion. 
As Asen notes, exclusion in the public sphere “is never total because the dynamics of 
inclusion and exclusion operate on multiple levels. Participation in public discussions 
does not proceed only through voice and body; inclusions and exclusions also occur in 
the perceptions of others - the imagining of others. Sometimes, individual and groups 
"appear" in debates from which they are physically absent as images (linguistic and/or 
visual representations) circulate in public discourse” (347). The influence of this 
mainstream “imagining” on public discourse only amplified the movement’s need to find 




misconceptions or invested in maintaining them. This imagining, however, informed both 
the form and content of public discussions of feminism, meaning that the movement’s 
intervention required attention to both subject matter and rhetorical strategies. Leadership 
models necessarily responded to each, as well.  
I now consider the role of the feminist press and feminist periodicals in the 
formation of the feminist counterpublic of the 1970s in order to assess how the process of 
establishing alternative communicative networks influenced the rhetorical and discursive 
strategies the movement deployed, both among movement women and as the movement 
represented itself within mainstream media. Histories of the women’s movement 
frequently draw on the textual artifacts associated with its efforts, but the literacies and 
related rhetorical skills responsible for each artifact’s production and reception are just as 
often slighted in analyses more concerned with its informational function and dimension. 
The fact that these elements of the work can be so easily omitted speaks to the 
controversial nature of such literacies within the movement itself. Kathryn T. Flannery 
has worked to supplement histories that downplayed the centrality of literacy practices 
and the movement’s related educational concerns. In particular, she notes that text-based 
exchanges tended to be overlooked in favor of face-to-face interactions, even in the 
women’s own accounts of the movement and their work. She argues that the active 
“forgetting” of textual production, despite rich archival records and collections that attest 
to its significance, reveals the contested and complicated nature of the very literacy 
practices on which the movement was built. “Some movement participants expressed 
considerable ambivalence about the role of literacy in women’s lives,” Flannery writes, 




culturally loaded practices that had operated historically as class marker, sign of 
patriarchal power, or a means to exercise hierarchical authority” (2-3). Recognizing 
literacy as a performative component of the very institutions and systems against which 
they struggled led movement women to neglect that their participation both required and 
cultivated certain modes of rhetorically salient literate action.  
For a number of movement organizers, however, the social and cultural 
consequences that attended traditional conceptions of literacy were central to feminist 
efforts. Activist Charlotte Bunch was one of the most vocal on this issue and consistently 
warned other organizers and movement participants against assuming that all of the 
women they hoped to reach were functionally literate. Citing both widespread illiteracy 
and the effects of the alternative media moving the country toward what she referred to as 
a “postliterate era,” she emphasized that taking basic literacy for granted in the United 
States in the 1970s led to its being undervalued in terms of its revolutionary potential 
(249-250). Bunch effectively linked the social issues facing women to a gendered literacy 
crisis that required the movement’s attention and active intervention. Reading and 
writing, she argued, were integral to the feminist project because they “provide a means 
of conveying ideas and information that may not be readily available in the popular 
media;” “help develop an individual’s imagination and ability to think;” increase an 
individual’s “capacity to think for herself, to go against the norms of social culture, and 
to conceive of alternatives for society;” “aid each woman’s individual survival and 
success in the world;” and allow women to make use of the written word, which is the 
“cheapest and most accessible form of mass communication” (250).  Ultimately, Bunch’s 




underscoring its power aimed the movement’s efforts toward the cultivation of a specific 
set of individual practices that contributed to an intellectual community capable of 
envisioning and demanding social change via the written word.  
Cultivating such literacies among women, however, required public forums that 
modeled and created space for their practices, and it was this need that led to the 
development of the feminist press. Likewise, if movement women were to take full 
advantage of the opportunities for public participation that feminist media outlets offered, 
they needed to adapt to the discursive norms for which these outlets strategically selected. 
Based on the symbiotic principles at its center, my treatment of the relationship between 
movement periodicals like off our backs and the modes of textual production and 
consumption that came to be associated with the feminist movement of the 1970s is 
heavily influenced by Deborah Brandt’s conception of “sponsors of literacy.” As 
mentioned earlier, Brandt defines literacy sponsors as “any agents, local or distant, 
concrete or abstract, who enable, support, teach, model, as well as recruit, regulate, 
suppress, or withhold literacy—and gain advantage by it in some way” (166). Given that 
their theoretical and ideological interventions were grounded in textually mediated 
rhetorical action, movement periodicals certainly encouraged particular modes of literate 
engagement among their audiences. In many cases, periodical design itself became 
pedagogical as it modeled and sometimes offered direct instruction in purposeful and 
persuasive public discourse. Historian Tom Reynolds has made similar claims regarding 
the relationship between early twentieth-century mass-market magazines and the college 
system emerging at that time, arguing that the alliance between the two “offered training 




and seller” and encouraged an understanding of literacy that would eventually be seen as 
“natural or inevitable” as a result of its pervasiveness (164). For the young men who were 
the magazines’ target audience in Reynolds’s account, collegiate life and its associated 
institutions set the standards for literate action in the public realm, and being active 
readers of the magazines gave these men access to the conversations at the center of this 
discursive community and to the economic and social privileges it conferred upon its 
members.  
While the mass-market periodicals that Reynolds cites were complicit in 
furthering what might be understood as mainstream or traditional literacies, literacies 
which upheld existing power structures and reflected the values of these structures, 
movement periodicals like off our backs were more invested in establishing alternative 
literacies that subverted the discursive norms associated with patriarchal structures and 
institutions.  As a result, the rhetorical strategies that these periodicals employed served a 
two-fold purpose. First, they actively worked to align normative discursive structures and 
forms with outgroup perspectives, a strategy which, when deployed effectively, 
succeeded in rendering the rhetorical and argumentative modes dependent upon these 
structures and forms ineffective within movement discourse. Having thus deactivated the 
rhetorics governing mainstream public discourse, the periodicals were able to imagine 
and build alternative structures of public discourse from the ground up and to ensure that 
these structures reflected and supported the movement’s ideological goals and vales. To 
this end, the rhetorical action contributing to these new systems worked, too, as a model 
for would-be participants. This meant that the periodicals and participants must hold 




both oppositional and positive self-positioning; thus, they reflected both implicit and 
explicit engagements with the rhetorical strategies contributing to the movement. This 
makes movement periodicals rich sources for assessing the role of language and public 
discourse in the formation of counter-communities and in the leadership models that 
these communities develop and rely upon when it comes to interacting with mainstream 
media and representing themselves in more widely accessible public forums.  
As a movement periodical that responded directly to these concerns, off our backs 
exemplifies some common rhetorical strategies deployed in the process of creating public 
forums capable of facilitating productive feminist discourse. In the magazine’s first issue 
published in February of 1970, an editorial statement explains that “off our backs appears 
now at a stage when the existing institutions and channels for communication have 
ceased to meet the growing needs of the women's struggle” (1). This framing of the 
periodical as actively intervening in a communicative realm defined by failure and 
frustration as far as feminist discourse is concerned contributes a strong sense of 
rhetorical exigence to the magazine’s mission. By suggesting that traditional discursive 
norms and forums are not capable of sustaining the type of public discussion and 
expression that the movement requires, the magazine positions itself as an invaluable 
outlet without which the movement will not be able to proceed. 
 On the surface, this intervention is a formal intervention rather than a theoretical 
or ideological one and is very much concerned with the issues of literate production that 
are important to both Flannery and Bunch. The formal critiques made against the 
mainstream media, however, are immediately linked to the ideological motives governing 




tied to patriarchal power structures. According to the editorial, it is the “male-dominated 
media” that has denied women “the space and freedom necessary to develop [their] 
journalistic talents,” and this same media structure has “shown itself insensitive to 
[women’s] needs, unaware of [their] oppression” (1). In so characterizing the gendered 
dimension of the mainstream media in its critique, off our backs effectively unites its 
female readership against a common enemy by emphasizing the connection between 
social identity and discursive style. If mainstream forums are incapable of facilitating 
feminist discourse and if this incapacity is the result of their being male-dominated and 
governed by masculinist values, then the only workable solution is for women to create 
and control forums of their own that actively resist the discursive norms responsible for 
the failure of the mainstream forums.  
The case against the structural failure of these “public” forums is made even 
stronger by what can be read as the editorial’s anticipation of accommodationist 
perspectives that might argue for women’s working within existing structures in order to 
effect change from the inside out. The statement claims that, in fact, the women working 
in journalism and news media have been most forcefully affected by the media’s 
“patterns of discrimination,” patterns which  “define and confine their news within the 
‘Style’ and ‘Fashion’ sections” (1). Significantly, even the women who have in some 
sense infiltrated the media structures have fallen prey to the oppressive hierarchies that 
gender media content in ways that work against feminist news and discourse. This 
critique also offers further insight into the ways that the mainstream media has 
marginalized women’s issues by relying on traditional conceptions of “news” that would 




a kind of subordinate discursive space which would allow them to include female voices 
and perspectives while keeping them separate and while controlling their influence. 
Ultimately, responding to this particular mode of oppression as the magazine represented 
it required that the movement surrender the media structures that had been so forcefully 
co-opted by the patriarchy and build their own. “As we begin to create and support our 
own media,” the editorial contends,” the very definitions of news will change as we gain 
the power to describe it as we see it and as we make it” (1). For off our backs, the 
feminist movement had, in its dealings with the mass public, reached a point of 
definitional stasis that requires the creation of a more sympathetic and productive 
discursive sphere in which the term “news” refers to more than the expression and 
enactment of patriarchal agendas. 
The pedagogical function of the feminist periodical has been well-documented, 
particularly in relation to how such publications sought to provide women access to 
information that the mainstream press and related institutions refused to make available.20 
My particular interest, though, is in how the literate and rhetorical practices fostered by 
these publications imagined and staged a carefully constructed mode of participatory 
citizenship in the process of building a pedagogical community rooted in feminist 
principles. This is the process to which the public intellectual could actively contribute. 
Adrienne Rich refers to this intellectual community as the "women's-university-without-
walls," describing it as an extra-academic pedagogical realm that took “the shape of 
women reading and writing with a new purposefulness” and of “the growth of feminist 
bookstores, presses, bibliographic services, women’s centers, medical clinics, libraries, 
                                                          
20 For an example of such work, see Flannery’s treatment of the distribution of women’s health information 




art galleries, and workshops, all with a truly educational mission” (126). Rich’s 
description is significant in the way that it aligns individual reading and writing practices 
with the creation of communicative spaces in which such practices and the learning for 
which they allowed could be shared. In order to facilitate the transition from individual 
practices to public performances, the women’s movement needed to find ways to control 
the media networks responsible for the dissemination of movement news and for 
providing women access to feminist public forums.  
Identifying and enacting strategies for meeting this need became integral to 
assessments of public-intellectual models associated with the movement and its goals. At 
the same time, though, the structures of these feminist media networks and the rhetorical 
action for which they selected were largely at odds with traditional models in which 
individuals acted as spokespeople. In her work on the Women in Print Movement of the 
1960s, Trysh Travis offers a productive reading of the relationship between the 
movement’s goals and the textual networks it organized. Emphasizing the movement’s 
attempt to “create an alternative communications circuit—a women-centered network of 
readers and writers, editors, printers, publishers, distributers, and retailers through which 
ideas, ideas, objects and practices flowed in a continuous loop,” she contends that “the 
movement’s largest goals were nothing short of revolutionary: it aimed to capture 
women’s experiences and insights in durable—even beautiful—printed forms through a 
communications network free from patriarchal and capitalist control” (276). Resisting the 
hierarchical structures characteristic of the male-dominated media and public sphere was 
a primary goal for the women involved in constructing this “alternative communications 




editorial collectives that sought to share work and responsibility among a team of women 
with diverse perspectives on the movement and its goals.21  
While the feminist network’s emphasis on community and collectivity over the 
individuality and authority characteristic of traditional print media aligned with its 
ideological mission, teamwork was, in part, also a matter of necessity. As Junko Onosaka 
notes, women’s organizations were among the many groups who benefitted from the 
technological advancements associated with offset printing that allowed for the relatively 
quick production of cheap papers and pamphlets, but the process required a number of 
people completing various tasks related to both assembly and duplication (15). Even 
beyond the material production of individual papers, however, feminist publishing 
depended upon the extended networks that Travis characterizes, and Onosaka explains 
that “women in feminist publishing were keen to take control of all aspects of 
publishing—from typesetting, photographing, printing, and binding, to selling—if they 
were to successfully circulate their information and disseminate feminist values” (43). 
Without the capital of traditional and commercial presses, feminist publishers were 
unable to pay women for their work or their service, which meant that generating interest 
and involvement required convincing prospective volunteers of the press’s goals and 
values and cultivating an allegiance independent of financial compensation for the time 
and effort devoted to producing and distributing the magazine. In this way, the 
periodicals and presses were really only sustainable to the degree that they were able to 
build a community and function collectively. 
For off our backs, these structural concerns and the role they played in the 
magazine’s mission featured heavily in the first issue’s editorial statement. Titled “dear 
                                                          




sisters,” the statement’s form invokes epistolary conventions, and it also appears 
alongside two letters from women not directly involved in the magazine’s production but 
interested in its project.  By addressing their audience directly and showing an immediate 
willingness to share layout space, the magazine’s editorial collective uses the statement to 
initiate a discourse that invites a response. Right away, off our backs portrays itself as an 
open forum within which editorial perspectives interact with and create space for readers’ 
voices. The text of the statement only furthers these principles by grounding the 
magazine’s success in the active participation of its audience. “In order to succeed,” the 
statement reads, “we need you to use this paper to relate what you are doing and what 
you are thinking…We intend to build a national network of correspondents and welcome 
women from all parts of the country who will report regularly on the activities of their 
groups and cover the news” (2). In so representing itself as a collaborative project and 
making its readership responsible for its success, off our backs sought to disrupt more 
traditional publishing models that upheld strict boundaries between reader and writer and 
that drew on a more centralized and authoritative editorial power.  
The fact that the two letters appearing alongside the statement speak to issues of 
distribution directly contributes to the statement’s work. The first letter is from Barbara 
Burris of the Women’s Liberation Coalition of Michigan, and Burris expresses 
excitement about “the idea of a Women’s Newspaper to counter the male dominated 
‘movement’ press,” writing that “your paper – or should I say our paper? – off our backs 
may be the answer we are looking for.” Based on this alignment with off our backs’s 
mission and the collective “ownership” she invokes when referring to “our paper,” Burris 




they might eventually be able to get them on newsstands (2). This letter models the type 
of movement activity on which the feminist press depended. Recognizing the periodical’s 
potential, Burris offers to take an active role in its distribution, thus extending its reach 
and expanding it readership by her own efforts. Given the statement’s emphasis on the 
readers’ role, Burris is offered as an example of productive participation. 
 Below Burris’s letter is another from Ellen R., a postal worker in New York City. 
Ellen writes that she has seen the magazine’s address on letters and expresses her interest 
in the journal, asking that they “either send [her] a sample copy or tell [her] the 
subscription rates” (2). While Burris’s letter reflects how the periodical established and 
cultivated a readership through feminist channels that were already open, Ellen’s letter 
speaks to a more diffuse version of community building. Interestingly, she learns of the 
periodical as a result of the correspondence it receives, rather than as a result of the 
material it puts out. While subtle, this point emphasizes again that the magazine is a 
collective enterprise as interested in hearing from other women as it is in speaking to 
them. Even within the context of this first issue, the magazine makes clear that its readers 
have an active role in furthering its reach; Ellen might never have heard about the journal 
had readers not sent their letters. Also significant is Ellen’s position as a postal worker. 
While Burris’s letter speaks to a physical space in which feminist news can be 
distributed, a number of women would not have access to such spaces. These women 
would depend upon the postal service, and including Ellen’s letter suggests that this mode 
of involvement is possible. The models of distribution emphasized reflect the magazine’s 
goal of giving all women access to feminist news. Below these two letters also appear 




Both of the advertisements emphasize the movement’s need, suggesting that such jobs 
actively contribute to the movement’s goals.  
In all of these ways, the layout of the page on which the editorial statement 
appears contributes to the goals and ideas that it expresses directly. The fact that the 
letters are published alongside the editorial statement emphasizes the periodical’s 
function as an open forum welcoming text-based contributions from its readership. The 
letters’ contents, however, speak to the various roles open to women wishing to 
contribute to the periodical’s mission and reflect the magazine’s goal of extending the 
feminist network already in place by widening its communicative channels. By offering 
Barbara and Ellen as models for how women might get involved or take action, and by 
doing so using each woman’s own words, the magazine makes an otherwise invisible 
portion of the feminist publishing process visible. Finally, both the letters and the 
advertisements speak to the significance of distribution within the context of these goals, 
and they emphasize the degree to which the magazine’s dependence upon other women 
for such tasks contributed to the statement’s characterization of the collaborative 
publishing structure central to the feminist textual network. The rhetorical design of the 
page on which the editorial appears, thus, performs its goals and models its larger 
discursive principles 
 Karlyn Kohrs Campbell has discussed the community-oriented and connection-
based communicative styles in feminist discourse in her work on feminine rhetorical 
style. According to Campbell, female speakers “strategically adopted what might be 
called a feminine style” in order to negotiate the cultural tension between public presence 




example, draws on inductive reasoning, welcomes audience participation, moves to 
encourage the audience’s identification with the speaker, and aims at empowerment in 
the sense that its goal is to convince its audience that they can take action to produce 
change. Significantly, this style reflects the rhetors’ “experiences as women and was 
adapted to the audiences and experiences of female audiences,” but it is not an inherently 
“female” style and is often employed by men as well as by women (12-13). What is 
important about Campbell’s identification of a feminine rhetorical style is the way in 
which it exemplifies the relationship between rhetorical action and social identity within 
the public realm and gives insight into the strategic value and persuasive potential of 
rhetorical forms that adapt to and make use of this relationship.  
Extending Campbell’s treatment of the influence of feminine rhetorical style 
Bonnie J. Dow and Mari Boor Tonn argue that the style can play a role in mainstream 
political discourse and can work to offer alternative models of political judgment. Dow 
and Tonn write that “the characteristics of feminine style are part of a synthesis of form 
and substance that works to promote an alternative political philosophy reflecting 
traditionally feminine values” (287). They argue that feminine discursive strategies like 
those that Campbell discusses contribute to the formation of what Rita Felski calls “the 
feminist counter-public sphere,” “which operates to provide potential for oppositional 
ideology that counters hegemonic ideas of universality” (287).  Significant here is how 
Dow and Tonn link discursive forms associated with feminine values and identities to 
alternative epistemologies and modes of judgment that have the capacity to actively 
intervene in social discourse within the a traditionally masculinist public realm. The 




value systems that can infiltrate public discourse and reshape public consciousness.  
Ultimately, this alternative discursive style and its ability to transform the public 
discussion about women’s social roles were what feminist periodicals were hoping to 
cultivate in their pages. Public-intellectual figures associated with the women’s 
movement, however, were not always as ready or willing to push against mainstream 
modes and media, the same modes and media that were responsible for their public 
positions. Individual personalities like Friedan and Steinem, therefore, were not always 
contributing intellectual work attentive to the movement’s larger discursive needs, and it 
is to this issue that I now turn.  
 
What is a Feminist Public Intellectual?: off our backs and the Freidan/Steinem 
Showdown  
At the opening of the article “twinkle, twinkle…the great superstar fiasco,” Grace 
Jones assumes an interdependent relationship between rhetoric and social values in the 
process of characterizing the debate between Betty Friedan and Gloria Steinem. This 
debate has been treated especially poorly in the establishment press, and it is this 
treatment that further emphasizes the need for off our backs’s intervention. In addition to 
pointing out the counterproductive nature of the “generals in opposing camps” analogy, 
Jones speaks to the background contexts possibly motivating mainstream interest in the 
debate, namely significant events such as the National Women’s Political Caucus and 
Democratic Convention. She suggests that the particular rendering of the debate within 
the establishment press has sensationalized differences within the women’s movement 




in these national political forums. Taking this critique even further, Jones emphasizes the 
detached and shadowy nature of the press’s reports, describing the stories as circulating 
“rumors” and “vague charges” in addition to their being “neither sympathetic nor 
objective” (2).  
In this first section of the article, Jones effectively characterizes the failure of the 
mainstream media to represent the relationship between Friedan and Steinem in any sort 
of productive way, basing this critique on the relatively opportunistic nature of the 
coverage’s timing and on the questionable epistemological and rhetorical conventions 
structuring the coverage itself. In so rendering the mainstream treatment, Jones creates 
demand for the feminist account she offers. Because these types of stories are circulating 
and are affecting women as they do, she contends that it is “necessary to examine the 
issue from the viewpoint of the feminist press” (2). In this sense, Jones’s intervention is 
an intervention grounded in a different set of discursive practices that will allow her, 
within the context of off our backs, to treat the issue more fairly and more productively. 
Unlike the establishment press, she has knowledge of and skill in the discursive practices 
that will allow for a more effective engagement with the women involved, their contexts, 
and their points of view.  
Once she has created demand for the account that is to follow, Jones moves to 
frame her discussion of Friedan and Steinem, and she begins by focusing on the structure 
of the interviews she conducted with each woman. This discussion of the interviews 
themselves follows a statement about the ways the women had interacted with the 
establishment press since the debate had begun receiving attention. She explains that 




press only,” and was then available for interviews following the article’s publication. 
Steinem, on the other hand, “refused to comment to the press” (2). Because this account 
appears before her discussion of the interview strategies that each woman employed in 
their interaction with her, it functions implicitly as a productive point of comparison. 
Given the interest in alternative discursive modes at the heart of off our backs’s mission, 
it is no surprise that women trained within these discursive realms might expect certain 
types of public participation from women positioned as movement leaders and be 
attentive to the ways in which these types of participation structured their involvement in 
various media forums.  
The periodical’s particular interest in its relationship to more mainstream media 
forums becomes clearer in Jones’s explanation of Steinem’s willingness to speak with 
her. “Gloria Steinem agreed to talk to me,” she explains, “because oob is a movement 
paper. She feels that this subject cannot and should not be given to the establishment 
press for distortion” (2). For Steinem, any engagement with the establishment press 
subjects the movement to misrepresentation. Again, the suggestion seems to be that the 
discursive practices structuring the mainstream media are themselves ill-equipped for 
engaging with women’s issues. In order to mediate this risk, Steinem takes a protective 
stance, and her media practices might be described as isolationist. Within the context of 
her own strategy for media engagement, as it is explained to Jones, feminist issues like 
the debate between her and Friedan should be confined to the feminist press, where they 
can be responsibly represented by those who have a vested interest in them.  
In contrast to Steinem’s strategy, Friedan’s involves not only engaging the 




strategy might be seen as accomodationist. Her willingness to use the debate’s rhetorical 
currency to her advantage in the process of generating interest in her McCall’s article and 
other work for and with the mainstream press itself suggests a certain compliance with 
traditional discursive practices and modes of publicity, especially given the masculinist 
rendering of the debate within mainstream contexts. This accomodationist stance applies, 
too, to her engagement with the feminist press. Jones explains that she spoke with 
Friedan on the phone for an hour and that, when she looked back at her notes, she 
recognized much of what she had written down as “Betty  quoting Betty in her McCall’s 
article,” explaining that she, thus, will not “differentiate between our phone conversation 
and her article when I quote her” (2).  
Jones’s account of her interview with Friedan reveals much about how Friedan’s 
own discursive practices inform her position relative to the women’s movement and her 
modes of public-intellectual engagement. The fact that Jones feels no need to 
differentiate between their phone conversation and the McCall’s article suggests that 
Friedan did not adapt her discursive modes to various media forms, which might be read 
as a challenge to the cultivation of alternative literacies and discourse practices that the 
feminist press saw as integral to the work of the women’s movement. In this way, the 
discursive and rhetorical choices that Friedan makes in her public-intellectual work 
reflect her ideological stance regarding the strategies most useful in women’s efforts to 
achieve social equality. As Jones’s describes, Friedan favors a “slow” and “conservative” 
approach that will keep women from becoming “alienated” socially. To this end, she asks 




unwritten rules’” (2). Based on Friedan’s media practices, these “unwritten rules” seem to 
include those governing discursive norms within the public sphere.  
Jones ties Friedan’s approach to linguistic convention, too, explaining that the 
McCall’s article upset her primarily because “it was so thoroughly laced with a definition 
of WOMAN that would not greatly disturb the most conservative man” (2). Given that 
redefinition was one of the central rhetorical strategies employed by the feminist press as 
it moved to develop a communicative realm free from the oppressive influence of 
masculinist norms,22 Friedan seemingly strategic conservation and rhetorical deployment 
of these very terms likely read either as a betrayal or as a mark of unpardonable 
ignorance. Either she was purposely choosing to work within the linguistic norms and 
conventions that the periodicals had identified as responsible for large parts of women’s 
oppression, or she was so removed from the movement’s current projects that she could 
not contribute to its mission. To take this critique even further, the fact that she used her 
interview with off our backs as an opportunity to quote from her McCall’s article is 
reflective of a citational strategy that upholds the primacy of traditional print media and 
relies on the authority associated with the static and carefully edited texts at the center of 
this model. In quoting herself, Friedan again works against the discursive strategies and 
values characteristic of the feminist press in the sense that she replicates rhetoric 
appearing in mainstream venues and, in the process, relies on a univocal defense 
dependent only on her own thinking and experience and effectively untouched by the 
experience of other women or movement participants. On the basis of these particular 
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modes of engagement, Friedan fuels the mainstream media’s fire, even going as far as 
implicating Steinem and the “Ms. Crowd” in the persistence of the “personality element 
that has plagued her efforts to publicize the issues” (2).  
Once again, the media practices that Jones ascribes to Steinem stand in direct 
contrast to those she ascribed to Friedan. Steinem not only meets with Jones in person 
after refusing to comment to the mainstream press, but she also makes a point of speaking 
with another woman present. “Margaret Sloan and Gloria Steinem speak together,” Jones 
explains, “so I was able to talk with them both. Gloria always speaks with another 
woman as a method of proving to the press and other women that the women’s 
movement is full of women who can express themselves as well as she” (2). In addition 
to recognizing the role of the feminist press within the movement and the significance of 
how it counters the mainstream press in its coverage of movement news, Steinem shows 
that she is well aware of the rhetorical and the discursive practices that it has cultivated in 
order to productively intervene in mainstream discourse. The fact that she speaks with 
another woman present effectively deconstructs the more traditional and individualist 
leadership models on which the “generals in opposing camps” analogy is founded. It also 
works to reflect the movement’s larger investment in representing a multiplicity of voices 
and perspectives whenever possible. Within the context of the article, Jones, too, works 
to preserve the discursive structure of the interview based on this choice by 
differentiating between Steinem’s and Sloan’s contributions and quoting their statements 
directly rather than summarizing them as often as she did Friedan’s.  
In addition to the way the choice to speak with Sloan structures the interview 




rationalization that Steinem offers Jones further reflects the movement’s own aims and 
strategies. As was the case with the Friedan’s rhetorical choices and self-representation 
within the communicative realms structuring the movement, Steinem’s, too, speak to and 
reflect her understanding of the movement’s mission and the means by which it hopes to 
achieve social equality. The fact that she wants to prove the capacity that women have for 
rhetorical performance and to disrupt patterns of thinking that might attribute her public 
position to her being one of few women capable of such performance reveals an attention 
to the role of literate rhetorical action within the public realm. It also speaks to the 
pedagogical function of the movement overall. In much of her work, Steinem represents 
the movement’s work in terms of its responding to a literacy crisis, one that is in some 
ways the result of an assumed incapacity.23 Here, though, it becomes clear that offering 
herself as a model of the rhetorically literate woman is not enough. The movement’s 
success depends upon the cumulative and community-based rhetorical effort and public 
engagement reflective of these community’s desires as well as their abilities.  
Ultimately, Jones’s account of each woman’s public media practices leads to an 
assessment of their particular leadership models from the perspective of the feminist 
press. It is at this point in the article that Jones moves to consider the influence of 
“superstars” directly and to consider the leadership models most appropriate for the 
movement given the type of public the feminist press seeks to sustain. In a section with 
the subheading “who’s who,” Jones considers the status each woman has and how that 
status has been cultivated. In her discussion of Friedan, Jones characterizes the influence 
of The Feminine Mystique, describing the enthusiasm with which the book was received. 
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This reception, Jones argues, is partially responsible for Friedan’s “founding mother 
position” (2), and Jones notes that McCall’s has referred to her as “‘the founder of the 
women’s movement” and that Friedan as even said of herself that she “started it all” (3). 
While conceding the influence of the book and recognizing that Friedan put the publicity 
it received “to work to organize the thousands of women to whom her book spoke” (3), 
Jones nonetheless critiques this “founding mother” model on a number of fronts.  
First, she emphasizes the ways in which the book as a statement of the 
movement’s challenges and goals is too static a text to accurately reflect the needs of the 
movement as they adapt to new conditions and shift to account for a wider a range of 
women’s experiences. Second, she points out that the work of the women’s movement 
had, in fact, begun before The Feminine Mystique hit shelves. Other women had been 
contending with issues of social equality before Friedan, and Jones names Bella Abzug, 
Edith Van Horn, and Simone De Beauvoir as specific examples.  
While Jones does not link these two critiques to the particular model of 
intellectual engagement underlying Friedan’s participation in movement discourse, it is 
clear that a connection exists. Like the McCall’s article, which the magazine refers to as 
Friedan’s “definitive” statement on the movement and on her relationship with Steinem, 
the book relies on and navigates a realm dependent upon traditional print media and the 
intellectual authority that attends it. As a result of its participation in this system, it 
cannot sustain and does not allow for the consistent revision at the center of the 
movement’s own textual modes, and it must adhere to common understandings of 
authorship. The significance of authorship here also speaks to the ways in which the book 




of discursive intervention that the book is believed to have made. In adopting the 
“founding mother” position and in attributing the movement’s beginnings to the book’s 
publication, Friedan gives the movement a cohesive origin story that can be traced 
directly to her initial intervention.  Such a narrative certainly has persuasive power in the 
sense that it appeals to traditional models of linear historical progression and seems to 
unite the multitude of voices that make up the women’s movement currently. This unity 
is, however, a façade that, in fact, does the movement a disservice in the process of 
making the movement more palatable for the mainstream press.  
Again, Friedan’s intervention can be understood as a productive intervention that 
worked within traditional discursive structures in order to generate awareness of an 
alternative point of view. The problem, however, is that the movement and its goals had 
since outgrown these structures, at least according to the feminist press and women like 
Jones and Steinem. Friedan’s intervention is not, at this point, productive in the sense of 
generating new discourse or rhetorical resources for movement use. It continues to 
circulate, in the form of her book and article, within the mainstream media, as it was 
designed to do, but it does not makes space in this media realm for the exercise of the 
alternative literacies that the movement has developed. In part, the issue surrounding the 
nature of Friedan’s intervention can be understood in relation to the rhetorical choices 
informing her constructed audience. As Chaïm Perelman and Lucia Olbrechts-Tyteca 
contend, “every social circle or milieu is distinguishable in terms of its dominant opinions 
and unquestioned beliefs, the premises that it takes for granted without hesitation: these 
views form an integral part of its culture, and an orator wishing to persuade a particular 




audience within productive rhetorical action, Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca note that 
much about an audience’s, group’s, or civilization’s values and favored epistemological 
processes can be learned through examination of the texts associated with them.  
For the many rhetors contributing to and working within the women’s movement 
of the 1970s, audience was certainly a concern. They were, however, often writing for 
what Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca refer to as “composite audiences,” audiences 
comprised of “people differing in character, loyalties, and functions” (21), and the ways 
in which they reacted to this challenge, in particular, reveals much about their aims and 
methods. Because of the focus on discursive and communicative norms at the center of 
the feminist press’s mission, the strategies employed for contending with the needs and 
expectations of potential readers who might currently exist outside of movement 
discourse carried a large amount of ideological weight relevant to the rhetor’s beliefs 
about the nature of social equality.  
In Friedan’s case, the fact that her work conformed to traditional and standard 
discursive modes and appealed to dominant narrative structures and related topoi reveals 
her anticipation of a mainstream, commercial readership. Within the context of the 
feminist circles, the book’s rhetorical structuring serves another purpose. In some sense, 
engaging with the book’s ideological stance requires female readers to adapt to its 
relatively normative discursive modes, with Friedan assuming that they can or will rather 
than adapting to theirs. The book, then, becomes something of a model for the type of 
social mobility that this approach, in Friedan’s opinion, affords, remarking from its 
position atop the best-sellers list, “See where playing by the rules got me?” Jones 




[they] must move through the doors that are open’” (2), and this is exactly the rhetorical 
strategy of which she makes use. Her goal is not to open new lines of inquiry or to 
introduce new discursive modes more attentive to the movement’s aims. Rather, it is to 
move through the communicative channels as they are and to model the possibility of this 
approach. While not always unproductive or problematic, such a strategy does prove 
challenging within the context of the women’s movement because so much of the 
movement’s effort was directed at cultivating and creating outlets for alternative forms of 
expression, argument, and persuasion. Friedan’s model essentially undoes or ignores a 
significant amount of this work, and because it employs dominant discursive modes, 
rather than working with and through the movement’s alternatives, it has the advantage of 
social currency and momentum. Thus, it becomes the model that others must define 
themselves against and respond to within the context of their own rhetorical work.  
In some ways, Friedan’s public-intellectual model creates a closed -market system 
much like the one that I argue Booker T. Washington’s created. Just as many of the 
industrially educated black men and women would be incapable of public rhetorical 
performance, the women who have learned from the feminist press and adopted its 
discursive strategies would be barred from participating in the mainstream realms that 
Friedan believed would be most effective. Given the pedagogical aims of the movement, 
a large number of the women involved in the feminist press’s projects had learned to 
participate in public discourse only within the context of its own forums, forums which 
were structured to resist the values informing their mainstream and mass-public 
counterparts. The cultivation of such alternative literacies becomes, on the basis of 




disservice in the sense that this set of practices does not translate to the larger forums like 
those in which Friedan’s book and article circulate. While the feminist press seeks to 
open discursive space for all women, Friedan appears to adapt a more traditional 
spokesperson-based intellectual model in which the women who can speak in the 
mainstream press and to the mass media in ways that are persuasive, meaning that they 
adhere and appeal to the culture’s dominant doxa, should speak for the rest. Unlike 
Steinem who consciously resisted speaking for other women in such ways, Friedan, Jones 
suggests, welcomed the opportunity and saw it as necessary for the movement’s overall 
growth.  
The inequality that Fraser characterizes as ingrained in and perpetuated by the 
discursive structures and conventions governing mainstream discourse was exactly what 
the feminist press sought to address, and Jones’s assessment of public-intellectual 
leadership models reflects this goal. In encouraging conformation and suggesting that 
equality would only be achieved by working within the existing systems and institutions, 
Friedan’s approach did not account for the fact that playing by the rules might mean 
succeeding at the expense of other women. Likewise, her model did not attend to the 
significant revolutionary potential of rhetorical style within the public sphere as it 
interacted with and informed the formation of social identity. As Fraser describes, “public 
spheres are not only arenas for the formation of discursive opinion; in addition, they are 
arenas for the formation and enactment of social identities. This means that participation 
is not simply a matter of being able to state propositional contents that are neutral with 
respect to form of expression. Rather…participation means being able to speak ‘in one’s 




through idiom and style” (68-69). Based on Fraser’s assessment, Friedan’s model did not 
allow for true public participation, but rather for a stunted approximation of participation 
that stood at odds with the version toward which feminist periodicals endeavored.  
Given Jones’s position within the feminist press, her assessment of Friedan and 
Steinem certainly reveals a similar understanding of the role of discursive style and 
convention within public participation. The link between this interest and productive 
leadership models becomes even clearer when she moves from her critique of Friedan to 
consider the issue of superstardom directly. She explains that “Americans, lacking an 
aristocracy, have created the superstar mystique. American women, socialized to depend 
on an authority figure, find it very hard to be superstars, yet have a very great need to see 
women who are” (3). Here, Jones emphasizes the socially constructed nature of 
superstardom generally and for women in particular in terms of the pervasive influence of 
authoritative and hierarchical structures of power. As a result, the ascendency of women 
to the position of superstar can be productive in the sense that it shows the potential for 
women to assume such position but problematic in the sense that it can allow other 
women to remain in the background positions that they have always assumed in male 
power structures and institutions. Likewise, the women who rise to these higher positions 
are subject to the same power structures within the context of the mainstream discourse. 
Jones writes that “for the women who makes it there is the joy of finally getting someone 
(outside of the movement) to take her seriously,” but she notes that “the press reminds 
you that even as a superstar, you are a second class superstar (the fact of the cat-fight 
publicity demonstrates that).” Despite this possibly uncomfortable treatment at the hands 




important medium for our growth” and includes as a parenthetical Steinem’s point that 
“‘we can’t forget that the press is a powerful organizing tool’” (3). On the other side of 
the issue is the fact that assuming such positions also opens women to criticism within 
the movement and among other women. Within this context, “everyone is waiting and 
testing to see if the women UP THERE is a megalomaniac or just an all right sort who 
can’t help that it happened to her, but doesn’t let it go to her head.” Ultimately, Jones 
concedes that “there is a ‘damned if you do, damned if you don’t’ dilemma for stars” 
given this complex system and the socializing forces at work (3). It is at this point in the 
article that we begin to see the “paradox personality” emerging from Jones’s critique. The 
women’s movement needs leaders, but movement discourse resists traditional leadership 
models. The women’s movement needs a public face, but movement discourse cannot be 
represented in the mainstream press.   
This particular iteration of the publicity paradox shares some structural features 
with the similar challenges faced by the early female rhetors. In her treatment of feminist 
rhetoric, Campbell considers the ways in which the public sphere and rhetorical 
performance were gendered masculine and the problems that this posed for women who 
wished to speak publicly: “The public realm was competitive, driven by 
ambition…Similarly, speaking was competitive, energized by the desire to win a case or 
persuade others to one’s point of view. These were viewed as exclusively masculine traits 
related to man’s allegedly lustful, ruthless, competitive, amoral, and ambitious nature. 
Activities requiring such qualities were thought to ‘unsex’ women” (11). While Campbell 
writes in regard to early nineteenth-century women, a look at Bunch’s assessment of 




very little had changed between the two periods.  Bunch explains that “the media’s 
portrayal of feminism and its leaders caused some resentment and confusion” because “as 
the movement grew, the media began to single out certain women as acceptable 
spokespersons for causes that received legislative legitimacy and widespread public 
attention. Though still frequently caricatured, these ‘safe’ leaders were most often while, 
middle-class, straight women who were portrayed as only wanting to learn how to play 
like the boys in order to get their share of the existing pie” (124). While women in 
Bunch’s moment had much more access to the media and to a public audience than they 
did during the time which Campbell refers to, the same gendered dynamics were 
nonetheless at play. The media selected for acceptable spokespersons, and these 
spokespersons were “unsexed” in the sense that they were portrayed as endeavoring 
toward a masculine mode of public participation but as not fully meeting the 
requirements. The idea of “wanting to learn how to play like the boys” speaks to this, and 
the reference to “playing” and the idea of “getting their share of the existing pie” suggests 
that the same competitive and glory-based motives Campbell discusses continued to 
inform notions of “productive” public discourse during Bunch’s time.  
For Jones, Steinem is more effective than Friedan at navigating the dilemma 
facing the movement’s leadership and at actively engaging its challenges. Steinem is 
aware of how her position as a “superstar” could negatively influence the women with 
and for whom she works, and this awareness is, Jones suggests, a necessary first step in 
the direction of responsible leadership. Reflecting on how this awareness surfaces in 




Why does Gloria feel she must begin her speeches by declaring that she has colds 
and dirty laundry just like everyone else? She’s probably responding to our need 
to reaffirm our potential through her success; to reassure ourselves that the line of 
humanity and womanhood that holds our world to hers is still intact. Such 
reassurance is healthy among people who are just beginning to flex their abilities 
as long as it is a projection of our potential, not an authority beyond our control. 
That authority, which most of us consider almost unapproachable, is created by a 
system whose values are far from those of the movement. (3)  
In this sense, individual superstardom can be productive for the movement at large, but 
only to the degree that it remains reflective of the community’s potential rather than 
suggestive of the individual’s exceptionality. The latter is especially counterproductive 
within the context of the women’s movement because it reintroduces the hierarchies and 
individualistic values structuring the patriarchal systems the movement has worked to 
deconstruct.  
Jones and off our backs were not, however, the only ones to recognize the 
challenges to female leadership and public intellectual presence posed by these social 
incommensurabilities. In “Woman Power and The Leadership Crisis,” an article 
originally published in Ms. in July of1980, Bunch directly addressed similar issues in 
similar terms. She wrote that the movement’s attempts to find functional leadership 
models “is complicated by society’s inability to honor or even acknowledge leadership 
from women, as well as by our own desire to create new styles of leadership that are not 
male-defined or hierarchical” (122). Like Jones, Bunch ties the search for these new 




and a reconceptualization of what “leadership” can mean, effectively drawing on 
rhetorical strategies of redefinition like those mentioned earlier. “Reacting to the power 
concentrations and star systems of male-dominated groups,” she writes, “the women’s 
liberation sector was opposed to hierarchy and in favor of collectives, which were seen as 
a means of eliminating ‘stars,’ sharing power, and fostering in every woman the 
responsibility to develop her own capabilities” (123). Of particular interest in Bunch’s 
characterization is the point about “fostering in every woman the responsibility to 
develop her own capabilities.” Bunch ties the cultivation of these capabilities to 
collectives, but I contend that rhetorically conscious public-intellectual leadership models 
could have much the same function. Granted, in order to have such a function and to be 
productive within the context of the feminist movement, a “superstar” would necessarily 
occupy a very precarious position in which she is both apart from and a part of the 
movement at large.  
 While Jones suggests that Steinem is actively working to maintain a model that is 
more productive for the women’s movement, she follows this discussion with a 
characterization of the media’s role in sustaining such models. Because “a superstar is the 
child of the media,” she writes. “Women can’t CHOOSE HER…But with the help of a 
feminist press, women can support her or expose her as not speaking for the women who 
are the movement” (3). Within this context, the feminist press becomes responsible for 
policing public-intellectual work associated with it mission. Again, then, the magazine 
itself becomes a functional component of public-intellectual potential, but its readership 
is asked to make use of the feminist press in supporting or rejecting the individuals 




intellectual in regard to the feminist movement does fit within the movement’s larger 
discursive goals in terms of its granting ultimate power to the participant-audience and its 
emphasis of the collective over the individual, it avoids accounting for the position of 
these particular superstars within the mainstream media. If women are to use the feminist 
press to support or expose the stars speaking for them, how is this support or exposure to 
become public enough to counter the prevailing assumptions about the stars that circulate 
to these wider audiences? It is at this point in the discussion that the relationship between 
the feminist press and its discursive strategies and the mainstream media becomes 
significant and intersects with contemporary work on the challenges of public-intellectual 
intervention.  
Using the lens of public intellectual to account for women involved in the public 
sphere is challenging because so little work has been done on the gendered dimension of 
public-intellectual engagement generally. Most current work on public intellectuals is 
concerned with how they move between the institutional contexts from which they derive 
their intellectual authority and the public sphere, but this particularly contextual 
displacement has not always been the one responsible for the challenges facing feminist 
intellectuals.24 Thinking about Friedan and Steinem as public intellectuals requires 
considering the ways in which they aligned themselves not with the traditional 
intellectual institutions like universities but rather with the intellectual community on 
which the women's movement itself was founded. Given this particular alignment and the 
pedagogical nature of the work that they did, I contend that movement women in 
leadership positions faced a number of the same challenges faced by traditional 
                                                          





intellectuals seeking to intervene in public discourse and make their work known outside 
of the academy. For such traditional intellectuals, discursive modes and rhetorical style 
are the keys to public presence, and feminist intellectuals are subject to similar, if not 
harsher, assessment on this front.  
In her book-length study on styles of public intellectual engagement, Anna Young 
offers a schema for assessing the connection between public-intellectual work and 
rhetorical style, saying that rhetorical style gives academics a means of seeing “the term 
public intellectual not as a noun but as a verb” (11).  Despite the fact that neither Friedan 
nor Steinem were directly linked to universities, their public engagement required similar 
attention to rhetorical style in the sense that they moved to account for the fact that the 
particular social realm with which they were aligned also had its own styles and modes of 
representation and required them to adapt these in productive ways when it came to 
representing the movement more public forums. To this end, Young's conception of 
fluidity becomes significant. In viewing Freidan's model in this light, we might describe 
her style as too fluid in the sense that it does not adhere to the rhetorical norms associated 
with the group for whom she is positioned as a spokesperson and whom she is meant to 
represent within these larger realms. Steinem's style, by contrast, might be seen as too 
rigid. She refuses to engage the mainstream press, neither adapting her style to theirs nor 
trusting their discursive modes to represent her message or position. The problem here, 
though, is that the press nonetheless portrays her and her relationship to the movement in 
ways most reflective of their goals. While, as Cheryl Glenn has persuasively argued, 
silence or abstaining from media engagement can be a powerful rhetorical move in its 




with the movement require a public outlet. While the feminist press itself provides this 
outlet in the short-term, the ultimate goal of the movement is to change the dominant 
realm. As Travis describes, women working to establish a feminist press “believed that 
they would not only create a space of freedom for women, but would also and ultimately 
change the dominant world outside that space” (276). In the process of constructing a 
self-sustaining discursive system, that is, movement organizers and participants hoped for 
a more expansively transformative social shift.  
Given this goal, it becomes important that the discursive modes for which 
feminist periodicals select and in which they train movement participants begin to 
infiltrate the mainstream media's practices. Otherwise, the skills that women have worked 
to cultivate through participation in the movement will only serve to separate them from 
these spheres of access and power. A productive intellectual model in this context would, 
then, need to strike a balance. It would need to find strategies for introducing and making 
use of alternative discursive models more reflective of the movement's goals and rhetoric 
within mainstream contexts. Steinem's speaking with Margaret Sloan is suggestive of 
such a strategy in the sense that it forces the press to acknowledge multiple perspectives 
and viewpoints and works against easy understandings of leadership and public 
intellectual guidance. The fact that this strategy is deployed only in the feminist press, 
though, robs it of some of its potential power. The movement's aims and goals really 
require an opening up of the mainstream discursive sphere, and the superstar’s more 
public presence perfectly situates her to facilitate this opening. While such an approach to 
public-intellectual work here could be seen as adhering to an accomodationist stance 




discursive structures and forms in place, it differs from Friedan’s in the sense that it 
moves through the doors already open only in order to bust through the windows. By 
using the public presence afforded them by the traditional leadership models on which 
the mainstream press operates, feminist superstars had the access necessary to begin to 
introduce alternative discourse practices to larger audiences and to begin to open these 
forums to movement women who had cultivated similar practices within the context of 
feminist forums.  
Ultimately, these modes of influence are important for public-intellectuals and the 
groups with which they are affiliated on a larger and more general scale. Just as Du 
Bois’s and Washington’s public personae shaped the social and political realms available 
to black men and women, and did so in drastically different ways, so too did these 
feminist intellectuals’. Public performances of intellectual work, including the discursive 
strategies to which they adhere and which they make available for public use, actively 
influence public discourse overall. It is important that would-be public intellectuals attend 
to this function of public-intellectual intervention, asking how their own rhetorical action 
or rhetorical modeling creates opportunities for meaningful public participation, 
especially on the part of groups or individuals frequently silenced or excluded. As 
discussed earlier, literacy crises often reflect anxieties over who is allowed to participate 
publically and politically and over what skill sets such participation requires. For this 
reason, arguments that adhere to rigid or conservative notions of what it means to be 
literate can function to exclude the very alternative voices and perspectives on which true 




In contrast to the previous two, the following chapter examines public-intellectual 
work more directly concerned with literacy and educational reform. I read Cold War-era 
educational documents to consider how wartime crisis rhetoric characteristic of the 
World Wars continued to influence discussions of American public schooling into the 
late 1980s. Like public intellectuals responding to long histories of racial and gender 
inequality, public intellectuals writing during the Cold War confronted problematic 
conflations between literate ability and social identity. On one side, the country’s 
technological needs trumped all, and the only way to truly contribute to your country was 
to be scientifically literate and productive. On the other side, the precarious state of world 
affairs required the democratic habits of mind and modes of critical thinking more 
characteristic of the humanities. It was in this modeling of democratic participation that 
Americans could set an example for citizens of other countries. Public intellectuals on 
both sides of the debate, however, faced the public pressure of Space Race crisis rhetoric, 









LAUNCHING THE AMERICAN CITIZEN: COLD WAR CRISES  
AND NATIONAL LITERACY NEEDS 
In 1981, Ronald Reagan’s Secretary of Education T.H. Bell assembled the 
National Commission on Excellence in Education, tasking the group of 18 educators, 
administrators, and politicians with examining the quality of education in America. After 
18 months of data collection, a process which included soliciting papers from experts, 
hearing testimony from interested parties at a series of meetings and panels, and sifting 
through letters from concerned citizens, the Commission issued the 1983 A Nation at 
Risk: The Imperative for Education Reform. Fewer than seventy pages in length, A 
Nation at Risk made up for its brevity with its bombast and elicited equally extreme 
responses from both supporters and critics. In this way, A Nation at Risk set the tone for 
discussions of education in the years following its publication, and its brand of crisis 
rhetoric became characteristic of discussions of Reagan-era educational reform. A Nation 
at Risk’s rhetorical structure, however, reflects a much longer history of educational 
debates in the United States, and its framing of education as integral to national security 
and American identity aligns with a number of treatments of educational policy and 
literacy that appeared following World War I. Given the needs of the nation within global 
contexts, certain modes of literacy education were seen as more attentive to the Cold War 
climate than others, and these modes of education were subsequently linked to new 
models of American citizenship and political participation. As education became 
politicized in these ways, it, unsurprisingly, became a hotly contested topic, and a number 




One of the central educational conflicts that emerged at this time was that 
between the hard sciences and the humanities. Given the role of technological 
advancement in the Cold War era, many argued that scientific literacy and achievement 
were central to maintaining a position as a world power and that American citizens had a 
responsibility to contribute to this end goal. An intellectual speaking for this perspective 
was Glenn T. Seaborg, the Nobel Prize-winning nuclear chemist. As a lead member of 
the Commission responsible for A Nation at Risk, Seaborg worked closely with both 
educational and political institutions; he held a professorship at the University of 
California, Berkeley and served as chancellor from 1958-1961 while also acting as 
adviser to every American president from Truman to Clinton. Under Kennedy, Seaborg 
was appointed Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission, and both Johnson and 
Nixon called upon him when the nation faced issues related to nuclear power.25 As a 
scientist laboring on the forefront of both education and politics, Seaborg contributed to A 
Nation at Risk in ways that reflected a national interest in technological and nuclear 
development, an interest that was linked to anxiety surrounding the unmatched discipline 
and quick growth of Soviet programs seeking the same.  
On the other side of debates over educational reform during this era was Mortimer 
Adler, the infamous public philosopher and founder of “Great Books of the Western 
World.” Dedicated to introducing philosophy and philosophical thought to the masses, 
Alder regularly wrote for large popular audiences rather than for academic specialists, 
and he adhered largely to Aristotelian traditions and methods, preserving an interest in 
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“common sense” derived from deliberation in the public sphere and a commitment to 
moral and ethical models linked to republicanism. His How to Read a Book sought to 
connect everyday people to the cultural knowledge and understanding embodied in great 
literature and was itself a best-seller and reprinted numerous times. In keeping with his 
previous work, Adler’s 1982 educational manifesto The Paideia Proposal represented the 
humanistic approach to educational reform. Rather than aiming to create a generation of 
scientists, American education, in Adler’s perspective, should concern itself with 
modeling and cultivating citizenship practices grounded in deliberative engagement with 
a range of subjects. It should instill in students habits of mind that would allow them to 
thoughtfully enter into discussion with others. In its most extreme version, the 
scientifically interested party was seen as advocating for a vocation-based education that 
was more concerned with the cold facts of production and quantifiable innovation, while 
the humanists maintained a focus on the qualitative aspects of education that encouraged 
philosophical engagement with complex topics like the human-rights and justice based 
issues that stemmed from new global contexts and tensions.  
As mentioned above, both approaches responded to the same set of ideological 
and economical challenges that defined the late Cold War climate of the early 1980s. 
Adler and his group were working on the Paideia Proposal while Seaborg and the 
Commission completed their inquiries, and the Proposal was first published less than a 
year prior to A Nation at Risk. While the two educational plans were not direct responses 
to one another or in immediate dialogue, they represent two very different intellectual 
approaches to education that were nonetheless born of the same crisis-heated crucible. As 




as capstones to their decades of work on national education. While Adler arguably had 
more control over the Proposal than Seaborg had over the A Nation at Risk, many of the 
latter’s central concerns do link to work Seaborg did individually in the years leading up 
to its publication. In what follows, I consider the intellectual perspectives and rhetorical 
approaches both men took to the issue of national education in late Cold War contexts as 
a means of examining how functional rhetorical intervention required a 
reconceptualization of American citizenship based on the needs of a nation very much at 
risk in more ways than one.  
In addition to the direct influence of the Cold War on the American public and the 
place that this public envisioned for education, I work here to account for the intellectual 
climate more generally as it was affected by the moment’s characteristic anxieties and 
their public expression. The rise of anti-intellectualism following the World Wars and 
peaking, or perhaps plateauing, in the 1950s and early 1960s is one of the largest forces 
structuring intellectual work produced during this time. A trend materially embodied in 
everyman Eisenhower’s victory over the egghead Adlai Stevenson in 1952, the anti-
intellectual movement seems oxymoronic when placed in its Space Race context and 
considered alongside the nation’s desperation for technological and scientific 
advancement. An important feature of the anti-intellectual mindset as it manifested 
among the American people, however, was the distinction between functional 
brainpower, typically applied to scientific and technological fields, and ineffectual 
philosophical musing, associated with humanities fields and the soft sciences.  
In his study of the development of the “egghead” as a highly politicized cultural 




cultural movements” aimed at everyday Americans, and he notes that these movements 
responded to “the tension between affirming the intelligence of marginalized groups and 
resisting the narrowly defined labeling of intellectuals in the United States” (9). 
Significantly, brainpower was seen more in terms of production and social capital, 
whereas such definitions might exclude, or functionally occlude, the potential benefit of 
more cerebrally confined intellectual effort. The characterization of intellect as a 
requirement for social mobility still influenced discussions of brainpower, though, and 
the multitude of forms it took among various groups, especially when these forms seemed 
to be in conflict with one another or when they were applied for contradictory ends. In 
the first half of the twentieth century, the very idea of intellect and its role in American 
culture was in constant flux as a result of the shifting identity of the American populous 
itself, in part because the idea of intellect as social capital could function both 
conservatively and subversively. According to Lecklider: 
Intelligence represented a site of conflict that put the concerns of ordinary 
Americans—especially those who were not profiting from brainwork—at the 
center of a discourse concerning ideology and identities; class and conflict; and 
the shifting politics of race, gender, and sexuality. The tension between those who 
sought to use intelligence to enforce and maintain their power and those who 
imagined intelligence as a site of empowerment for ordinary men and women 
simmered below the surface of even the more seemingly innocuous cultural texts 
and practices.  (227) 
In this sense, the majority of American people had access to the social capital linked to 




academic class and could be tied to their everyday lived experiences and labor-based 
contributions. The national need for active engagement with and functional response to 
the cultural climate and its pressing anxieties facilitated this decoupling. Given the lived 
experience of the Cold War and the character of the Soviet threat in terms of scientific 
production and tangible technological creation, intellectual thought in, of, and for itself 
was rendered as a waste of resources, and within wartime contexts, there was no greater 
sin than wastefulness.  
The most complete account of the anti-intellectual climate dominating American 
political development in the second half of the twentieth-century is Richard Hofstadter’s 
oft-cited Anti-intellectualism in American Life. Published in the 1960s, the monograph 
engages the anti-intellectual movement at a relatively nascent stage, and the forces it 
outlines were only amplified by the time Seaborg and Adler made their contributions to 
the Cold War educational debate, although these forces took a slightly different form in 
the years following Sputnik. Focusing on the 1950s as the time at which the concept of 
anti-intellectualism entered the national consciousness and on the 1952 election between 
Stevenson and Eisenhower, Hofstadter writes that “the political ferment and educational 
controversy of the 1950s made the term anti-intellectual a central epithet in American 
self-evaluation; it has slipped unobtrusively into our usage without much definition and is 
commonly used to describe a variety of unwelcome phenomenon” (6). Here, and 
elsewhere, Hofstadter suggests that the term itself came into being and gained social 
currency as the name for a problem that Americans identified within their own political 
existence and national experience. He does, however, note that the emergence of the term 




political atmosphere in question as a problem, had never been part of the American 
experience before. Such an assessment of the issue would suggest a lack of familiarity 
with American history in a general sense. “Our anti-intellectualism is, in fact, older than 
our national identity, and has a long historical background” (6), Hofstadter writes, 
contending that regard for the intellectual within American society is subject to the 
fluctuation and tends to increase or decline in a cyclical fashion across time.  
Given that the Cold War intellectuals were primarily concerned with developing a 
model of American identity that would inspire a set of citizenship practices capable of 
sustaining this identity against the Soviet threat, the centrality of anti-intellectualism itself 
to the historical development of this national identity is a significant point to consider. 
The fact that Hofstadter links the concept and its popularity to its rhetorical force within 
crisis contexts makes this connection all the more resonant. Explaining that anti-
intellectualism is itself subject to a number of definitions and argumentative usages, 
Hofstadter writes that the term’s “very vagueness makes it more serviceable in 
controversy as an epithet,” which speaks to the concept’s function as a scapegoat for 
social or political ills that might not be attributable to a single source otherwise. Much 
like the concept of crisis itself and its capacity for sustaining argumentative engagement 
grounded in a problem/solution dichotomy based on its rhetorical deployment and 
framing, the amorphous concept of anti-intellectualism functions as a persuasive-
because-common issue that can be held responsible for a range of public discontents.  
In order to provide a history of the concept, Hofstadter must define it in some 
way, and he offers the following: “The common strain that binds together the attitudes 




mind and of those who are considered to represent it; and a disposition constantly to 
minimize the value of that life” (7). Immediately, this definition speaks to a notion of 
one’s individual citizenship practices in terms of what they contribute to a national 
project. Within these contexts, dedicating oneself to living “the life of the mind” is a 
selfish endeavor, and the intellectual’s seeming refusal to produce anything tangible for 
the betterment of his or her fellow Americans is suspicious insofar as it is un-American. 
In prioritizing the productive capacities of citizenship and the communal elements of 
national life, such an orientation to intellectual “work” constructs a value-system in 
which this work is judged in terms of what it fails to produce rather than in terms of what 
it can actually offer. Against the backdrop of wartime rhetoric and national policies 
obsessed with mobilization efforts, expedited production, and the hyper-efficient use of 
all available resources, this characterization of intellectual practice is easily seen as 
dangerous idleness and as a waste of human capital that the nation, facing its most drastic 
global crisis, could not afford. I turn now to this rhetorical backdrop and its discursive 
development within the contexts of the debate surrounding educational reform from 
World War I to the Cold War. 
 
The Wartime Paradigm: Educational Policy, Literacy, and International Conflict 
 According to A Nation at Risk’s introduction, the Commission was formed as 
part of  Secretary Bell’s response to what he viewed as ‘the widespread public perception 
that something is seriously remiss in our educational system,’ a perception linked to the 
international tensions of the Cold War and to the related uncertainty surrounding 




real and pressing, and the rhetoric of A Nation at Risk itself amplified this sense of danger 
in the process of proffering its educational assessment. Significantly, the threat that A 
Nation at Risk identifies is unlike others in the sense that it is a threat from within. 
Despite the nation’s strong educational history, “the educational foundations of our 
society are presently being eroded by a rising tide of mediocrity that threatens our future 
as a Nation and a people” (5). Even so, the threat was continually framed within its 
international context and in terms commensurate with the experience of war. “If an 
unfriendly foreign power had attempted to impose on America the mediocre educational 
performance that exists today,” A Nation at Risk reads, “we might well have viewed it as 
an act of war.” The destabilizing force of the country’s poor educational system is 
rendered here as powerful enough to have been weaponized and used against an enemy 
nation. Education is integral to national security, and attacks on the system of education 
are attacks on the nation itself.  
As far as the Commission is concerned, however, the American people are 
themselves responsible for the dire state of things: “As it stands, we have allowed this to 
happen to ourselves. We have even squandered the gains in student achievement made in 
the wake of the Sputnik challenge. Moreover, we have dismantled essential support 
systems which helped make those gains possible. We have, in effect, been committing an 
act of unthinking, unilateral educational disarmament” (5). Following the advances made 
at the height of the Cold War, Americans as a people mistakenly laid down their 
textbooks and microscopes; they became complacent and allowed the systems by which 
they had achieved relative security to fall to waste. Interestingly, this disarmament differs 




because of its passivity. Inaction on the part of American citizens has led to a decrease in 
educational achievement, and responding to the Commission’s report will require a more 
active engagement. 
Framing the country’s educational needs in terms of international contexts, even 
when those contexts were determined by philosophical or ideological tensions not (yet) 
materially realized, was a rhetorical strategy employed in much earlier reform 
movements and their supporting documents as well. During WWII, a number of 
government groups and agencies issued reports regarding the state of education relative 
to the nation’s current wartime status and in preparation for the country’s post-war needs. 
These discussions of education and its role in national security aligned with the rhetorical 
strategies deployed in treatments of militarization and industrialization, and these tropes 
remained central into the late Cold War period, influencing the public-intellectual work 
of both Seaborg and Adler. One example of these reports is Higher Education under War 
Conditions, a handbook published by the University of Chicago’s Institute for 
Administrative Officers of Higher Institutions in 1943 and edited by John Dale Russell, 
who would later become President Truman’s Director for Higher Education. The Institute 
was organized for four purposes:  
(1) to provide opportunity for the discussion of common interest to administrative 
officers; (2) to stimulate critical discussions of current trends and proposed 
reforms in higher education; (3) to describe the methods employed under, and 
results secured in, experiments carried on in various colleges and universities; and 
(4) to stimulate further study of the many perplexing problems that arise in the 




Working toward these ends, Higher Education under War Conditions tackled four topics: 
“(1) voluntary education under the auspices of the armed forces; (2) use of educational 
institutions by federal agencies; (3) experiences of institutions with specialized training 
programs for the armed forces; and (4) problems of institutional management under war 
conditions” (111). Despite representing primarily militaristic and governmental 
perspectives regarding the intersection of public education and the wartime experience, 
the handbook nonetheless illustrates the central tensions structuring the nation’s 
educational concerns at large and exemplifies a number of the rhetorical approaches 
commonly taken to address them.  
 In keeping with the quatrain structure outlined above, I identify four pervasive 
rhetorical topoi at work in the majority of the essays collected in the handbook, as well as 
in other texts constructed for similar purposes: crisis, efficiency, political 
neutrality/individual freedom, and victory. All four themes appear again and again in 
discussions of American education from WWII through to the Cold War. The first of 
these should come as no surprise given the central focus of this larger project. Within this 
particular wartime moment, though, a functional and persuasive rendering of the crisis 
moment in terms of educational need required a significant redistribution of anxieties. 
Given the very real, very evident threats associated with WWII, encouraging Americans 
to pay attention to the day-to-day activities of their relatively safe and secure schools 
posed a challenge. Why should resources be directed to the classrooms when men were 
dying overseas? Recontextualizing the crisis in a way that situated the country’s needs in 
terms of long-term solutions that mobilized the forces on the homefront was a common 




reality that Americans faced every day in the form of rations and related patriotic ad 
campaigns. For this reason, the rhetoric of efficiency likely proved especially persuasive, 
fitting with the overall narrative of the country’s needs and recognizing the sacrifices that 
those on the homefront made for the war efforts. Based on this particular topos and its 
deployment in documents concerned with educational reform, education was to be 
viewed in terms of wartime industry; nothing was to be wasted, and every piece and 
possible resource was to be channeled toward the country’s ultimate goals.  
Despite the ways that the rhetorics of crisis and efficiency suggested collectivity 
and cooperation, maintaining a commitment to the central American values associated 
with individual freedom and one’s right to choice remained important. After all, what 
good were such cooperative efforts if they were not aimed at protecting the cornerstone 
of American ideology? Responding to this need was the rhetoric of political neutrality, 
which the authors of these educational handbooks deployed to remind readers what 
exactly they were fighting for. In the process of contributing to the war effort by 
supporting and enacting such educational policies, citizens were maintaining their own 
freedoms. Such policies, then, might seem politically motivated or as if they were 
encouraging conformity, but the authors were quick to remind readers of the larger stakes 
and ultimate ends. In this way, the various rhetorics can be seen as working together in a 
telescopic fashion: arguments focused on the larger and more enduring issues of 
American ideology could be deployed to justify arguments concerned with the specific 
needs of the crisis moment as it was being experienced.  
The final commonplace deployed consistently in wartime educational handbooks 




resource-based needs, and linking both of these issues to the conservation of American 
freedom, it seems necessary to remind readers that all remains dependent upon America’s 
victory on the world stage. While efforts at home can and should be considered in terms 
of the contribution they are making to these longitudinally oriented aims, the real and 
most immediate goal is to win the war. Again, the effect here is that readers, including 
parents and teachers as well as educational administrators, were made to see themselves 
as contributing to a situation that was geographically distant to most, both in terms of 
their cooperative efforts and in terms of their individual commitments. Overall, these four 
topoi interact in Higher Education under War Conditions and in other educational 
handbooks focused on wartime schooling reform in ways that highlight the contested 
place of education during times of crisis as well as the need for a unified national 
narrative defending educational interests.26  
In the Handbook on Education and the War, the published proceedings of the 
National Institute on Education and the War that was sponsored by the U.S. Office of 
Education Wartime Commission at American University at Washington, D.C. in the 
summer of 1942, the same primary concerns dominated. The result of a joint effort, the 
volume was edited by Administrator of the Federal Security Agency Paul V. McNutt and 
Commissioner of the U.S. Office of Education John W. Studebaker. Included in the front 
of the volume is a statement from Franklin D. Roosevelt addressing the “educators of the 
United States:” “Our schools, public and private, have always been molds in which we 
cast the kind of life we wanted. Today, what we all want is victory, and beyond victory a 
world in which free men may fulfill their aspirations. So we turn again to our educators 
and ask them to help us mold men and women who can fight through to victory. We ask 
                                                          




that every school house become a service center for the home front” (III). Blurring the 
lines between those at home and those abroad, this statement, appearing alongside 
Studebaker’s introduction to the collection, speaks to the movement for the unification of 
American effort and the deployment of the country’s resources. If the end goal was 
victory, then every citizen’s work must be understood in terms of how it contributed to 
that goal. This figurative militarization of the home front is even more direct in the 
introduction: 
The army of education has a real job to do in helping to supply our army of 
fighters and our army of workers with properly trained men and women. 
Educators know the size of their job, but they do not shrink from it. On the 
contrary, from the very moment the war was forced on us by the Axis powers, 
educators have been asking, ‘In what ways can we help the most?’ (IX) 
Those responsible for educating America’s youth are themselves figured as an army, and 
Studebaker is sure to emphasize the extreme nature of their task and the courage with 
which they have already faced the enemy. The current conflict is not a war that America 
has chosen, he notes, but that has not stopped citizens for doing their part to help the war 
effort. And, as always, the stakes are clear: “For win this war we must, if we are to 
destroy the threat of world-dominant fascism, and preserve for ourselves and for the 
world our heritage of democracy and freedom” (IX). Based on his rendering of the 
educator’s role in the war effort, Studebaker links education to the preservation of 
American identity and to the potential for democratic freedom the world over.  
As was the case in the first handbook, this handbook’s overall suggestion was that 




further adapted to account for wartime needs. In making the case for such targeted 
adaptation, Paul McNutt’s “Statement to the U.S. Office of Education Wartime 
Commission Concerning the Work of the Schools in Relation to the War” emphasized the 
immediacy of the country’s requirements. “It has become increasingly evident that the 
present world conflict has reached such proportions and such a stage that every force at 
the command of the people of the United States must be thrown into the war, at the 
earliest possible moment,” he explained. “The time of victory will be reduced in 
proportion to the extent to which we fully utilize these forces. Education must make its 
special and particular contribution to the struggle. Fighting with learning is the slogan of 
victory” (XIII).  
In service of this less-than-catchy slogan, McNutt and other contributors 
characterized the current moment in terms of its exceptionality. Given that the country 
had never before faced a challenge as great as that it faced currently, the standing systems 
and approaches were inappropriate, and continuing along already-forged paths was 
indefensible. Change was the only answer. In some cases, this notion of exceptionality 
was extended to the educational forces asked to undertake the adaptation efforts in ways 
that further cemented their relationship to the war effort. McNutt, for instance, 
proclaimed that “never was there a time when educational workers faced heavier 
responsibilities for adjusting the school program to a great national need. Never was there 
a time when these workers might take greater pride in the significance of their work, 
never a better opportunity to serve children, young people, and the Nation” (XIII). By 
acknowledging that the current demands made of educators were unlike anything ever 




is traditional and conventional. If contemporary educators want to rise to the needs of 
their country, they will need to innovate.  
 In an even more direct treatment of this final point, McNutt suggests that part of 
what the current moment requires is a redefinition of education itself. Linking this 
requirement again to the crisis moment, he contends that “the urgency of the situation 
requires that important adjustments be made in the programs of the elementary and high 
schools immediately. There is not time to be overly strict in definitions regarding the 
functions of education” (XIII). Again, the idea is that an overly traditional approach to 
education would be inappropriate and inattentive to the country’s actual needs. 
Interestingly, McNutt seems especially aware of American education’s long-time 
preference for tradition and convention. In offering his own definition, one suited to the 
wartime climate, he emphasizes the fact that education itself has, in fact, undergone a 
steady evolution over the years and is comfortably subject to rethinking:  
There have been many definitions of education. I will give you a short one suited 
to this grave hour. Education is the shortest distance between two points. Our 
Nation today is a contestant in the greatest war of all history. All our energies, all 
our resources of men and materials, are being mobilized to carry us from the 
position of contestant to another point—victory. Education can help us to shorten 
the distance to victory. (4)  
By suggesting that education has meant a number of things and referred to a number of 
methods over the course of American history, McNutt simultaneously emphasizes the 
continuity of change and highlights the exceptional character of the current moment. 




themselves are not unknown or unfamiliar within the country’s development; therefore, 
they are not to be feared. The particular definition that McNutt provides here is important 
in its references both to efficiency and to wartime victory as the end goal of American 
educational reform. Within this context, education is instrumentalized, rendered as a 
means of making the war effort as efficient as possible. Working from such a definition 
justifies any practices or activities that serve this function in terms of their “educational” 
potential. The needs of the war effort take precedent, and the goal of education is to help 
rather than to hinder.  
Acting under the auspices of the Civic Education Service, Director of the Service 
Walter E. Myer and his colleague Craig Coss, managing editor of The American 
Observer and the Weekly News Review, published a volume entitled Education for 
Democratic Survival that took up issues similar to those confronted by the National 
Institute on Education and the War. Published in the same year, the work responded to 
the same urgencies and concerns, but did so from a less military-driven perspective. 
Nonetheless, Myers and Coss deployed a number of the same rhetorical strategies in the 
process of making a case for their favored educational programs. As expected, the book 
opens with a description of the crisis moment:  
We are threatened today with the loss of almost everything we hold dear—
comforts, security, freedom, independence, life. With our backs to the wall we 
fight grimly for survival. We expect eventual victory after a long struggle, but a 
victory won only through bitter sacrifices and sorrow. It is a situation which a few 




 Once again, we have the moment represented as a serious threat to the continuity of 
American life and identity as we know it. What is at stake is the viability of the most 
characteristic of American values.  
In contrast to the authors of the handbooks discussed above, Myers and Coss take 
a slightly more critical approach to the current moment, grounding its most significant 
threats in mistakes of the past and offering a historical trajectory in which their 
educational efforts might functionally intervene. “Why are we in such a tragic position 
today?” they ask readers before immediately stating that “every thinking person knows 
the answer:” 
It is because a quarter of a century ago we fought a war that we didn’t 
understand. We didn’t know what to do with victory when it came; didn’t know 
how to organize and maintain peace; didn’t know how to handle our own 
domestic problems, how to maintain stable industry in a land of plenty. (vii) 
Ultimately, these lapses in knowledge are the result of a single failure among the 
American people: “The trouble was that the levels of political enlightenment were not 
high enough.” Not only were politicians not prepared for the unprecedented social and 
cultural shifts spurred by the First World War, but also the voters were often misinformed 
and steered otherwise knowledgeable representatives in unproductive directions. Given 
this particular rendering of the crisis moment, the fallout that might follow comes as no 
surprise. With the Nation “confronted by the necessity of winning a desperate war, and of 
restoring order amidst utter ruin,” Myers and Coss contend that “we need to inaugurate a 
great campaign of political enlightenment, a campaign such as the world has never seen” 




did, Myers and Coss set the stage for a particularly extreme description of what is at 
stake: “If democracy is to survive, the political education of the masses must proceed step 
by step with the mechanical and military advances. If it does not, the little children of 
today will pay the price tomorrow in blood and tears” (viii).  
While Myers and Coss use the rhetoric of militarization to emphasize the need for 
political competence, they are less invested in the unifying principles that might link life 
at home to life on the front. It is not that education must serve to prepare men and women 
for a seamless transition into the armed forces, but rather that it must prepare future 
leaders and citizens to contend with the political issues associated with and stemming 
from the war condition. More so than the previously discussed crisis narratives, Myers 
and Coss’s seeks to contextualize the current moment in terms of its causes and in a way 
that encourages deliberative and philosophical engagement with its possible 
consequences. The narrative is grounded in and responsive to the current need, but it 
resists being wholly subsumed by it, as many of the other narratives are. In their assertion 
that the definitions of education not be so restricted as to be rendered unresponsive (I 
imagine that traditional models of liberal education would be counted among such 
potentially detached and, thus, irresponsible approaches), the previous discussions allow 
the immediate needs to overwhelm more longitudinally focused concerns. Success in 
educational reforms is linked solely to the outcome of the war, and there is no discussion 
of what it might mean for the post-war period. On the other hand, Myers and Coss invest 
in an educational model specifically designed to contend with the issues they deem 
responsible for the war, namely the citizenry’s inability to respond to the political 




 In some sense, this difference between the accounts offered by the first two 
handbooks and the account offered by Myers and Coss is a difference between thinking 
about literacy as an applied skill and thinking about literacy as a mode of analytical 
engagement. Within the direct, and indirect, discussions of literacy in two handbooks and 
in similar venues, literacy is largely rendered as a discreet skill set that can be deployed 
when the need arises, such as when one finds themselves in a bunker under enemy fire 
and faced with decoding the instructions for assembling a new piece of artillery. The 
need, however, selects for very particular skills, and one achieves literate standing only 
when their individual abilities align with these needs and their larger national aims. While 
Myers and Coss offer a similarly utilitarian educational model in the sense that it, too, 
responds to specific needs, the nature of these needs is that they require a more 
ideological, critical engagement with the forms of knowledge that schools might impart 
to their students. This mode of literacy is similarly dependent upon a base of knowledge, 
but it moves beyond direct application to allow for an informed overall orientation to the 
subject matter and to its role in particular contexts. If the handbooks’ authors were 
concerned with cultivating skills that would allow students to know how to act within war 
contexts, Myers and Coss hoped to supplement this with educational models that would 
ensure that they knew the why, too. This orientation extends the crisis moment in a way 
that characterizes the current war itself as a symptom of a more enduring problem, 
thereby redirecting the urgency and immediacy that the crisis moment affords to less 
temporally dependent modes of thought and models for citizenship.  
 Despite this more philosophical engagement, Myers and Coss do still rely on the 




other “industries” have been converted over the course of war, giving the motor industry 
as an example. “Organized American education,” however, “watches the battle of the 
giants from the side lines. The great work it might do in this crisis of civilization is being 
left undone” while “other industries are in the thick of the fight” (ix). From their 
perspective, they view the education “industry’s” failure to adapt as particularly 
egregious given the extremity of the situation. “We are in a far more dangerous war than 
we were a quarter of a century ago, they explain, and “if we win we will be confronted by 
problems of peace and stability infinitely more difficult than the problems which 
confronted and defeated us then.” If the nation stumbled following WWI, Myers and 
Coss foresee an even greater struggle following the end of WWII, even if victory is 
achieved.  
Here and at other points in their discussion, Myers and Coss challenge the victory 
trope so common in the other crisis narratives. Based on their rendering of the crisis, 
victory itself will never be enough. In order for the nation to avoid the pitfalls victory 
brought following WWI, the general populace needs to cultivate an entirely new 
orientation to WWII’s political causes and consequences. This orientation requires that 
the American public be “better prepared in knowledge, in disciplined thinking, in 
scientific and reasonable temper” than they were in the past. Essentially, Myers and Coss 
are concerned here with enduring habits of mind rather than with discreet and directly 
applicable literacy skills. As it stands, however, such habits will not be cultivated through 
formal education “unless the schools rise quickly to meet the crisis, unless they do as the 
motor and other industries have done, unless they adopt a program of political 




the topoi so persuasively constructed by the more militaristic handbooks and so 
commonly circulated through mass media treatments of the wartime climate in order to 
advocate for a very different model of educational reform with a very different, though 
not completely unrelated, end goal.  
Within the context of this more politically philosophical approach to the 
educational challenges facing the nation, Myers and Coss also speak to the invigorating 
nature of the crisis moment and its inherent potentiality. While there are a number of 
concerning developments tied to the experience of crisis, “the war has set in motion 
powerful forces which may be turned to peaceful and progressive uses” (5). Again, this 
approach to the issue forces readers to consider the state of things as they will exist 
beyond the war. Once peace has been achieved, the momentum of homefront 
militarization need not be abandoned or even scaled back; in fact, it can be channeled 
toward more enduring and productive ends. Myers and Coss contend that the war “has 
proved that miracles can be performed through organized effort where there is agreement 
on objectives. Achievements of science, engineering, organization, almost stagger the 
imagination. They have been performed in all warring countries, regardless of forms of 
society and government; in Germany, Japan, Russia, England, and the United States” (5). 
In making this final point, Myers and Coss put the United States in league with other 
world powers, both allies and enemies, effectively emphasizing the universal nature of 
human achievement within the current crisis contexts. This rhetorical alignment would 
have no place in the more victory-focused educational handbooks, which were interested 
in establishing a sense of American exceptionalism derived from the nation’s individual 




it functions to remind readers of the more humanistic nature of scientific achievement, a 
point which is further underscored by the references to miracles and imagination. While 
the technological advancements referenced took mechanical forms, Myers and Coss 
highlight the human element responsible for such creation. This again illustrates their 
interest in linking the moment’s current education needs, even those concerned with 
science and technological development, to a more philosophical dimension, an interest 
which few of their contemporaries shared.  
The force of nationalist sympathies, however, cannot be ignored, and Myers and 
Coss quickly return to such discourses themselves. Contrasting the current moment’s 
movement to the “lethargy of the depression days,” a time “when faith in the organizing 
power of nations was waning,” they assert that “we can still act vigorously as a nation. 
The world’s inhabitants can reach far-off goals when the national will is set at the job.” In 
addition to distinguishing between the depression era and the wartime period on the basis 
of national response, Myers and Coss distinguish between the current moment’s necessity 
and the future’s possibility. “Today,” they note, nations “are performing miracles of 
organizing how to destroy their neighbors. Tomorrow they may use their new-found 
powers in the interest of human welfare. Who knows? Forces of altruism and idealism are 
undoubtedly at work these days, along with the darker influences” (5). While this section 
of the discussion continues to emphasize the potential for wartime advancement to 
positively affect life in the post-war period, its references to destruction and the “darker 
influences” pass more of a judgment on wartime activities than previous sections’ 
characterizations. In part, this more direct assessment facilitates a shift to an assessment 




“there is in the democratic countries a potent will to peace and justice. These forces 
cannot at this time be measured, but they are strong and pervasive enough to justify a 
hope that the peoples of the world may be shocked ‘back into sanity’ to such an extent 
that decline may be arrested” (5-6). While all countries, regardless of political structure, 
are capable of technical advancement, this final point positions democratic nations as 
being able to act as a moral compass for the rest of the world in the post-war period. If 
this is, in fact, the case and if America is poised to take its place as a model nation 
following the events of the war, then the ethical burden placed upon the average 
American citizen is all the greater, and the nation’s educational institutions has a yet 
greater responsibility to prepare these citizens for such work.  
 
Cooling Off and Heating Up: From WWII Trenches to Cold War Laboratories 
The suggestion that Americans are, or will be, particularly well-suited to function 
as world leaders was not isolated to Myers and Coss’s account, especially in the years 
immediately following the war. In 1949, the Educational Policies Commission of the 
National Education Association of the United States and the American Association of 
School Administrators published A Nation at Risk American Education and International 
Tensions, which addressed the post-war anxieties lingering in educational programs. As 
the Foreword reminds readers, the country and world have undergone significant changes 
in the last decade, and the pace of change is unlikely to slow: 
Although it is true that many Americans lack the experience, the ready access to 
reliable information, and the political sagacity necessary for a fully satisfactory 




American people have consciously accepted that challenge and that they ardently 
desire, within the limits of their understanding and power, to make every 
contribution of which they are capable. (19) 
According to the authors, the American spirit is, in itself, something that individual 
citizens can model for the rest of the world and something which can have a positive 
effect in the contexts of post-war rebuilding. The description of what Americans lack, 
however, aligns with the assessment that Myers and Coss offer in the sense that there are 
limitations on the resources provided to Americans that to some degree inhibit their 
political abilities. American citizens are without “ready access to information” and 
without “political sagacity,” but they are nonetheless expected to model democratic life 
for the rest of the world. The willingness of every American to assume this leadership 
role for the good of global society is rendered as compensating in some way for this lack. 
Ultimately, this notion of individual responsibility becomes integral to the act of 
American citizenship, which is linked again to the current state of international affairs as 
well as to national influence. A Nation at Risk emphasizes that “just as every American is 
personally affected by the solutions found for the problems that trouble the world, so 
every American can play a part in effecting these solutions.” As was the case in the 
wartime handbooks for educational reform, this post-war model depends upon striking a 
careful balance between individual freedom and national cooperation. While Americans 
as individuals have the ability to function as models for members of other nations, it is 
their status as Americans that grants them this power.  While “the individual does have 
influence in world affairs” even if “the extent of that influence may seem very small in 




A Nation at Risk argues that “the potential influence of the individual American in 1949 
is relatively large” (19).  Again, the national identity of the individual in question 
becomes an important qualifying characteristic, a point which is only further underscored 
when A Nation at Risk considers the global climate in the years to come. 
  While Americans in the postwar years might have already had the power that A 
Nation at Risk describes, it is especially important for citizens to realize that:  
…the American citizen of the 1950s will possess a considerably greater ability to 
affect world accords than his grandfather had. And his power will be, as it is now, 
significantly greater than that of most other persons in other parts of the world. 
Probably the typical American for years to come will have a larger role in shaping 
the future of mankind than will the typical citizen of any other country. (19-20)  
Given the current state of international affairs, then, it becomes all the more significant 
that the next generation of American be better prepared than their predecessors to accept 
the burden placed on the citizens of such an influential world power. The need for this 
particular form of preparation is the point at which educational reform could intervene. 
The image on A Nation at Risk’s cover illustrates the potential promise of American 
youth in these same terms, showing a couple of schoolchildren—a boy and a girl—being 
lifted above the turmoil of poverty and oppression as it is represented in the figures of a 
woman and child enveloped in the shadows cast by a large hand shackled to a crumbling 
building. Supported by a second, and noticeably less oppressive, large hand, the boy and 
girl stand illuminated against the dark scene below, a halo of light surrounding them. 
Under their arms, they each hold a schoolbook, and above them is a pane of glass through 




in the upper half of the image suggesting that the children alone have access to this 
“window onto the world.” Overall, the image positions American children as the sole 
possessors of the special vantage point that contending with current international tensions 
requires and characterizes them as potential saviors who should be equipped with the 
global and political knowledge contained within the textbooks and educational materials 
to which they alone have access. They are, however, supported by, and dependent upon, 
the unshackled hand, which symbolizes a democratic freedom that stands in opposition to 
a Soviet totalitarianism and which again emphasizes the significance of characteristically 
American values and perspectives relative to the children’s global influence. Despite the 
outcome of the war, the image forcefully contends, America’s job is not yet done, and the 
children are the ones who must be prepared to face what is to come next.  
It is, ultimately, within these international contexts that post-war educational 
policies developed, and the fact that they were responding to such a historically resonant 
and (literally) earth-shattering series of events was clear in their treatment of cultural and 
societal development generally. “Educational policy depends partly upon endeavors to 
shape the course of human events and partly on endeavors to predict them, a balance 
between ideals and anticipated realities,” A Nation at Risk contends. “We can look back 
now over the past ten years and perceive that profound changes have occurred in 
American life, largely as a result of worldwide forces let loose by war and postwar 
conditions” (iii). Given that the postwar conditions that currently influence the course of 
national and international life are “likely to continue into the adulthood of the children 
now in school,” the Educational Policies Commission explains that schools must respond 




here as functioning somewhat as a hinge, and educational policy designed to respond to 
the moving target of a country defined by change and growth needed to be attentive to the 
actual life experiences of the populace facing this change and responsible for this growth.  
This hinge-like function of the contemporary moment is further emphasized in A 
Nation at Risk’s understanding of the “world situation” as it is defined by “two major 
pairs of contradictory forces.” A Nation at Risk identifies two paradoxes responsible for 
current international tensions: “the first of these paradoxes is that of a world brought 
closer together and yet of a world split asunder,” and “the second paradox is that of a 
world sorely afraid and yet incurable hopeful” (1). Within the context of the first paradox, 
A Nation at Risk considers the role of science and technology as they have served to bring 
nations into closer contact with one another but have done so despite deepening 
ideological divides. The second paradox seemingly responds to the climate created by the 
tension of the first, emphasizing the fact that military preparations have not ceased since 
the end of the war and that future conflict seems inevitable.  
Based on this understanding of the crisis moment and its needs, the Commission 
outlines three broad topics which the American system of education should consider and 
should attempt to reflect in pedagogical and literacy-based reform efforts. The 
Commission contends that students, in preparation for functional citizenship, should be 
equipped with an “ability to recognize and reduce the lag between social change and 
technological advancement,” a “devotion to the ideals of peace and realistic efforts to 
promote international cooperation,” and an “ability to understand and meet the 




Although A Nation at Risk does not deal with the exact means by which schools or 
individual teachers might go about instilling such abilities and commitments in students, 
it does emphasize the degree to which the same abilities and commitments are necessary 
for full democratic participation and would contribute to a better functioning American 
society overall. “In a society that grants universal suffrage,” A Nation at Risk reads, 
“these insights, abilities, and drives should be developed through education to the greatest 
possible degree among the total population” (28). The modes of literacy being privileged 
here do not take the form of discreet skill sets or decoding practices, but rather they are 
philosophical orientations and judgement-based commitments that are rendered as 
capable of producing a strong population of knowledgeable voters. Based on this 
understanding of national and international crisis, both as it currently exists and as it 
might exist in the future, American schools must encourage a literacy that breeds 
democratic citizenship and which serves the national patriotic interest.  
 In its more direct treatment of how schools should contend with the threat of 
totalitarianism, A Nation at Risk’s patriotic project becomes all the more evident, 
particularly in terms of the school’s role in securing strong national loyalties. 
Recognizing that “to develop the kind of patriotism that is true to the best ideals of 
America is a major educational task,” A Nation at Risk argues that “the schools must act 
upon a reasoned conviction that patriotic citizenship involves responsible action with 
respect to the international duties and commitments of the people of the United States” 
(36). Importantly, the current state of world affairs requires a patriotism that is especially 
concerned with matters beyond national lines and the tendency to remain geographically 




responsibility. As A Nation at Risk explains, “it is deeply patriotic to attempt to protect 
one’s country and one’s fellow citizens from the calamities of war. The patriot who sees 
beyond the borders is a better citizen than the man or woman who is ignorant or 
unconcerned about the relations of his country to the rest of the world” (37). In part, true 
commitment to patriotic citizenship as it is understood here requires exposing students to 
the principles and practices of the very ideological systems that pose a threat to American 
democracy, including Soviet totalitarianism and Communism. The goal of such exposure 
is to increase “civil intelligence” on the part of the American population so that they 
might be better equipped to contend with these threats, but A Nation at Risk also clearly 
indicates that advocating alternative ideologies will not be tolerated in American schools 
and that the teaching of these alternative structures and systems must be done alongside 
the teaching of American principles, ideals, and values. Clearly, this “civil intelligence” 
is by no means neutral, and it is grounded in a model of cultural literacy that is meant to 
further students’ commitments to the American way of life, a project which A Nation at 
Risk contends will make them better global citizens, as well. 27  
 This interest in fostering productive citizenship practices among students at all 
levels of education grew concurrently with an interest in encouraging students to develop 
other types of life skills that would serve them beyond their educations and in the 
everyday. Reforms that sought to ground education in everyday experiences, including 
                                                          
27 Today, it is impossible to use the phrase “cultural literacy” without invoking E.D. Hirsch’s 1987 Cultural 
Literacy: What Every American Needs to Know. While Hirsch’s critique of progressivist education, a catch-
all term for a series of fragmented movements which is discussed more directly below, focuses on the ways 
in which its curriculum ignored the traditional canon and, in so doing, failed to provide students with the 
type of shared knowledge base on which cultural literacy depends, the meaning of “cultural literacy” as it 
applies here differs slightly. The post-war educational reforms and related reports approach cultural literacy 
not as a storehouse of knowledge that can be accessed in ways that directly inform everyday decisions and 
actions but as the democratic and citizenship-based practices and the habits of mind on which they rely and 




those associated with labor and industry, in order to make it more attentive to the actual 
needs of the country and of its citizens largely aligned with progressivist educational 
reform efforts, particularly in terms of their most foundational concerns. Over the course 
of their development, however, progressivist models and ideologies took a wide range of 
forms. While a complete account of the progressivist program is beyond the scope of this 
project, important here are both John Dewey’s original principles as they relate to the 
post-war climate and the controversial “Life Adjustment” movement as it contributed to 
the intellectual zeitgeist with which Seaborg and Adler would later contend. 28  
 As the widely acknowledged “father of progressivist education,” John Dewey was 
principally concerned with the reformation of American democratic structures and with a 
reevaluation of the forms of civic participation for which they allowed. In this way, his 
significance to the post-war movement and reform efforts revolving around the 
construction of functional American, and world, citizens is evident. Of particular 
importance are progressivist education’s strictly philosophical foundations. The most 
basic, and perhaps most democratic, of the movement’s characteristic tenets was its 
student-centeredness. In part, the increased focus on children can be linked to WWI and 
WWII interests in the mobilization of youth, which ultimately prioritized children as 
resources in the war effort. This particular focus and its rendering of youth are also clear 
in the cover illustration of the post-war American Education and International Tensions 
                                                          
28 Educational historian William G. Wraga has argued that the Life Adjustment movement was not nearly 
as popular or influential as educational historiography has suggested. He contends that the movement’s 
early critics and historians writing after the fact have consistently tended to vilify the movement as “an 
outmoded form of progressive education that rejected academic subject matter and that was inimical to the 
necessary provision of a rigorous academic curriculum for all students” (185). This treatment, though, both 
overstates the effect of the program’s principles and prevents contemporary reformers from assessing the 
program’s potential merits. In essence, the Life Adjustment Movement was and is an easy target. While I 
find Wraga’s assessment persuasive overall, I am less concerned with how the program’s rhetoric 
manifested materially than I am with how it functioned relative to existing discursive frames, and it is for 




which is described above. Beyond this link, though, child-centeredness can be seen as an 
outgrowth of other related progressive movements. Educational historian Andrew 
Hartmann identifies two important educational movements that intersected at the concept 
of child-centeredness: “education for social efficiency, the ‘order’ variant of progressive 
education, and education for social democracy, the ‘justice’ variant” (9). Despite the 
differences between these two strands of progressive education, “both focused on 
enlarging and altering pedagogy and curriculum beyond what were considered traditional 
methods and programs that had relegated the child to a less important position” (9). As a 
result of this intersection, child-centeredness became a pedagogical concern that united 
otherwise diverse or disparate strands of progressivist education, making it indispensable 
to the movement at large.  
One of the most extreme iterations to come from progressive education’s 
development was the Life Adjustment movement, which reached its peak in the decade 
following the end of WWII. The phrase “life adjustment” was first popularized in a 
speech delivered by Dr. Charles Prosser at a 1945 conference hosted in Washington, D.C. 
by the Vocational Education Division of the U.S. Office of Education, and the movement 
is often blamed for the demise of progressivist reform generally based on the critique that 
its primarily vocational and “therapeutic” but intellectually vacant curriculum completely 
misunderstood the mission of general education. One of the most outspoken and prolific 
critics of the Life-Adjustment movement was historian Arthur Bestor.29 His 1953 book 
Educational Wastelands: The Retreat from Learning in Our Public Schools, for instance, 
argues that educational theorists and pedagogues have done the nation a disservice by 
                                                          
29 Given that Bestor was most known for his popular criticisms of life adjustment education and less known 
for his academic work on educational reform, his function as a public intellectual figure concerned with 




moving school curriculum away from the traditional liberal arts models. Such devaluation 
of the core curriculum on which America’s public school system was founded, he argued, 
contributed to “the growth of anti-intellectualist hysteria that threatens not merely the 
schools but freedom itself” (11).  
According to Hartman, the life adjustment movement was the “pedagogical 
counterpart to the relativist theory of democracy,” although it proved much more 
controversial that its political foil. As Hartman described it, the movement “assumed that 
U.S. society was ideal, and thus focused almost entirely on means rather than ends. The 
radically reformist ideas of progressive educators or pedagogical reconstructionists of the 
1930s, democratic ends, were ditched by World War II in favor of educational stability, 
efficiency, and child-centered gimmickry” (5). In a 1960 response to a current state of 
educational reform, Bestor takes issue with these very approaches in terms of how they 
ultimately distract from the real aim of public education, namely civic training for every 
student. Within the context of this response, Bestor first attacks a California-based 
curriculum initiative to require 30 hours of driver’s education from high school students. 
Given that those thirty hours can be used to satisfy credits typically assigned to social 
studies courses, Bestor pointedly jests that it might be more productive for the nation to 
award a driver’s license to any student capable of demonstrating a familiarity with the 
American Constitution. “Let us, by all means enforce a high standard of competence for 
those who seek the privilege of driving on our highways,” he writes. “But let us not do so 
by lowering the standards of competence for those who in the future will hold the 




core, Bestor sees education focused on life skills as irresponsible and as dangerous for the 
future stability of the country.  
In addition to this critique of such educational orientations, Bestor focuses on the 
life-adjustment movement’s interest in the personal over the civic or political, contending 
that this further lowers the standards of classroom instruction and learning. Important in 
these critiques, however, is Bestor’s insistence that the humanities are the subjects on 
which civic life and well-being depend, and he barely mentions the hard sciences. 
Despite the fact that English and social studies courses are required in public education, 
the current state of the curriculum continues to be an issue. According to Bestor, the 
“widespread illiteracy that has resulted from deficiencies in public-school programs in 
English composition and literature is apparent,” but “more menacing, is the situation in 
the social studies. Disintegration within this area of the curriculum poses a direct threat to 
American institutions of self-government, which demand of the citizen both a knowledge 
of history and a developed ability to subject public issues to rational analysis” (550). 
Even in the face of the Soviet threat and larger Cold War climate, Bestor characterizes 
the nation’s largest challenge in terms of the humanistic education with which it is failing 
to supply its students. While his perspective on the issue aligns with many of the points 
made by Myers and Coss in response to the educational needs of WWII, the privileging 
of the humanities over the hard sciences was less common following Sputnik, and 
national discourse on educational reform took a greater interest in scientific advancement 





Holding Democracy to the Bunsen Burner: Seaborg and Science vs. Adler and the 
Humanities  
Despite the natural connection between technological innovation and a future-
oriented perspective, Glenn T. Seaborg frequently worked to contextualize the 
scientifically invested crisis moment from a historical perspective, a move that linked the 
unknown to the known and served to ease anxieties related to the quickening pace of 
change. At the opening of an address that he made to students at Augustana College in 
1959, Seaborg speaks of the “crisis” of human freedom that the nation faced with slavery 
and the Civil War one hundred years earlier. Describing that a century earlier, “our young 
democratic form of government faced a terrible test,” Seaborg emphasizes that “we came 
through our crisis. Our humane society, with its emphasis on the value of the individual, 
survived. But only a civil war could confirm our democratic principles” (3). As a model 
for the role of crisis, this rendering of the civil war as a necessary affirmation of the 
values associated with American identity suggests that such crises are both requisite and 
ultimately reifying and that they are, therefore, nothing to fear, at least not in the long 
run. The impending crisis should be approached in similar terms: as “another test of our 
liberal democracy.” Here, Seaborg acknowledges that “our problem is different in kind 
and, and the time scale is longer,” but “it is not less important than the one we faced a 
century ago.” In part, this importance stems from the fact that the crisis is invested in 
similarly American ideals, specifically those concerned with “individual human 
freedom.” Slavery is not, however, the threat. Science is. “The question is,” Seaborg 
writes, “whether science with all its bounty and mercy, will mock us by placing chains 




Interestingly, this treatment emphasizes the potential tension between scientific 
achievement and democratic practice, a point which is more frequently ignored and 
actively obscured in the service of portraying the two as cohabitating peacefully and even 
as mutually dependent parts of a single American whole.  
Seaborg’s treatment of the role of science in national development harkens back 
to the 1949 Educational Policies Commission’s contention that schools should consider 
more carefully the relationship between technology and social change. The 
Commission’s report emphasizes the power of education to intervene in just the scenario 
that Seaborg describes. “Through education in its broadest sense,” A Nation at Risk 
contends, “men gradually adjust the social institutions to the new conditions [brought on 
by technological advancement] in a fashion that will satisfy their moral standards” (26). 
Similarly, within the context of this address, Seaborg suggest that education in an overall 
sense can grant American citizens the critical and analytical capacities they need to 
ensure that they channel scientific learning and progress to their best advantage and are 
able to adapt their institutions in the process.  
The concern about how scientific literacy will interact with democratic life and 
ethical codes is shared by a number of the individual contributors to an interesting 
volume entitled Challenge to American Youth. A generalized version of Seaborg’s 
address to Augustan College appears in the volume, alongside transcripts of speeches 
delivered at other college and university events in front of student audiences. The 
volume’s editor Philip Angeles speaks specifically to the collection’s goals in his Preface, 
deploying a rhetoric of crisis much like that on which Seaborg relies. “A century that has 




beings to live together in peace and justice,” Angeles writes. “These are delicate times. 
The world seems unable to step back from the brink of destruction” (5). For Angeles, 
these delicate times require “the tempered advice of our wise men,” and he offers the 
book as an “opportunity” for American youth to “‘hear’ inspiring ideas, cogently 
expressed” and to give Americans access to the “opinions of their own intelligentsia” (5-
6). Intellectuals are responding to the nation’s current crisis, but Angeles’s attempt to 
preserve these responses in book form suggests that the intellectuals are not reaching the 
audiences they need to on their own. The emphasis on cogency, however, suggests faith 
in the ability of rhetorical expression to intervene in and influence the course of events as 
they will respond to the crisis moment. For this reason, this small volume seems 
especially interesting in light of my project at large. The collection’s contributors are 
primarily educators, administrators, and authors, and the topics treated consider the 
relationships among national identity, education, and global responsibility.  
Although less directly scientific in its orientation than Seaborg’s contribution to 
The Challenge to American Youth and a number of his earlier responses to the state of 
American public and higher education, A Nation at Risk nonetheless participates in a 
similar mode of crisis narrative and targeted response, and Seaborg’s influence can 
certainly be felt. Right away, A Nation at Risk links the national risk to the fact that “our 
once unchallenged preeminence in commerce, industry, science, and technological 
innovation is being overtaken by competitors throughout the world” (5). While the 
Commission acknowledges that A Nation at Risk’s interest in education contends with 
only one of the many causes of this decline in global status, it notes that education is “the 




situation is the result of the “squandered gains in student achievement made in the wake 
of the Sputnik challenge” (5), again characterizing the educational crisis in terms of the 
technological innovation at once made possible.  
The idea that America has fallen short of the technological promise it once 
showed is not, however, the whole story. Neither is the fact that American industry is 
falling behind its competitors in the most technologically innovative sectors. According 
to the A Nation at Risk: 
The risk is not only that the Japanese make automobiles more efficiently than 
Americans and have government subsidies for development and export. It is not 
just that the South Koreans recently built the world’s most efficient steel mill, or 
that American machine tools, once the pride of the world, are being displaced by 
German products. It is also that these developments signify a redistribution of 
trained capability throughout the globe. Knowledge, learning, information, and 
skilled intelligence are the new raw materials of international commerce and are 
today spreading through the world as vigorously as miracle drugs, synthetic 
fertilizers, and blue jeans did earlier. (6-7) 
What is most important in this context, then, is the fact that the technological competition 
signifies a loss for Americans in the sense that “trained capability,” rendered as a limited 
and finite resource, is travelling overseas. In addition to the financial capital that follows 
technological innovation, A Nation at Risk recognizes the ways in which human capital 
follows similar patterns, and the redistribution of this type of capital is what concerns the 




In order to rebuild and maintain national stores of human capital, which is the 
most pressing outcome of the current international crisis as the Commission characterizes 
it, the country must reinvest in its educational efforts. If failing standards are to blame for 
the dire state of things, then stronger and more definite standards are the reasonable 
solution. Again, though, while the primary issue is not industrial or financial, A Nation at 
Risk does very little to decouple these issues from the educational program they prescribe 
at this point. “If only to keep and improve on the slim competitive edge we still retain in 
world markets,” the Commission explains, “we must dedicate ourselves to the reform of 
our educational system for the benefit of all—old and young alike, affluent and poor, 
majority and minority. Learning is the indispensable investment required for success in 
the ‘information age’ we are entering” (7). Thinking both about the competitive edge that 
has been lost and about future requirements to adapt to the “information age,” the 
Commission links a range of national anxieties to the current state of the country’s 
educational systems, again creating meaningful demand for the reform programs its 
constituents put forth later in A Nation at Risk.  
In addition to treating the commerce-based concerns driving these programs, the 
Commission acknowledges that educational reform can serve other purposes relevant to 
national need in global contexts. Education also contributes to the “intellectual, moral, 
and spiritual strengths of our people which knit together the very fabric of our society” 
and Report suggests that working toward these strengths is a component of every 
individual’s contribution to social stability. The individual’s role and responsibility is 
treated directly for the first time here, and a large part of that responsibility concerns 




“The people of the United States need to know that individuals in our society who do not 
possess the levels of skills, literacy, and training essential to this new era will be 
effectively disenfranchised, not simply from the material rewards that accompany 
competent performance, but also from the chance to participate fully in our national life” 
(7).  
At this point in A Nation at Risk, democratic participation is wholly dependent 
upon one’s literacy-based skill sets. Literacy is important not only within the context of 
job markets but also within the context of civic life and the meaningful exercise of one’s 
individual freedoms within democratic society. The phrasing here emphasizes the ease 
with which economic production and the production characteristic of democratic 
participation can be conflated in terms of the prerequisites expected for each, as un-
American as that conflation might be in principle. What is even more interesting in this 
treatment of literacy and its role in national life is the way in which the Commission 
attempts to mediate the tension between community-based American values and the 
American ideal of individual choice. A Nation at Risk contends that “a high level of 
shared education is essential to a free, democratic society and to a fostering of a common 
culture, especially in a country that prides itself on pluralism and individual freedom” (7). 
At this point in the discussion, it becomes increasingly clear that the literacy practices 
required for economic and political participation, as A Nation at Risk imagines them, are 
not in any sense ideologically neutral and are imagined as protecting the characteristically 
American values associated with democratic life.  
Despite the economic and cultural-preservation concerns at the center of A Nation 




context of the Commission’s model, there are occasional glimmers of the slightly more 
philosophical models of civic engagement that emerged more frequently in post-war 
documents like American Education and International Tensions. For example, A Nation 
at Risk does invest in a certain form of “common sense” that is similar to Aristotle’s 
koine aesthesis or sensus communis and does position this sense as integral to democracy, 
much like Aristotle positioned sensus communis as the keystone of functional 
republicanism. A Nation at Risk contends that “for our country to function, citizens must 
be able to reach some common understandings of complex issues, often on short notice 
and on the basis of conflicting and incomplete evidence. Education helps form these 
common understandings” (7). In this sense, education is the honing of the sensory faculty 
that allows individuals to make judgments about the issues they face, and shared 
educational experiences ensure that citizens are capable of producing the same judgments 
relative to the same stimuli or relative input. Given the explicitly community-based 
orientation of A Nation at Risk’s understanding of the process, it might be more closely 
aligned with the Roman perspective characteristic of a Ciceronian treatment of the force 
as it manifests in the laws, social practices, and institutions characteristic of a group of 
people living together. In these ways, the “common sense” shared among members of the 
community shape the codes and norms that govern the community, thereby further 
enforcing commitments to the modes and terms of judgment that spur them.  
This particular commitment to instilling in American youth a shared base of 
knowledge which could steer them towards similar judgments is also represented in terms 
of the contribution it makes to a more patriotic mission. In addition to investing in a 




the freedoms and opportunities that make America great. “Part of what is at risk,” A 
Nation at Risk warns, “is the promise first made on this continent: All, regardless of race 
or class or economic status, are entitled to a fair chance and to the tools for developing 
their individual powers of mind and spirit to the utmost.” This commitment to functional 
education as the means by which the community can ensure that every individual have 
access to a life defined by the “American Dream” shows another way in which A Nation 
at Risk’s contributors attempted to negotiate the relationship between social need and 
individual freedom. While this initial phrasing suggests that the community is responsible 
for the individual, the next sentence emphasizes the multidirectional nature of what is, in 
fact, a mutual dependency: “This promise means that all children by virtue of their own 
efforts, competently guided, can hope to attain the mature and informed judgment needed 
to secure gainful employment and to manage their own lives, thereby serving not only 
their own interests by also the progress of society itself” (8). Again, A Nation at Risk 
returns to concerns associated with economic stability, describing how the careful 
cultivation of the judgement capacity facilitated by “common sense” is a prerequisite for 
gainful employment, which is the sole means by which students should be expected to 
one day contribute to overall social growth on a national scale.  
Despite these somewhat philosophical and qualitative literacy needs, however, 
there are very quantitative ways in which the American school systems seem to failing 
their students. In addition to the numerous “indicators of risk” drawn from comparisons 
made between American students and students in nations across the globe, A Nation at 
Risk notes that “about 13 percent of all 17-year-olds in the United States can be 




high as 40 percent” (8). Here, A Nation at Risk turns to more traditional literacy concerns 
associated with decoding practices, and while these failures are concerning on a number 
of levels, the authors describe in more detail the challenge that they pose for business and 
military leaders. These leaders “complain that they are required to spend millions of 
dollars on costly remedial education and training programs in such basic skills as reading, 
writing, spelling, and computation” (8).  A Nation at Risk even refers specifically to the 
Department of the Navy, which “reported to the Commission that one-quarter of its 
recent recruits cannot read at a ninth grade level, the minimum needed simply to 
understand written safety instructions. Without remedial work they cannot even begin, 
much less complete, the sophisticated training essential in much of the modern military” 
(9). Given the Cold War tensions and the ever-looming possibility of conflict with the 
Soviets, the fact that the men responsible for keeping America safe in the face of attack 
might be unable to read and understand even the most basic texts required for them to do 
their jobs is understandably considered a risk that the nation should address immediately.  
Of additional significance is the way in which the literacy failings of American 
youth might further inhibit the growth of American technological advancement and make 
the country fall even further behind its international competitors. Given the growth of 
technological enterprises, the fact that American education is already having trouble 
keeping up is especially concerning. As A Nation at Risk explains, “these deficiencies 
come at a time when the demand for highly skilled workers in new fields is accelerating 
rapidly” (10), and the types of labor required of these workers depend upon their ability 
to adapt to new technologies and scientific advancement. Noting that “computers and 




factories, and offices,” A Nation at Risk cites one estimate that “indicates that by the turn 
of the century millions of jobs will involve laser technology and robotics.” In addition to 
the development of the technological fields, however, technology is unavoidable in most 
work places, as it “is radically transforming a host of other occupations. They include 
health care, medical science, energy production, food processing, construction, and the 
building, repair, and maintenance of sophisticated scientific, educational, military, and 
industrial equipment” (10). It is, ultimately, within this technologically oriented context 
that A Nation at Risk’s investment in the sciences becomes the most evident. Literacy 
here, in all of its forms, is valuable insofar as it facilitates economic growth, which in 
many sectors depends upon technological innovation. Overall, A Nation at Risk sets forth 
a scientific and technologically invested assessment of a literate citizenry, and this 
assessment harnesses the anxiety-fueled momentum attending the Space Race in ways 
that give it powerful persuasive appeal.  
On the other side of the debate and working with a slightly different rhetorical 
arsenal was an approach to educational reform guided by humanistic concern and study. 
The Paideia Proposal: An Educational Manifesto was the collective work of the Paideia 
Group, a committee of professors, college administrators, researchers, and high school 
superintendents and principals. Acting as Chairman, Adler was the Group’s clear leader 
and author of the Proposal’s text.  He dedicated the text to three educational 
philosophers: Horace Mann, John Dewey, and Robert Hutchins, who Adler explains 
“would have been our leaders were they alive today” (v). With this initiating gesture, 
Adler links his project and pedagogical approach to a particular lineage within the 




Below this dedication is a definition of “paideia” that serves a similar purpose. 
The definition explains that the word derives from the “Greek pais, paidos: the 
upbringing of a child. (Related to pedagogy and pediatrics.)” (v). Knowing Adler’s 
Aristotelian tendencies, this connection to the Greeks is unsurprising. The concept of 
paideia in particular features quite forcefully in Aristotle’s Politics, where it is described 
in terms of man’s ability to discuss matters of civic life with his peers in the process of 
political deliberation and, ultimately, in order to determine a course of action. In her 
discussion of rhetorical dunamis, a term meaning ability or facility, Eskaterina Haskins 
considers how Aristotle was reacting to the distinction that Isocrates drew between logos 
and paideia. Whereas Isocrates “regards discourse (logos) as an artificer of civic 
institutions and embraces the performative and politically constitutive character of 
traditional Greek education (paideia) by making character and political identity 
dependent on recurrent performance addressed to the polis,” Aristotle “aspires to protect 
the practical rationality and virtue of a properly habituated student from being corrupted 
by the norms of rhetorical and literacy culture” (237). Based on his conception of 
“dynamism,” Haskins contends, Aristotle effectively distinguishes between “eloquence” 
and “virtuous action,” linking the first to rhetoric and the second to politics. In making 
this distinction, Aristotle seems to be isolating, in order to privilege, a mode of 
citizenship very similar to the one that Adler hopes to instill in American students by 
means of his new curriculum.  
In titling his project thus, Adler also connects it to a Greek tradition largely 
assumed to be the cornerstone of liberal arts education. This definition of paideia, 




equivalent of the Latin humanitas (from which the ‘humanities’), signifying the general 
learning that should be the possession of all human beings” (v). Adler here further 
connects his educational program’s investment in certain modes of literacy instruction to 
a rich cultural heritage always concerned with civic participation.   
Reflecting the humanities’ interest in discourse and dialogue, the Proposal opens 
with a direct address to its readers, in an attempt to characterize the multiple audiences 
and groups who might be interested in its mission. In general, the Proposal addresses 
“Americans most concerned with the future of our schools,” but this group is divided into 
subgroups, including parents, teachers, school boards, college educators, and elected 
public officials. Of particular interest here are the less expected groups: employers 
“concerned about the effects on productivity of a work force lacking skills in reading, 
writing, speaking, listening, observing, measuring, and computing,” minority groups 
“angered by widening gulfs between the better educated and the poorly educated, and 
between the employed and the unemployed,” labor leaders “attempting to deal with 
workers who lack the skills to find jobs in the new high-technology industries,” and 
military leaders “needing brainpower among the troops capable of coping with 
sophisticated weaponry” (xii). These final groups seem to represent interests more in line 
with the educational models furthered in A Nation at Risk, but Adler’s direct recognition 
of them here seems to be an attempt to respond to the very real needs of the nation, too. 
He is quick to acknowledge that his more philosophical and humanities-based approach is 
not as disinterested in the everyday as critics might suggest and, in fact, has just as much 




familiarity with the popular critiques to be leveled at his program and illustrates how he 
attempted to confront them early in his work.  
Finally, the Proposal speaks to its cumulative audience and their national needs, 
addressing “American Citizens alarmed by the prospects of a democracy in which a 
declining proportion of the people vote or endeavor to understand the great issues of our 
time” (xii). At this point, Adler links his program directly to the democratic failings of 
the masses, suggesting that the degree to which basic citizenship practices are informed 
by schooling. Despite this interest in national needs, however, Adler is quick to note that 
the contemporary situation requires locally focused reform efforts. As was the case in the 
WWII educational handbooks surveyed above, the tension between nationally oriented 
cooperation and the individual freedom at the center of American identity proves here a 
rhetorical challenge to which Adler must also respond. While the Proposal’s program is 
“designed to improve the opportunities of our youth, the prospects of our economy, and 
the viability of our democratic institutions,” all of which have national effect, these goals 
“must be achieved at the community level without resorting to a monolithic, national 
educational system. It must be, in Lincoln’s words, of the people, by the people, and for 
the people” (xii). Just as A Nation at Risk justified its approach to education with a 
quotation from a founding father, thus linking its perspective to a long American 
heritage, the Proposal makes a similar rhetorical move here in its reference to Lincoln. 
Connecting its instructional program to American history served to exhibit the Paideia 





The connection between democracy and education is the focus of the Proposal’s 
first chapter. Like the previously discussed handbooks and treatises, the Proposal begins 
by explaining the need for reform in terms of the exceptionality of the current moment. 
“We are on the verge of a new era in our national life,” Alder writes, and “the long-
needed educational reform for which this country is at last ready will be a turning point 
toward that new era” (3). In part, this new era is itself the result of recent shifts in the 
national role of education, and the Proposal emphasizes that it has only been within the 
current century that all American children have had access to twelve full years of 
schooling and that all Americans have enjoyed the full privileges of citizenship, 
regardless of race, gender, or ethnicity. Adler further emphasizes the mutually beneficial 
relationship between the rise of schooling and the extension of suffrage: “the two—
universal suffrage and universal schooling—are inextricably bound together. The one 
without the other is a perilous delusion. Suffrage without schooling produces mobocracy, 
not democracy—not rule of law, not constitutional government by the people as well as 
for them” (3). In this way, the modes of literacy central to Adler’s project were 
represented as integral to functional democracy and the American ideal.  
Although Adler’s discussion of national need is less directly concerned with 
forms of scientific and technological competition that could very well determine the fate 
of all in the face of the next active international conflict, he nonetheless deploys the same 
rhetorical modes in order to characterize and emphasize the scale of the crisis as he 
understands it. Like in A Nation at Risk, the current situation is described in terms of a 
failure to live up to past potential. In Adler’s estimation, however, this past potential is to 




philosophies as they characterized the intersection between education and democracy is a 
squandering of the nation’s possible greatness. Adler does recognize the extremity of the 
“ideal Dewey set before us,” explaining that “it is a challenge so difficult that is it 
understandable, perhaps excusable, that we have so far failed.” Again relying on 
rhetorical models like those deployed in more scientifically and technically oriented texts, 
though, Adler quickly moves to consider the dire consequences of complacency on this 
front: “But we cannot continue to fail without disastrous consequences for all of us. For 
the proper working of our political institutions, for the efficiency of our industries and 
businesses, for the salvation of our economy, for the vitality of our culture, and for the 
ultimate good of our citizens as individuals, and especially our future citizens—our 
children—we must succeed” (4).  
While this section of the Proposal recognizes the economic and industrial issues 
facing the nation, these are not the fronts on which the most important battles are to be 
fought. Rather, a focus on political strength and citizenship practices is what the country 
needs. In focusing its efforts thus, what is to be gained is far more significant than the 
effort the nation must expend to achieve this ideal. Additionally, the current climate 
requires that the nation embrace this effort. Although we have survived this long, 
complacency now poses a clear threat. Taking this concept even further, Adler 
emphasizes the degree to which his readers, as individual citizens, are the ones most 
affected by this communal failure. He explains that “we are all sufferers from our 
continued failure to fulfill the educational obligations of a democracy. We are all the 
victims of a school system that has only gone halfway along the road to realize the 




education and democracy and rendered in terms of an inability to improve upon each 
individually in ways that would improve upon both collectively.  
Ultimately, Adler’s characterization of the country’s educational and political 
failings serves as a call for Americans to reinvest in their national identity by means of 
particular citizenship practices that are functionally grounded in American ideals. “We 
must end that hypocrisy in our national life,” he contends; “we cannot say out of one side 
of our mouth that we are for democracy and all its free institutions including, 
preeminently, political and civil liberty for all; and out of the other side of our mouth, say 
that only some of the children—fewer than half—are educable for full citizenship and a 
full human life” (7). As in A Nation at Risk, the dire state in which the nation finds itself 
is self-inflicted yet commensurate with the type of destabilizing influence that foreign 
enemies might attempt to exert. In failing to recognize its own ideological dependency on 
the habits of mind and informed practices associated with active American citizenship, 
the country has fallen prey to self-sabotage, and the distance between the “ideal” and the 
“real” of the American experience threatens to expose this failure to the public citizens 
that the nation as a nation needs to reinvest in and support its identity.  
 
Facing the Firing Squad: Gauging Response to A Nation at Risk and the Proposal  
Following its publication and initial circulation, Adler’s Proposal elicited varied 
responses, even among those similarly invested in protecting the humanities. A number 
of these responses compared Adler’s work to A Nation at Risk or similarly oriented 
projects as well, attempting to contextualize the Paideia Proposal relative to the ongoing 




in larger pedagogical discussions, which was an accomplishment in its own right given 
the strength of government-authored work like A Nation at Risk. One of the most 
referenced responses to the Proposal was Michael W. Apple’s 1985 article in Curriculum 
Inquiry. An educational theorist specializing in the intersection of education and political 
and cultural ideology, Apple began by aligning Adler’s work with A Nation at Risk with 
special emphasis on the similarities in the rhetorical addresses both made to the “public” 
in order to consider the degree to which the Proposal benefitted from the exigence-
related momentum created by the other. Interestingly, Apple suggests that the strong and 
extremely direct rendering of the educational crisis in A Nation at Risk had, perhaps, the 
unintended consequence of generating interest in and demand for alternatives and 
competitors. While the Commission’s report might have been more rhetorically efficient 
within its construction of the “risk” facing the nation, Adler’s work thrived in the 
discursive environment that it produced, a characterization that suggests a somewhat 
more symbiotic relationship between the two documents than might be evident otherwise. 
Based on this characterization, my earlier assessments of crisis as a catalyst hold, as both 
documents and their authors found demand for their intellectual work in the crisis 
moment. However, in this particular case, it remains significant that A Nation at Risk and 
similar treatments set the terms of the discussion and constructed the rhetorical frame 
driving public interest in educational reform generally. Alternative perspectives and 
voices, like Adler’s, found themselves relying on similar appeals and discursive forms in 
order to appeals to a public already familiar with the more standard treatments.  
 While Apple acknowledges that a number of the issues Adler considers in the 




power dynamics as a particular example of this, he characterizes the document as a 
conventional type of curriculum reform text known as a “slogan system,” a 
characterization which even further emphasizes the rhetorical construction of the text 
over its curriculum-focused content. Apple also acknowledges that slogan systems can be 
effective and are not, as a genre, to be wholly dismissed. He does, however, describe 
three attributes that contribute to the slogan system’s rhetorical appeal, all of which are 
significant within the context of Adler’s overall public-intellectual persona, too. 
According to Apple, slogan systems must “have a penumbra of vagueness so that 
powerful groups or individuals who would otherwise disagree can fit under its umbrella,” 
“be specific enough to offer something to practitioners here and now,” and “have the 
ability to charm.” On this final point, Apple clarifies that “put simply, its style must be 
such that it grabs us. It offers us a sense of imaginary possibility and in doing so 
generates a call to and a claim for action” (97). Here, we get the most direct assessment 
of the significance of rhetoric within the slogan system model and a particular reference 
to the centrality of style.  
It is, ultimately, against this schema that Apple judges the Proposal and attempts 
to account for its ultimate influence on pedagogical practice. In terms of the first criteria, 
Apple judges that while the Proposal attempted to offer a wide umbrella, but it ultimately 
failed based on the identity of the group responsible for its authorship, particularly when 
compared to A Nation at Risk. While the Proposal’s sponsors include administrators from 
large school districts, college presidents, and representatives from educational and 
professional groups, “conspicuous by their absence...are teachers, government officials, 




Proposal] will have very little impact” (97). Here, Apple suggests that the Proposal fails 
to appeal to a broad enough range of interests based on the fact that its contributors 
represent limited perspectives, perspectives which do not account for the day-to-day 
experiences of the classroom or the workplace. In contrast to the Proposal’s failure, A 
Nation at Risk succeeds, in Apple’s assessment, on the basis of its contributors’ more 
varied interests and allegiances: 
The National Commission was heavily loaded not only with university presidents, 
administrators, and academics, but had politicians and representatives of teachers 
and industry on it. The Paideia Proposal’s impact will be lessened considerably 
because of its very historical roots in academic and old humanist culture, roots 
that limit the spread of its umbrella, as it were. Working class and rightist populist 
groups will not necessarily agree with such a definition of the basics, and 
historically have often been antipathetic to the transformation of schools back into 
academies for what may be seen by them as elite knowledge that has little bearing 
on their economic and cultural experiences. (97-98) 
Apple’s critique of the Proposal’s rhetorical efficacy draws directly on the previously 
discussed climate of anti-intellectualism and the assumptions it furthered regarding the 
less productive nature of humanistic study and its subject matter. Adler’s investment in 
the liberal arts tradition of American public education is described as being out of sync 
with the values and interests of the masses to the degree that it fails to account for their 
understanding of their own needs. The fact that the Proposal was constructed by men and 
women working from atop academia’s ivory towers could be taken as a sign of its 




other side of the issue, however, A Nation at Risk more fully represented working-class 
and industry-based issues, and its Commission included a wider range of voices that were 
not as suspiciously out of touch as the academics working on the Proposal.  
While Apple does not refer to the Commission’s scientific and technological 
concerns directly, despite his frequent reference to the Paideia Group’s humanist 
leanings, a look at the contributors’ affiliations makes this difference clear. Representing 
the leaders of industry on the Commission is William O. Baker, former Chairman of the 
Board for Bell Telephone Laboratories. Additionally, the two college faculty members 
that contributed to A Nation at Risk, Seaborg and Gerald Holton, are both from the hard 
sciences. Seaborg’s work in chemistry was certainly of value by industrial standards, 
especially his contributions to projects concerning nuclear energy. As the Mallinckrodt 
Professor of Physics at Harvard, Holton’s interests extended to the history of science and 
to the development of scientific curriculum and culture.  
In 1981, Holton delivered a Jefferson Lecture for the National Endowment for the 
Humanities entitled “Where is Science Taking Us?”  He was the first scientist ever 
invited to deliver the annual address, and his differing perspective on the role of the 
humanities was clear in the way that his lecture disagreed with the very first Jefferson 
Lecture delivered by Lionel Trilling in 1972. In his lecture, Trilling argued that Thomas 
Jefferson had been wrong to name science and scientific achievement as the means by 
which societies improved themselves, claiming that the humanism was, in fact, the force 
responsible for such improvement. Holton, however, positioned Jefferson’s faith in 
science as a still viable option. This shift in the lecture’s treatment of the topic represents 




with other academic arenas and modes of education were more and more committed to 
scientific achievement as a national project.  
 Also on the Commission was Charles A. Foster Jr., who represented the 
Foundation for Teaching Economics in San Francisco, a group which developed 
leadership programs for young Americans focused on economic approaches to national 
and international issues. While the group had aims similar to Adler’s in the sense that it 
sought to prepare young Americans for modes of citizenship that spoke to national need, 
the group’s particular orientation to global politics focused not on humanitarian concerns 
but on international markets and trade agreements. Overall, the make-up of the 
Commission does in itself represent a wider range of interests and perspectives than the 
constituency who collaborated with Adler on the Proposal, and this difference did 
influence the relationship between the texts and their audiences.  
On the second characteristic of slogan systems, that related to specificity, Apple’s 
critique is much briefer yet just as pointed. While the Proposal endeavors to identify 
specific reform efforts and pedagogical models, its discussions stay so abstract that a 
teacher or parent wishing to follow its program would have very little idea of how to start 
and of how to do so in relation to a larger school system following a very different 
program. This abstractness might be tied to the intellectual character of the Proposal 
outlined in the previous critique in the sense that it shows little familiarity with the 
practical and material challenges faced in the classroom. If teachers turned to the 
Proposal for practices to implement in their classrooms, they would largely be 
disappointed, as Adler’s curriculum consisted of more universal, school or district-based 




On the third point, the point of style, Apple acknowledges that Adler writes well, 
but he contends that the document “lacks the spark of newness because so much of it is 
really a defensive program, a call to return to a romanticized past in which ‘ideas’ 
dominated school life and all students paid close attention to the teacher” (98). While 
Apple is right to recognize the conservative elements of Adler’s program, his assessment 
here is linked more to an understanding of the crisis moment as it is rendered in 
documents such as A Nation at Risk than to the crisis as Adler and the Paideia Group 
characterize and describe it. The tendency to judge the Proposal based on these terms 
speaks to the relative strength of the various crisis narratives, which Apple considers in 
his suggestion that the discursive atmosphere prepared by A Nation at Risk increased the 
attention being paid to Alder’s work. A Nation at Risk is future-oriented in the sense that 
it attempts to account for a world defined by technological innovation and advancement 
at every level of its educational program. The Proposal, however, looks to the past, 
locating the current failings not in an inability to adapt but in a hasty forfeiting of 
meaningful and productive tradition. By the Proposal’s own understanding of the current 
moment’s needs, its program is “timely,” but given the more powerful exigence 
associated with the technologically invested educational aims, the tendency to judge the 
Proposal’s on the basis of its response to this alternative crisis narrative was 
understandably common.  
Apple recognizes this mismatch as it manifests in the Proposal’s discursive style, 
explaining that he notices a “self-consciousness in writing, a style in which the political 
artifice of the volume is all too visible. It tries so hard to preserve something for everyone 




ideologically than might otherwise be the case” (98). The fact that the Proposal attempts 
to maintain discursive neutrality is, apparently, something that makes its program 
suspect. Again, though, this particular discursive character seems to be in line with the 
Proposal’s own understanding of the crisis moment’s primary problems as well as its 
potential. The Proposal’s investment in the Aristotelian conception of paideia, for 
instance, emphasizes the need for the liberal arts approach to the rearing of the ideal 
citizen. Within this model, the idea that every citizen has something to contribute to the 
community and should be given the tools that he needs to make this contribution clear is 
important.  
The project focuses on the shaping of character, a character based initially on a 
Greek ideal and, in Adler’s re-rendering, on a democratic or American ideal. The 
persuasive potential of this approach to public education depends upon every citizen’s 
ability to see himself living up to this ideal. In this sense, the open democratic style that 
Apple identifies as a problem is, in fact, endeavoring toward significant rhetorical ends. 
That this strategy does not work to generate the level of readerly investment that it should 
suggests that the version of citizenship that Adler’s audience has come to expect of itself 
differs drastically from the models he imagines as productive. If there is something 
suspect about his democratically oriented address and his attempts to appeal to a wide 
audience on the basis of a shared sense of collective responsibility, the issue might lie in 
the difference between Adler’s imagined audience and his actual audience, the former 
being more ready to accept this responsibility and the latter being resistant and expecting 




understanding of the American public is one of the factors that might challenge Adler’s 
public-intellectual intervention and persona.  
Apple is not alone in his assessment of the Proposal and A Nation at Risk relative 
to these challenging ideological and rhetorical contexts. In his 1984 response for The 
Journal of General Education, pedagogue Marshall W. Gregory considers the reception 
of Adler’s work among those with more sustained interests in educational reform. He 
opens with an analogy that highlights the role of national and military interests in 
educational reform overall. “For at least 35 years, perhaps longer,” Gregory writes, 
“Mortimer Adler has aspired to be a five-star general leading the American public into a 
happy and productive attack on venality and sloth in education” (70). The militaristic 
tone is extended here in Gregory’s discussion of how readers should react to Adler’s 
Proposal. “This is our language; these are our prejudices, and hearing them uttered 
always makes the troops stand up more straight and march more smartly” (70). Gregory 
ties the rallying force of Adler’s work to the “language” here, emphasizing the degree to 
which the communicative function of his program and the vocabulary it borrows from 
and gives back to readers is of prime importance. In essence, the rhetorical function that 
Gregory ascribes to Adler’s work is that attributed to epideictic rhetoric in the classical 
tradition.  
 Deploying a similar model for the persuasive power of social cohesion, Chaïm 
Perelman and Lucia Olbrecht-Tyteca offer the concept of “communion” in their New 
Rhetoric, a text which was similarly born of war-time crisis. Acknowledging that the 
concept is relatively “understated” in the treatise and that direct discussion of it is “brief 




significant element of the pair’s revisioning of rhetoric’s social potential. “In The New 
Rhetoric,” Graff and Winn explain, “communion is used in a very general sense as the 
term denoting a community’s agreement on questions of value, but also, more narrowly, 
as an objective sought in certain forms of discourse and as an effect of specific linguistic-
stylistic devices” (46). In this way, The New Rhetoric’s conception aligns quite directly 
with Gregory’s discussion because it emphasizes the significant force of shared 
“prejudices” while also describing a scenario in which this force is strengthened, and the 
“troops’” commitment to the cause is amplified, as a result of specific language practices. 
This, too, speaks to Apple’s conception of slogan systems in the sense that slogans 
themselves are meant to have the effect of a rallying cry.  
Graff and Winn describe The New Rhetoric’s treatment of communion in terms of 
Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca’s revitalization of the epideictic genre, a strategy that 
links their new rhetoric to classical antecedents while also emphasizing the significant 
work the pair did in offering rhetorical models for contending with social values. 
Referring to this blending of new and old as one of The New Rhetoric’s most important 
contributions overall, Graff and Winn explain that the treatise offers “an interpretation of 
epideictic discourse that claims to break with the tradition or Aristotelian understanding 
of the genre: ceremonial speeches fashioned for the present on topics of praise or blame 
crafted for occasions in which the audience’s response is directed to an assessment of the 
speaker’s skill” (47). Specifically, Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca look to reorient 
treatments of epideictic, moving away from the more literary conception popularized by 
Aristotelian modes and emphasizing the rhetorical and persuasive potential. In this 




value-judgment and variable intensity of adherence (as distinct from simple persuasion) 
they claim to be lacking in the classical presentations of rhetoric and also inimical to 
analytic logic or apodictic demonstration” (48). Both of these additions speak to the ways 
in which the epideictic genre works with, or against, an audience’s existing value systems 
and creates attachments among the audience to the new or different subjects or ideas it 
introduces.  
In terms of the intensity of adherence that a rhetorical act can generate, one of the 
primary considerations is whether or not the rhetorical act inspires action on the part of 
its audience. As Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca explain it, “the intensity of the adherence 
sought is not limited to obtaining purely intellectual results, to a declaration that a certain 
thesis seems more probable than another, but will very often be reinforced until the 
desired action is actually performed” (49). More intense adherence manifests in following 
the line of reasoning not only to its reasonable conceptual conclusion but also to the 
actions and habits that this conclusion suggests. Within this context, it would not be 
enough for Gregory’s troops to agree with Adler’s orders; they must also carry them out.   
Despite the predisposition to agree with Adler on the basis of shared values and 
the forces of community, however, Gregory ultimately encourages Adler’s readers to 
approach his programs with a certain degree of critical distance.  He explains that to 
construct a list of all the points of agreement might take a dedicated fellow pedagogue “a 
week and would only prove, in the end, that we all serve, philosophically at least, in the 
same army.” Instead, Gregory sets forward for his colleagues the task of deciding 
“whether the position Adler advances in The Paideia Proposal is sufficiently coherent 




another way, whether we should widen our philosophical comradeship to include 
brotherhood in the trenches” (70). Here, there seems to be a significant difference 
between philosophical and value-based communion and action-oriented communion. 
When the persuasive force of rhetorical action is realized, when it successfully moves 
beyond the linguistic and conceptual realms and is transmuted into policy or other 
materially manifested forms, it requires a renewed sense of commitment. In part, this 
renewed or furthered sense of commitment is important in the sense that it recognizes the 
reality of putting plans or policies into action. As Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca explain, 
“the intensity of adherence, aiming at effective action, cannot be measured by the degree 
of probability attributed to the accepted argument, but rather by the obstacles overcome 
by the action and the sacrifices and choices is leads to and which can be justified by the 
adherence” (49). All things being equal, the implementation of one policy over another 
might not require a greater degree of adherence, but when one of multiple options means 
more effort, more resources, or greater sacrifice, the degree of adherence must be 
amplified to account for these challenges.  
This particular understanding of the rhetorical challenges characteristic of policy-
based argument might be linked directly to the stylistic failings that Apple identifies as 
one of the Proposal’s central weaknesses. While policy-based argument depends upon 
these amplifications, the epidictic genre works toward amplification primarily by a 
mobilization of already-held beliefs and traditional principles, which might be one of the 
rhetorically resonant reasons for the Proposal to lack that “spark of newness.” In their 
assessment of the role of epidictic, Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca explain that “the very 




procession than of a struggle—results in its being practised by those who, in a society, 
defend the traditional and accepted values, those which are the object of education, not 
the new and revolutionary values which stir up controversy and polemics” (51). Given 
the conservative tendency of educational development generally, it is easy to see why the 
epideictic genre would be meaningful within such contexts. Again, though, given the 
intellectual climate of the Cold War and the ways in which common characterizations of 
the Soviet threat served to push an interest in the Space Age as brand new and formerly 
unknown, tradition was itself a tough sell. Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca recognize in 
epidictic discourse “an optimistic, a lenient tendency” by which “the speaker readily 
converts into universal values, if not eternal truths, that which has acquired a certain 
standing through social unanimity. Epidictic speeches are most prone to appeal to a 
universal order, to a nature, or a god that would vouch for the unquestioned, and 
supposedly unquestionable, values. In epidictic oratory, the speaker turns educator” (51). 
This particular orientation is not, perhaps, the most persuasive in the face of a crisis 
which challenges the very nature of social order, and given the largely unchallenged 
appeal of more future-oriented narratives and their attendant need, the conservative 
approach requires a more forceful defense than these optimistic tendencies realize. 
Given the rhetor’s function as an educator, the character of the speaker is 
important to the rhetorical effect of epidictic. Before considering the specific structural 
elements that determine a pedagogical text’s persuasive appeal, Gregory gestures toward 
the significance of ethos within such leadership contexts. This treatment speaks directly 




 The primary assumption underlying The Paideia Proposal is that the army Adler 
  has always wanted to lead is at last ready to be led. In this slender document he 
  attempts nothing less than to shape the future of American education—an attempt 
  based on the optimistic assumption that the American public is mounted, armed, 
  and ready to do battle for educational reform, momentarily holding back only 
  because it lacks a commanding general with enough presence and authority to 
  rally the troops and win the war. (71) 
Within a democratic context, the general/troops analogy functions primarily as an 
uncomplicated and direct model of authoritarian rule, one rarely seen (or at least denied) 
in the government or the academy.30 Still, though, the analogy provides a model in which 
power is meaningfully warranted by specialized knowledge and training.  
As discussed in the earlier chapters, ethos-based appeals are at the center of most 
public-intellectual work. Importantly, though, authority itself is typically distanced from 
argumentation. According to Hannah Arendt, “if authority is to be defined at all it must 
be in contradistinction to both coercive power and persuasion through argument” (45). 
Within this Arendtian conception, true authority is undercut by acts of force, including 
violence, and by direct efforts toward persuasion. While the former calls attention to a 
power’s need to enforce its position, the latter suggests an equality that distributes 
influence among the relevant parties. True authority is strongest when it is effective 
despite being undefended. Sociologist Frank Furedi, too, finds Arendt’s treatment of the 
state of authority more persuasive than the treatments of her contemporaries and critics, 
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noting in particular that her contention that authority has most consistently been treated 
and experienced as a problem since the onset of the modern age.  
In Between Past and Future, Arendt contends that “authority has vanished” and 
that “most will agree that a constant, ever-widening and deepening crisis of authority has 
accompanied the development of the modern world” in the twentieth century (1). It is this 
crisis and the various forms that it has taken throughout history that concern Furedi and 
which speak to the relationship between persuasion and authority. Furedi identifies the 
rise of liberal theory as one philosophical and political trend that weakened the normative 
function of authority. “The belief that persuasion rather than force constituted the 
foundation of order,” he explains, “has as its premise the belief that, through free speech 
and communication, the public could be influenced to act in accordance with reason and 
their interest” (350). This conception is similar to Habermas’s theories of the bourgeois 
public sphere at its emergence, highlighting the constructive and productive nature of 
public discourse. On this same point, Furedi refers to Leon Mayhew’s contention that the 
rise of liberal models of democracy in the eighteenth century positioned the 
“development of public opinion as a constituent component of the social order” (1285). 
Important here for Mayhew and Furedi is the conception of the “public” as “a solidary 
group, bound by their common reason and united by a process of dialogue through which 
the principle of socially limited state power is stated forcefully,” and the liberal, or 
utilitarian, model “asserts that in any free exchange of ideas among rational speakers, 
truth will emerge victorious” (1283). Authority, then, is derived from consensus, but the 




ideas.” In moments of crisis, public intellectuals need to protect and foster these 
conditions in order to ensure that the public realm functions.  
Within an Aristotelian tradition, ethos might be seen as an actively generated 
form of authority, although the reputation of the speaker as it exists separate from the 
speech act itself is nonetheless a functional component. In his Rhetoric, Aristotle explains 
that “persuasion is achieved when the speech is so spoken as to make us think him 
credible. We believe good men more fully and more readily than others” (I.ii.4). The 
speaker’s identity is formulated as the background context for the content of his speech; 
if we believe a man to be good, we are primed to accept his conclusions and 
recommendations. In part, this stems from the impulse toward communion and 
consubstantiality discussed above. If we agree with the statements of a good man, we can 
see ourselves as good. His enviable qualities become our own over the course of the 
persuasion.  
Aristotle’s discussion also speaks to ethos as a means of determining the degree 
of adherence, suggesting that while it might not, in all cases, be wholly persuasive in its 
own right, it might be powerful enough to solidify an audience’s commitment to certain 
ideals or values that they might only adopt tenuously otherwise. Given that the type of 
value-driven mobilization that Gregory suggests is Adler’s primary goal, this 
understanding of ethos is especially significant within the context of his project. 
Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca note that within a value-focused rhetorical model, “the 
speaker must have qualifications for speaking on his subject and must also be skillful in 
its presentation, if he is not to appear ridiculous” (52). Interestingly, however, Perelman 




position to the community-centered and cohesion-encouraging influence of shared values. 
As they explain, “it is not his own cause or viewpoint that he is defending, but that of his 
entire audience. He is, so to speak, the educator of his audience, and if it is necessary that 
he should enjoy a certain prestige before he speaks, it is to enable him, through his own 
authority, to promote the values that he is upholding” (52). Within this model, the 
speaker’s strategy for himself as a member of the group to whom he speaks requires that 
he nonetheless be distant enough from the masses to warrant the audience’s attention. 
This point, along with the characterization of the speaker’s role as educator within this 
context, leads directly to the plight of the public intellectual generally, as the intellectual 
is consistently working to align herself with the values of the audience while retaining 
enough authority to grant her claims power.31 Gregory’s general/troops analogy works to 
place Adler in a position of authority that effectively achieves this model of relationship, 
although the authority within this model is derived from an institutional hierarchy.  
Deploying a tripartite structure similar to that that Apple uses to characterize 
slogan systems, Gregory identifies the structural failings that he believes will limit the 
Proposal’s influence:  
There are at least three hurdles—in addition to merit—that any polemical writer 
such as Adler must clear if he is going to make his position command general 
assent. First, he must introduce his position at a favorable time. Second, he must 
clarify and sharpen the issues not only so that they acquire increased focus, but 
also so that the different constituencies to whom he appeals can see good reason 
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for accepting his version of the issues. Third, he must employ a literary form that 
grabs attention and propels people into concrete action. (71) 
Overall, Gregory’s suggestion is that the Proposal fails to clear these hurdles and will, 
thus, have limited influence on the reality of pedagogical practice. Based on his 
discussion, though, the failure has more to do with rhetorical form than it does with 
content or concept, and Gregory’s assessment largely aligns with Apple’s in this interest.  
The first hurdle that Gregory identifies is one familiar to rhetoricians: the 
challenge of kairos. Historically, the conception of kairos in Aristotle’s Rhetoric has 
received relatively little attention when compared to Plato’s treatment in the Phaedrus, an 
imbalance that James L. Kinneavy and Catherine R. Eskin seek to redress in their article 
on the former. In earlier work on the subject, Kinneavy defines kairos as “the right or 
opportune time to do something, or right measure in doing something” (80). On the basis 
of the second half of this definition, the concept has been linked to decorum in the work 
of George Puttenham and Francis Bacon, an emphasis which informs James S. Baulim’s 
treatment of the topic. Within the context of this treatment, appropriate timing is linked 
more directly to the ethos-building process in the sense that it conveys a sense of the 
speaker’s sense of the situation that he or she addresses.  
As I discussed in the introduction, Lloyd Bitzer’s conception of the “rhetorical 
situation” characterized the responsive nature of the rhetorical act more directly than 
previous work on the subject. “In order to clarify rhetoric-as-essentially-related-to-
situation,” he writes, “we should acknowledge a viewpoint that is commonplace but 
fundamental: a work of rhetoric is pragmatic; it comes into existence for the sake of 




it performs some task” (3). Similar to Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca’s rehabilitation of 
the epidictic genre, Bitzer’s intervention refocuses attention on rhetoric’s social and 
political functions over its literary or merely linguistic form. In so doing, he identifies 
three elements of the rhetorical situation that exist prior to, and in some cases 
independent of, the rhetorical act itself: “the first is the exigence; the second and third are 
elements of the complex, namely the audience to be constrained in decision and action, 
and the constraints which influence the rhetor and can be brought to bear upon the 
audience” (6). Taken together, these three elements structure the background context 
governing the rhetor’s intervention, and successful rhetorical discourse responds to them 
in proportionate measure.  
While all three of Bitzer’s elements could be, and often are, influenced by and 
exerting pressure upon the timing of the rhetorical act, his conception of exigence is the 
most closely linked to kairos. “Any exigence is an imperfection marked by urgency,” he 
explains. “It is a defect, an obstacle something waiting to be done, a thing which is other 
than it should be. In almost any sort of context, there will be numerous exigencies, but 
not all are elements of a rhetorical situation—not all are rhetorical exigencies. An 
exigence that cannot be modified is not rhetorical” (6). In making this distinction, Bitzer 
gestures toward a principle central in the Aristotelian definition of deliberative rhetoric, a 
point which, when combined with the Apple’s and Gregory’s characterization of 
pedagogical treatises, serves to highlight the hybrid nature of the genre. While it is a 
document concerned, at least superficially, with questions of policy, the pedagogical 
treatise is, ultimately dependent upon questions of value and the ideological systems that 




most public-intellectual work on educational matters in general and on issues of literacy 
in particular.  
Downplayed in Bitzer’s account, however, is how the rhetorical act itself can 
function to bring the exigence to life for audiences and in some sense even construct an 
exigence-based justification of its own existence and significance. Richard Vatz’s oft-
cited response to Bitzer’s article earned its position in the canon of contemporary 
rhetorical theory on the basis of this point. According to Vatz, “exigences are not the 
product of objective events, but rather are a matter of perception and interpretation” 
(214), and this understanding places more agency with the rhetor and his construction of 
events and the related framing of his argument. Within this model, “situations obtain their 
character from the rhetoric which surrounds them or creates them” (159), and this 
creative force is controlled by the rhetor and the narrative framing by which he or she 
presents the rhetorical discourse to his or her audience. Situations are constructed from 
the particulars of this narrative as the rhetor selects and presents them. For Vatz, the 
process of selection determines rhetorical salience: “Rhetors choose or do not choose to 
make salient situations, facts, events, etc. This may be the sine qua non of rhetoric: the art 
of linguistically or symbolically creating salience. After salience is created, the situation 
must be translated into meaning” (160).  If the rhetorical force of an intervention is 
determined by an author’s or a speaker’s ability to make the pressing conditions requiring 
response immediate for readers or auditors, it is clear that Seaborg and the Commission 
responsible for A Nation at Risk had more to work with than Adler and the humanists. 




resonant in the sense that it allowed him to return to a classical pedagogical model long 
forgotten, but not even Aristotle can compete with the A-Bomb.  
The second obstacle that Gregory identifies closely aligns with Apple’s slogan 
system in the sense that it emphasizes both the need for a relatively narrow and 
manageable focus and the need to characterize the issues at play in ways that will be both 
accessible and convenient for a diverse audience. In some sense, Gregory’s rendering of 
this obstacle speaks more directly to the seeming contradiction that exists between the 
first two attributes of slogan systems as Apple explains them. For this type of reform-
minded pedagogical work to be persuasive, it must find a middle ground in which it is 
both specific enough and general enough. Interestingly, however, Gregory’s description 
suggests that one can follow from the other; in the process of clarifying and sharpening 
the issues the author can not only treat them with increased focus but can also increase 
their general appeal by way of his “version.” It is in contending with this obstacle that we 
see most forcefully how the pedagogical projects to which both Adler and Seaborg 
contributed relied on a certain version of past events, a certain historiographic narrative 
that positioned their suggestion for reform as meaningful within the social and cultural 
contexts as they themselves create them. The construction of the crisis narrative, then, is 
itself a way of preparing an audience to assent to action-oriented recommendations.  
Ultimately, the mismatch between the moment as Adler understands and responds 
to it and the moment as the majority of the nation and various interested parties see it is 
one of the Proposal’s most pressing challenges. Gregory contends that: 
Adler's Paideia Proposal begs the question by assuming what needs to be proved. 




leaders, and school boards indicate that they agree about how to define the main 
problems and how to solve them. He jumps from the unsupported assertion that 
the troops are ready to fight, to the unsupported conclusion that what they are 
ready to fight for is to provide the citizenry with an education that will prepare 
them with lifelong learning and preserve democracy. (72-73) 
It is, in this sense, the aims of educational reform that become controversial, despite 
Adler’s work to render models associated with his particular goals as the most capable of 
meeting the nation’s needs. In assuming agreement, Adler neglects to support this model 
in terms of these aims, which has the potential to undercut the entire argument set forth in 
his Proposal for those who do not share his initial orientation and foundational 
educational philosophy. The problem here is a failure to recognize the composite nature 
of his audience and their various investments in the issue of literacy. Given Adler’s 
investment in the discursive practices of citizenship, this failure seems to represent a 
serious inability on Adler’s part to model the types of rhetorical engagement with 
complex subject matter and diverse audiences would require. Gregory notes, as a pointed 
aside, that “educators are prone to mistake the echoes of their own talk for the voices of 
other people” (73). This speaks to a significant issue in rhetorical practice generally that 
democratically oriented education would, in theory, attempt to correct in its target 
population. Public intellectuals can intervene in public discourse by modeling meaningful 
rhetorical action, but Adler’s work fails to engage his audience on these terms.  
As was the case with the second, Gregory’s third obstacle aligns with Apple’s 
discussion of slogan systems, focusing on the issue of style. While Apple treats this point 




the text itself to be capable of acquiring and maintaining an audience’s attention and of 
spurring the audience to act. Classifying the Proposal as a manifesto, Gregory asserts that 
Adler has chosen to work in a particular difficult argumentative mode. This assessment, 
too, aligns with the Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca’s assessment of educational discourse 
generally. They characterize such discourse as similar to epidictic in that it “is not 
designed to promote the speaker, but for the creation of a certain disposition in those who 
hear it. Unlike deliberative and legal speeches, which aim at obtaining a decision to act, 
the educational and epidictic speeches create a mere disposition toward action, which 
makes them comparable to philosophical thought” (54). Of additional interest relative to 
Gregory’s assessment is their consideration of in-group/out-group dynamics.  
They emphasize that “entry into a specialized group requires initiation,” but “while a 
speaker must normally adapt himself to his audience, this is not true of a teacher 
responsible for teaching students what is accepted by the particular group they wish to 
join, or at least which those responsible for their education wish them to join.” Given that 
the pedagogue persona that he adapts is integral to Adler’s work, this teacherly 
orientation seems a fitting characterization of his rhetorical self-fashioning, too. Under 
such models, Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca write: 
…persuasion is preliminary to initiation. It must secure submission to the 
requirements of the specialized group, for which the teacher is the spokesperson. 
Initiation into a given discipline consists of communicating its rules, techniques, 
specific ideas, and presuppositions, as well as the method of criticizing its results 
in terms of the discipline’s own requirements. These characteristics distinguish 




acquainting it, in nontechnical language, with certain interesting results, without 
enabling it, however, to use the methods which made it possible to reach these 
results or, a fortiori, to attempt to criticize them. (100) 
If one of Adler’s aims was to win over a particular subset of pedagogues and 
professionals already predisposed to a similar philosophical engagement with the issues 
of educational reform, then his style might be understood as an attempt at modeling these 
practices of discursive initiation. Nonetheless, Gregory’s assessment suggests that the 
Proposal met a much larger audience than that for which such stylistic choices would 
have functioned productively, and the result was that a large portion of this actual 
audience remained unconvinced, or uninitiated.  
It does, however, seem that the Proposal has had one of the effects required of 
productive public-intellectual work in the sense that it has encouraged additional 
engagement with the topic at hand. “Despite its flaws,” Gregory writes, “[Adler’s] book 
has served the useful purpose of allowing the rest of us to clarify our own ideas as we 
think through some of his” (78). Among educators, the book has functioned as a reminder 
of what can go wrong when argumentative structures and forms do not adequately assess 
the needs of their audiences. The Proposal’s failure has acted as a cautionary tale and has 
inspired the text’s in-group and incidental supporters to refine their own thinking on the 
subjects its treats. It has not, however, succeeded in modeling the means by which these 
ideas, once refined, can be communicated to the general public. Its failure might suggest 
some strategies to avoid, but it would be difficult to correct these with only the Proposal 
as an anti-model. The question of what style would be appropriate for such a document 




rhetorical style and public-intellectual intervention is often under acknowledged in ways 
that negatively influence the intellectual’s real-world effect. In general, though, the 
language-based aspects of persuasive discourse have been well documented by rhetorical 
theorists.   
Jeanne Fahnestock seeks to explicate the relationship between rhetorical 
persuasion and language in her work on style. She argues that “of all parts of rhetoric, 
style is arguably the most implicated in the others, since linguistic choice is the point of 
realization for the rhetorical precepts and theories belonging to the other canons” (7). In 
traditional rhetorical theory, the “other canons” to which Fahnestock refers include 
invention, judgment, and arrangement, as well as memory and delivery. Fahnestock’s 
point, however, is that decisions made at the level of diction and syntax both inform and 
are reflective of decisions made at the levels of argument, organization, and presentation. 
For Aristotle, linguistic style (lexis) was largely a matter of appropriateness within the 
context of genre. Although he discusses such matters in more detail in the Poetics, his 
treatment of style in the Rhetoric suggests that “the virtue of style [lexeōs aretē] be 
defined as ‘to be clear’ [saphē] (speech is a kind of sign, so if it does not make clear it 
will not perform its function)—and neither flat nor above the dignity of the subject, but 
appropriate [prepon]” (3.2.1404b). In his translation of this section of the Rhetoric, 
George A. Kennedy notes that “Aristotle here applies to word choice the concept of 
virtue as a mean between two extremes that is fundamental to his ethical philosophy” 
(198), a point which further links rhetorical style to social action.  This Aristotelian 
conception also highlights the role that style plays in ethos-building, a point which further 




 In her work with Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca’s treatise, Fahnestock 
emphasizes the “foundational points about the language of argument made throughout 
The New Rhetoric: language choices encode selected objects of agreement and constitute 
techniques of argument” (30). While Gregory separates style from argument in his 
assessment of Adler’s Proposal, his treatment of the document nonetheless emphasizes 
the ways in which the two are integrally linked. In their treatment of this link, Perelman 
and Olbrechts-Tyteca take issue with the concept of neutrality in discourse. “There are no 
neutral term choices,” they contend, “though there are choices that count as neutral 
(unmarked) in a certain context, and stylistic analysis is based on an awareness of 
options. To generalize this point: characteristics that are attributed to words are in fact 
products of their use” (45). Within this conceptualization, the significance of audience is 
especially clear, as every piece of language functions on the basis of the audience’s 
orientation to that language generally and to the word or term in particular. Language, 
that is, can only be neutral under certain conditions that structure a relationship between a 
rhetor and his or her audience. According to The New Rhetoric, “ordinary, unremarkable 
language represents a set of agreements, a community of thought. Ordinary language 
promotes agreement on ideas, and an apparently neutral style increases credibility” (45). 
In this sense, language is itself rhetorically resonant, even in cases where it calls no 
notice to itself in any direct way.  
If language itself is capable of constructing the relationship between rhetor and 
audience in a positive, rhetorically productive way, it can have equal effect in the 
opposite direction. This, it seems, is a central issue in Gregory’s assessment of Adler’s 




The New Rhetoric explains that “many language choices construct or encode the 
rhetorical situation (communion with the audience is one aspect)” (45), but this assumed 
communion is self-defeating if not realized in the actual relationship between rhetor and 
audience. Gregory describes the controversial contexts surrounding educational issues, 
but he notes that “rather than contribute to an ongoing debate, Adler takes the tone of 
wrapping things up once and for all” (78). In adopting such a tone, Adler seems 
disconnected from his actual audience and unaware of the actual controversy surrounding 
the issues about which he writes. This disconnected, unaware attitude is, however, the 
exact type of attitude that Adler’s educational program would seek to displace in its 
students. It is the very attitude that thwarts democratic engagement in the sense that it 
refuses to engage with issues as issues. Under such a model, The New Rhetoric explains,  
“the status of ‘elements’ as objects of agreement can be altered; personal tastes can be 
presented as standards or values; values can be presented as facts; judgments of facts as 
values” (45), all on the basis of style. This particular stylistic orientation threatens real 
engagement with difference and forecloses opportunities for debate or disagreement. 
Alternative styles, however, have the capacity to do the opposite, to create opportunities 
for real and meaningful discussion. Such styles would allow public intellectuals to 
productively influence a public realm tending toward less engaged and less inclusive 
characters.  
 Overall, the perspectives and related rhetorical strategies exemplified by Seaborg 
in his work in and leading up to A Nation at Risk and by Adler in his publically oriented 
philosophy and the Paideia Proposal speak to the challenges facing the public 




environment to which both men and projects responded remained reliant on wartime 
paradigms for “productive” citizenship, and these paradigms influenced public 
conceptions of literacy and learning. The anti-intellectualism associated with materialistic 
approaches to production and with the heightened focus on the brainpower required of 
workers in a growing industrial economy exerted influence on the public’s relationship to 
education, as well. Set against this backdrop, both perspectives required rhetorical 
strategies that actively responded to the contradictions in notions of American citizenship 
that this cluster of concerns highlighted, strategies which rose to the crisis moment in its 
most heightened sense. While both borrowed from wartime rhetorics and grounded their 
reform programs in crisis narratives that sought to create a demand for the specific 
intellectual product each offered, A Nation at Risk proved more persuasive within the 
public realm based on its more practical and economically minded orientation, while the 
Paideia Proposal proved a tougher sell based on its philosophical grounding and more 
academically invested goals. As an act of public-intellectual intervention, the Paideia 
Proposal failed to engage its public audience on the audience’s terms and to model the 
types of deliberative discursive engagement that its democratic mission depended on. 
While it stood as an antidote to A Nation at Risk, both conceptually and stylistically, its 
rhetorical structuring was ultimately unable to turn the tides of educational debate on 
either front.  
 While the educational debates of the Cold War era were very clearly concerned 
with the practices and character of American citizenship, contemporary debates are no 
less so. In the following chapter, I examine how Stanley Fish’s 2005 op-ed “Devoid of 




instruction in college education. Fish’s piece appeared in the New York Times, reaching a 
very large public audience. Most academics and composition specialists, however, 
responded via list-servs and forums accessible only to their smaller discourse 
communities. The reception of Fish’s piece speaks to the public intellectual’s power and 
to the role of discursive intervention and participation more generally. This reading of his 
piece and of the responses it elicited leads me to consider the particular rhetorical styles 
that his mode of public-intellectual work models relative to the literate practices that he 




 CHAPTER V  
DOING WHAT COMES RHETORICALLY: STANLEY FISH, COMPOSITION 
STUDIES, AND THE CONTEMPORARY ART OF PUBLIC INTELLECTUALISM 
 
 In his 2008 book Out of Style: Reanimating Stylistic Study in Composition and 
Rhetoric, compositionist Paul Butler fervently decries the fact that composition studies as 
an academic discipline is without its own force of public intellectuals. Butler contends 
that this situation leaves the field open to unwarranted criticisms based on 
misrepresentations of the work it does and without any direct means of addressing such 
misrepresentations. Citing literary critic and law professor Stanley Fish and his 2005 New 
York Times op-ed column “Devoid of Content” as a prime example, Butler argues that the 
“experts” addressing the public on matters of literacy and writing instruction within 
universities do so from outside the field of composition, from positions of authority not 
derived from their work on or scholarly interest in the subject. In order to address the 
distortions that such “experts” perpetuate, composition studies needs its own public 
intellectuals, true experts capable of wresting the bullhorn from Fish’s hands and using it 
to tell a more accurate story of the field. If composition studies is to answer the cavalry 
call that Butler sounds here, the field must first determine what achieving a position of 
public intellectualism equivalent to Fish’s requires, information that Butler himself does 
not provide. By assessing Fish’s contributions to media outlets regarded as forums for 
public discourse in relation to various models of public intellectualism, particularly those 
models shaped by the modern university system and its relationship to the public, 
composition studies could arrive at a greater understanding of the rhetorical function of 




productive use of the role among their own ranks and, thus, to represent themselves 
publicly.  
 When Fish’s “Devoid of Content” ran in the New York Times in May of 2005, the 
heated response the op-ed piece elicited from composition and rhetoric scholars was 
surprising given that Fish had made the same basic argument three full years earlier in an 
article for the Chronicle of Higher Education entitled “Say it Ain’t So.” In both pieces, in 
fact, Fish rehearses an argument that anyone familiar with Fish’s previous work on 
language and writing pedagogy would find both expected and redundant. As is the case 
with “Say it Ain’t So,” “Devoid of Content” bewails the state of writing instruction on 
the basis of strategies that prize content over form.  Fish contends that current trends in 
composition instruction subordinate the teaching of effective written form to the 
encouragement of content-driven critical thinking that is ultimately unrelated to the act of 
writing itself. He argues that such instruction assumes, incorrectly, that “if you chew over 
big ideas long enough, the ability to write about them will (mysteriously) follow.” The 
column suggests that it is the result of such trends that a larger number of college students 
graduate without ever learning how to write effectively and provides an outline of the 
course Fish teaches specifically to ensure that his students are not among that number.  
 Despite the argument’s lack of novelty, and its being founded on an overly 
generalized and unproven premise, the New York Times piece proved particularly 
inflammatory and ignited an immediate series of posts to composition and rhetoric 
message boards and writing program administration list-servs, an effect that Butler 
suggests was based not on the content of the critique alone, but on the fact that the 




In support of this suggestion, Butler cites one of the many posts that appeared on the 
WPA-L list-serv in response to the article the same day Fish’s column ran. In his reply to 
a post asking whether those involved in the list-serv might be taking Fish’s column too 
seriously, Florida Atlantic University professor Jeffrey Galin writes that the piece would 
not have posed such a risk if it had gone to a more specialized audience, but “because it 
went to The New York Times, [the piece] circumvents the entire academic community and 
speaks directly to an audience that already believes that academics don’t know what they 
are doing, especially when it comes to writing.” The piece’s power, then, lay primarily in 
its reaching a public audience, and Fish’s access to this audience positioned him as a 
threat that advocates of composition studies could no longer simply ignore as they had 
previously.  
 Recognizing the importance of a public audience to the column’s academic 
reception, Galin, like Butler, identified the obvious solution as speaking back in the same 
manner to the same audience. His post to the list-serv concluded that composition 
scholars “need to spend more time talking to the public about writing issues that don't 
sound like defensiveness, justification, or highbrow theory. We need to proffer an 
alternative, viable model that speaks to the average reader…dispelling persistent myths 
about the teaching and learning of writing.” The irony here is palpable. In Galin’s 
assessment, teachers of writing are unable to write clearly and persuasively about their 
teaching. In an earlier post, Galin expresses similar concern, writing “I worry how the 
popular press will spin [Fish’s] pedagogy. Is there a voice among us who can articulate 
an alternative to the popular press that is viable?” For both Butler and Galin, exposing 




new public intellectual. This new public intellectual would be a voice among 
compositionists who could occupy the position that Fish occupies and speak directly to 
the public in order to provide them with a more accurate picture of writing instruction.  A 
savior of sorts, this public intellectual could protect the field from potentially slanderous 
and deficient representations like those provided by Fish and others operating from 
outside of the composition community. 
Ultimately, the controversy surrounding Fish’s column and the resultant outcry 
speak to the fraught nature of the role of today’s public intellectual more generally, 
inviting a consideration of the forces shaping current conceptions of the role and its 
potential efficacy in service to composition studies. In a 1977 interview, Michel Foucault 
explained how he saw his own work, his own contributions as an intellectual, as capable 
of intervening in the public political and social spheres.  “It is necessary,” he claimed, “to 
think of the political problems of intellectuals not in terms of ‘science’ and ‘ideology,’ 
but in terms of ‘truth’ and ‘power.’” Re-conceptualizing “the political problems of 
intellectuals” in the way he suggests means that “the question of the professionalization 
of intellectuals and the division between intellectual and manual labor can be envisaged 
in a new way” (132), in a way that will put the effort of intellectuals in more direct and 
productive conversation with public life. As mentioned in the introduction, the idea of the 
“public intellectual” was first developed in Russell Jacoby’s 1987 book The Last 
Intellectuals: American Culture in the Age of Academe (Posner 26). Foucault’s earlier 
treatment of the intellectual, however, already points to the natural divide between 
intellectual work and public life that the term “public intellectual” both emphasizes and 




unnecessary in the sense that all intellectual work should have public relevance, thereby 
making all successful intellectuals public intellectuals to some extent. When it comes to 
considering the viability of training one to function as a public intellectual committed to 
specific causes, the process for going public remains a significant concern. In the section 
that follows, I consider how this process has been characterized by academics in the past 
and how Fish’s public-intellectual development compares to these characterizations.  
 
How Far is the Fall?: Measuring the Distance Between Academic and Public Culture 
Since Foucault, the potentially problematic division between public and 
intellectual life has been resituated as a division primarily between the public and the 
academy. Today, the modern university system, as the institution responsible for the 
production of intellectuals, plays a more prominent role in structuring the relationship 
between intellectuals and the public than it has in the past. Despite this new 
configuration, or more likely because of it, interest in the role of the intellectual continues 
to warrant increased attention, occupying a particularly prominent position within the 
academy itself. While the constellation of concerns surrounding the question has changed 
relatively little since Foucault’s explanation of his own work and while the conversation 
continues to circle around the intellectual’s public function, the source of exigency has 
shifted as a result of the evolving relationship between the public and the academy. In 
previous accounts of the public intellectual, the role was characterized as a role 
performing a social function for the good of the people. Making intellectual work 
relevant to public life benefitted the public, bettering everyday life and creating space for 




academy, however, suggest that it is not the public who are currently in need of 
intellectuals equipped to bridge the divide, but rather the academy itself.  
In recent years, academics have felt additional pressure to produce work that is 
useful and relevant, that can pass through and thrive outside of the ivory tower and that 
effects real change in the real world. At the same time, members of the public have 
become more and more vocal in demanding justification, in asking how the work being 
done by the institutions of higher learning that they support benefits society at large. 
Ultimately, this increased attention to the boundaries separating the academic and public 
sphere has done less to facilitate communication and understanding between the two than 
it has to breed confusion and resentment. While I offer an overly generalized account of a 
much larger and more complex situation, the general nature of the current divide between 
the academy and the public and the shift in communicatory dynamics is central to 
understanding the function of a public intellectual acting in the vein of Fish or filling the 
role as Butler and Galin believe is necessary for composition studies. If it is the academy 
or particular disciplines that have the most to gain from public-intellectual work, 
academics must pay closer attention to how today’s public intellectuals function. 
Specifically, they must account for the systems of popular media and public address in 
which they operate in order to take true advantage of the opportunities that such positions 
and systems provide for communication beyond the bounds of the often isolated, and 
isolating, academic discourse which is readily available to them.  
According to Fish himself, the state of the modern university and the character of 
the modern academic are directly at odds with producing functioning public intellectuals. 




binary it suggests, the “private intellectual,” claiming that there is no such thing, even 
within the context of the academy. Arguing that the academy is itself a type of public 
sphere, Fish thus troubles the notion of “publicness” on which the original term relies. 
The suggestion, then, becomes that the public intellectual must participate in a particular 
type of public realm, one that extends beyond that to which the academic, acting in the 
role of academic, has immediate access. Indeed, one of Fish’s most controversial claims 
about the role of the public intellectual is that life in the academy threatens to 
immediately disqualify one to succeed in such a position; he contends that no facet of 
academic training or higher education prepares a scholar for the role of public 
intellectual. For Fish, a public intellectual is “the public’s intellectual; that is, he or she is 
someone to whom the public regularly looks to for illumination on any number of (indeed 
all) issues” (Professional 119, emphasis in original). Additionally, Fish writes that “a 
public intellectual is not [only] someone who takes as his or her subject matters of public 
concern,” contending that “a public intellectual is someone who takes as his or her 
subject matters of public concern, and has the public’s attention” (118, emphasis in 
original).  Given these points and their combined force, Fish argues that academics are 
not the natural choice for public intellectual positions based on their specialization, 
“academics are not trained to speak on everything, only on particular things,” and on the 
difficulty they would have commanding attention, “academics do not have a stage or a 
pulpit from which their pronouncements, should they be inclined to make them, could be 
broadcast” (119). According to Fish, the structure of the academy, the value it accords to 
specialization, and its often wholly internal modes of communication make it nearly 




Fish is right to question the meaning of “public” in relation to an intellectual’s 
role within the academy and to suggest that the academic might have additional 
challenges to overcome in pursuing the role of public intellectual, but he overstates the 
case in a characteristic fashion. While it is true that academics operating within the 
constraints of academia may not have training to speak on a wide range of subjects and 
may not have access to public forums, the suggestion that academics only function as 
academics within academic contexts seems odd given Fish’s own career. In order to 
consider Fish’s approach to the public-intellectual function, I return now to Richard 
Posner’s economic model, which I discussed at greater length earlier. Posner considers 
the academic public intellectual, the public intellectual affiliated with a university, as the 
most common model, having replaced the independent public intellectual more 
frequently seen during early decades of the twentieth century. Although Posner ultimately 
contends that the quality of public-intellectual work has declined along with the 
“academization of intellectual life” (29), his critique targets public intellectualism more 
generally and suggests that there is overall room for improvement, even for academic 
public intellectuals. In this sense, it is not that academics cannot function as public 
intellectuals as Fish describes, but rather that they could function more effectively, at 
least based on Posner’s understanding and assessment.  
Posner’s conception of the public intellectual is guided largely by an economic 
model in which all successful public intellectuals necessarily supply a good or fill a role 
that a given market demands. “Being an academic public intellectual,” he contends, “is a 
career, albeit a part-time and loosely structured one, and like other careers it can be 




considers public-intellectual work as functioning like a symbolic good, a good “the 
principal content or function of which is expressive or informational” and which can 
include “art, propaganda, journalism, and scholarship” (6). Public intellectuals, academic 
or otherwise, can offer various types of these symbolic goods depending on market 
demand. For instance, in addition to being informative, a particular piece of public-
intellectual work might also function as a solidarity good, a symbolic good that facilitates 
a sense of community investment for those who already share the author’s perspective. 
Ultimately, Posner’s economic model succeeds in demystifying public-intellectual work; 
if such work follows trends of supply and demand like any other economic good, the 
question of what type of intellectual supplies the good the public demands becomes 
irrelevant. If academics can provide the required good, they can succeed as public 
intellectuals regardless of their university affiliations or overly specialized areas of focus. 
What becomes important is that academics learn to read the market and to structure their 
contributions to public forums accordingly. 
In his discussion of how the public evaluates the efficacy of public-intellectual 
work within the context of his economic model, Posner gestures briefly toward rhetoric, 
but he does not make use of the connections as productively as he could. “We might put 
it,” he writes, “that rhetoric is to symbolic goods as advertising is to ordinary goods; the 
classic devices of rhetoric are well understood by Madison Avenue” (49). In this sense, 
rhetoric becomes the means by which a product is sold. Posner considers as an example 
Aristotle’s conception of ethos, arguing that a symbolic good can be sold purely on the 
basis of the construction of a speaker’s or writer’s authority. What Posner does not 




nature and form of the symbolic goods themselves, a point that seems particularly 
relevant given that economic trends reflect demands for specific goods despite the 
advertising used to heighten their appeal. Take, for example, the concept of a solidarity 
good described earlier. As a communicative form meant to encourage community among 
like-minded people, a solidarity good would seem to adhere to many aspects of epidictic 
rhetoric as it is described by Chaim Perelman and Lucia Olbrechts-Tyteca in The New 
Rhetoric. Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca write that the epidictic genre is often 
characterized as having “no other aim than to please and to enhance, by embellishing 
them, facts that were certain or, at least, uncontested” (48).32 Epideictic rhetoric, then, 
maintains or secures adherence to a set of beliefs that the speaker assumes his audience 
already shares, thus contributing to a sense of community just as solidarity goods are 
expected to do. This sense of rhetorical genre aligning with the type of good public-
intellectual work is meant to provide extends, however, to other forms of public-
intellectual work Posner considers and the demands they meet. Some public-intellectual 
work responds to and passes judgment on past actions or other intellectual works, thus 
adhering to elements of judicial rhetoric, while other public-intellectual work offers 
policy suggestions or prophecies about what a current event will lead to, thus adhering to 
elements of deliberative rhetoric. By addressing the ways in which the specific type of 
symbolic good that a piece of public-intellectual work provides can be understood in 
terms of rhetorical genre, the academy in general and composition scholars in particular 
could further enhance their understanding of how to produce the type of public-
                                                          
32 For a more fully developed account of the epidictic genre, see the discussion of the relationship between 




intellectual work that the public demands in order to secure positions as functioning 
public intellectuals.  
While Posner’s consideration of rhetoric within the context of public-intellectual 
work remains surprisingly cursory given the connections for which his economic model 
allows, Steven Mailloux has positioned rhetoric as central to his understanding of public-
intellectual work and the potential for the academic intellectual to engage in such work. 
Responding directly to Fish’s characterization of the academic as ill-suited for the role of 
public intellectual, Mailloux, like Posner, specifically considers “academic intellectuals” 
as a subcategory, positioning the term in relation to “public intellectuals” as a more 
productive oppositional term than Fish’s “private intellectuals.” Drawing on Foucault’s 
definition of the role of intellectuals generally, which Foucault identifies as being able to 
“change something in the minds of people,” and Foucault himself as an example of just 
such an intellectual, Mailloux writes that “academic intellectuals speak and write 
primarily for the professional disciplinary communities with which they identify. In 
contrast, public intellectuals not only rhetorically engage audiences beyond the academy 
but are recognized as doing so by both academics and nonacademics” (140). Primarily, 
Mailloux takes issue with the line Fish draws between academics and public intellectuals, 
seeking to bring the two roles back together by more fully engaging the common work of 
all intellectuals, the changing of minds. In this sense, Mailloux’s model centers rhetoric 
by suggesting that intellectual work generally has a rhetorical function that might be 
adequately characterized as some form of persuasion. The distinction between the 
academic intellectual and the public intellectual, then, is not a distinction based on 




Given Mailloux’s characterization of the public intellectual, audience-centered 
rhetorical models become particularly apt models for engaging public-intellectual work. 
In addition to considerations of genre and convention, such models characterize 
communication between writers or speakers and their audiences in terms of the ability of 
a speech act or piece of writing to elicit a particular response in a particular audience. 
This facet of expressive and communicative “goods” seems to be the very element Posner 
overlooks in his economic model when he focuses on the external rhetoric surrounding a 
symbolic good rather than on the internal rhetoric structuring the work as a particular 
type of good fulfilling a particular function. As a rhetorician himself, however, Mailloux 
is particularly attuned to the potential for such models to contribute to our understanding 
of public intellectualism. In addition to the possibilities that such models have for 
rhetoricians who seek positions as public intellectuals, he recognizes the degree to which 
rhetoricians more generally may act as resources for other academics who wish to be 
involved in the public sphere. In the conclusion of his article “Thinking in Public With 
Rhetoric,” he offers the following statement about the relationship of rhetoric and the 
rhetorician to public-intellectual pursuits: 
Rhetoricians have a special role to play as metacritics in their role as public 
intellectuals. They can analyze the audience specificity of the translation process, 
the persuasive success or failure of various commentaries, and the tropes, 
arguments, and narratives used in strategies of invention. More generally, they 
can trace the rhetorical paths of thought in the public sphere. Rhetoricians can 
produce for various audiences analyses of how academics and non-academics 




they appear to think about rhetoric itself. The rhetorical self-consciousness, so 
crucial to deliberative democracy, remains the major contribution rhetoricians can 
make as academic intellectuals who go public. (145) 
As Mailloux states here, rhetoric, with its emphasis on audience and the effects, intended 
or otherwise, of communicative action, can be integral to understanding public-
intellectual work by way of understanding its functional components. In this sense, 
rhetorical theory, itself an academic discipline, offers its scholars unique insight into 
methods for actively engaging in the public sphere and in public discourse while 
simultaneously positioning these scholars as a resource for aspiring academic public 
intellectuals in other fields.  
Rather than hypothesize about and generate theoretical models for the ideal public 
intellectual as some accounts of the role do, Mailloux’s account suggests that we might 
have more to gain from an analysis of the available public-intellectual work produced by 
public intellectuals judged to be successful. By engaging such work analytically, we will 
be able to identify and gauge the power of particularly effective discursive strategies that 
can then serve as models for the production of equally successful public-intellectual 
work. As Jeanne Fahnestock contends, “patterns defined analytically are…always 
susceptible to use as models” (18). Just as the first rhetorical scholars built their models 
of argumentation from observations of those whose arguments were successful, so too 
can academics interested in public intellectualism build generative models by observing 
those who succeed in the role. It is, then, with this aim that I return now to Stanley Fish 
and consider the rhetorical nature of his recent public-intellectual work. Based on the 




considers him a successful public intellectual, at least on the basis of the audience he 
reaches and the public forums in which he participates. Although it is possible that he is 
not the ideal model, and does not even consider himself a public intellectual, Fish’s 
particular brand of public-intellectual work has nonetheless been the model against which 
other academic public intellectuals have struggled. For all of these reasons, Fish’s work 
seems an appropriate place to begin such an analysis.  
 
Something Smells Fishy: Assessing Stanley Fish’s Public-Intellectual Presence  
Having defended the emphasis that the term “public intellectual” places on 
“public” as significant in distinguishing the public intellectual from the academic 
intellectual while creating space for academic public intellectuals, I have already 
suggested that the nature of the public forum in which the intellectual participates is 
central to analyses of this participation. I have not yet, however, fully engaged the range 
of communicative forums appropriate for public intellectual pursuits. Given his interest in 
the expressive dimension of public-intellectual work, Posner defines such work as 
“communication with the public on intellectual themes by means of books, magazine 
articles, op-ed pieces, open letters, public lectures, and appearances on radio or 
television” (25). The public intellectual, then, necessarily makes active use of a range of 
communicative forms readily available to a general public, consciously structuring these 
forms for effective communication with general, non-specialized audiences. As the 
discussions of public-intellectual work in the previous chapters suggest, this process 
sometimes included the creations of new or hybrid rhetorical genres. Just as Du Bois’s 




periodicals of the 1970s, in ways that spoke to their particular audiences, aims, and 
objectives.  
Over the course of his career, Fish made use of a wide range of media, including 
the digital. Given that my primary focus is the type of public-intellectual work that 
Butler, Galin, and others deemed so potentially detrimental, I consider here only work 
that Fish has published in the same forum. Based on the restructuring of the newspaper, 
however, The New York Times now publishes many of its op-ed columns as online-only 
content. The columns I consider here are, therefore, published digitally in the 
“Opinionator” section of the online version of The New York Times. Although it is not my 
primary focus, a comparative analysis of public-intellectual work available in electronic 
forms and public-intellectual work available only in print would be an interesting 
addition to work on public intellectualism generally, particularly in terms of considering 
how Fish and others have adapted to digital media and made use of the additional public 
discursive practices for which such media allows. While I do consider the influence of 
certain digital media elements here, including reader comments and links meant to ease 
the forwarding of certain content via email or through social media sites, I have neither 
the time nor the space to do such elements justice and, thus, consider them only in 
isolation and within the context of my current project.  
While I am concerned with the rhetorical nature of individual pieces of Fish’s 
public-intellectual work, I am equally concerned with the rhetorical means by which he 
sustains his position in the public eye. In what follows, I will offer a rhetorical reading of 
three sequenced op-ed columns, focusing on how the first piece functions individually 




parts of a series. My ultimate goal here is to call attention to the rhetorical structures 
operating within Fish’s public-intellectual work in order to arrive at a point of 
understanding from which I can offer suggestions to aspiring academic public 
intellectuals who might wish to take on the role in order to publicly represent the 
academy and academic work.  
Before moving to consider the pieces themselves, it is important to consider the 
work the online forum does in positioning Fish as a voice worthy of the multiple bylines. 
The “Opinionator” section includes a number of op-ed columns organized by specialized 
subject, each of which highlights a particular contributor and provides readers with a 
focused biography describing that contributor’s work. Rather than contributing to a 
column organized around a specific subject and which is shared among a group of 
contributors, Fish has his own column dedicated to his thoughts “on education, law, and 
society.” Additionally, alongside each column appears an account of his professional 
work at a number of prestigious universities that heralds him as the author of thirteen 
books, naming a few of the most well-known. In this sense, the forum itself constructs a 
persona for Fish that might be considered in terms of an externally generated ethos that 
functions, in Posner’s model, as a form of advertising for the column. The site on which 
the columns appear suggests that Fish is qualified to speak on the subjects he chooses on 
the basis of his university teaching experience and that these qualifications justify the 
newspaper’s giving him his own regular column.      
Additionally, the theme that the column description offers, “education, law, and 
society,” serves a particularly important rhetorical function on the basis of Fish’s own 




that one of the things that disqualifies him from acting as a public intellectual is that he is 
not asked to speak on a broad enough range of subjects due to his particular academic 
specialization (Olson 120). His academic specialty, literature and literary criticism, does 
not, however, appear in the column description. While many of his columns refer to past 
work in his academic field, the column description seems structured to dissociate Fish 
from it in order to allow him to speak on a much broader range of subjects. In fact, I can 
think of very few subjects that would not fit under the heading “education, law, and 
society” in some way. It seems, then, that the column description can be seen as 
performatively distancing Fish from his academic specialization as a means of giving him 
access to subjects better suited to public-intellectual work and of constructing a sense of 
his being competent in his discussion of those other subjects.  
The first of the three columns I move now to consider, “Staging the Self: ‘The 
Hunger Games,’” appeared online on May 7th, 2012 and describes Fish’s and his family’s 
interest in Suzanne Collins’s best-selling book series. The piece starts off with an 
anecdote recounting Fish’s initial exposure to the books as a result of his daughter’s 
interest in them and his subsequent surrendering to their allure. Fish’s account of the 
experience would likely be familiar to a number of Fish’s adult readers, many of whom 
would have come to the series at their children’s urging and who could relate to his 
“devouring” all three after being hooked by the first. On the most basic level, the piece 
takes as its subject a popular topic with which public audiences would be well-familiar, 
and Fish employs the anecdotal opening as a means of aligning himself with an audience 
likely to have experienced the books in a similar fashion. In this way, Fish establishes a 




This opening anecdote might, then, be seen as functioning in the manner of an 
exordium meant to condition the audience in order to prepare them to accept what is to 
follow. Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca describe that “the purpose of the exordium is to 
make the audience well disposed toward the speaker and to secure goodwill, attention, 
and interest. It also provides certain elements that will give rise to spontaneous arguments 
dealing with the speech and the speaker” (495). Fish’s opening anecdote functions 
similarly, securing goodwill, attention, and interest by representing himself as an 
involved family man who is as attentive to the same pop culture phenomena as his 
readers. Additionally, his use of the term “devoured” to describe the way in which he 
read the three books provides a “certain element” that will ultimately lead to his major 
contention, which is that the “hunger” the books create in their readers is the source of 
their appeal. While constructing a version of himself that elicits positive responses from 
his audience, Fish also plants the seed of one of his argument’s major premises. Thus, the 
opening anecdote functions in two ways, conditioning the audience to accept the work on 
the basis of their feelings toward Fish and their identification with his experience and 
preparing them for the central argument by gesturing linguistically toward the conceptual 
framework under which he will be operating   
Although Fish offers an analysis of the book’s powerful appeal and popularity, he 
does so in order to explain a phenomenon which he expects readers already recognize and 
to which they can relate. He is not arguing for the power of the books, attempting to 
convince skeptics that they are worthy of reading. Rather, he is speaking to an audience 
already convinced of the series’ worth, articulating the ways in which the work itself has 




of epidictic rhetoric, justifying a set of beliefs that is itself not at issue or up for debate for 
the audience as the audience is constructed by the address. Toward this end, Fish 
implicitly engages a rhetorical strategy for partitioning or purging the audience. As 
Fahnestock describes, the popular trope allows speakers or writers to symbolically eject 
“some audience members as not worthy of being addressed” and constructs a specific 
audience in the sense that “after ‘witnessing’ this purging, those who continue to read [or 
listen] in the role assigned belong in a different group” (295-296).  By writing as if the 
appeal and power of the books is a fact rather than a point that requires argumentative 
defense, Fish addresses only those who share these beliefs, pushing any dissenting voices 
to the periphery by refusing to acknowledge even the possibility of their existence within 
the context of his discussion.  
Fish’s strategy ultimately only heightens the identificatory impulses that he 
encourages with his opening anecdote in the sense that readers who do not align 
themselves with Fish’s foundational belief cannot access Fish’s arguments and, thus, risk 
alienation or expulsion from the group of normalized readers Fish addresses. In order for 
the identificatory impulse to remain persuasive, however, aligning oneself with Fish’s in-
crowd, his target audience, must offer readers some benefit.  Otherwise, there would be 
no reason for them to feel compelled to remain within the group. The benefit of 
identification in this context derives from the authority of Fish’s account, the remaining 
difference between himself and his audience that qualifies him to offer an explanation of 
the series’ appeal that others cannot. In addition to the consistent reminder of Fish’s 
educational background and intellectual prestige offered by the biography to the side of 




authority at points throughout the piece. After recounting his family’s experience with 
The Hunger Games, for example, he asks “What accounts for three overeducated adults 
being so caught up in the story of a teenage girl—Katniss Everdeen—who lives in a 
dystopian future ruled and controlled by the decadent and cruel denizens of the Capitol?” 
By describing his family as “overeducated,” Fish effectively troubles the identificatory 
impulse the anecdote encourages by reminding readers that while his family may have 
experienced the series like other families did, his family is not any ordinary family. The 
self-conscious nature of the qualifier “over” preceding “educated,” however, does seem 
to lessen the effect in the way that it simultaneously calls into question the significance of 
an education that can be seen as somehow superfluous, but the reader is still reminded 
that Fish is an academic and that his account of the books carries the sense of authority 
that accompanies such a position.  
In addition to the explicit reference to his family’s status as highly educated 
individuals in the second paragraph, Fish injects references to other literary works and 
forms throughout his discussion of the popular trilogy. While arguing that The Hunger 
Games taps into a larger social “hunger” for authenticity, he references Hamlet by 
incorporating Polonius’s famous line to Laertes, “to thine own self be true,” as an 
example of authenticity’s being a matter of interest throughout literary history. Similarly, 
he considers the series’ final scene alongside conceptions of pastoralism, complete with a 
phrase from the title of Renaissance pastoral paintings in the original Latin. Certainly, the 
New York Times audience is going to be familiar with Hamlet and a large portion of them 
will also be acquainted with the pastoral tradition, so Fish’s references do not have the 




readers of Fish’s role as a specialized academic, the very role the description of the 
column seeks to obscure. Thus, their inclusion serves to invoke Fish’s specialized 
training as a literary critic as the source of his authority; it is based on his academic role 
that he is able to offer his audience insight into the experience of The Hunger Games that 
he has shared with them.  
Maintaining the slight difference between himself and his audience for which 
such authority allows is an important element of the rhetorical work the column is doing. 
If the identification was complete, what would a reader have to gain from Fish’s 
discussion that she could not gain from her own contemplation of her experience reading 
the books? What need, or demand, would the piece fill? The functional identification on 
which Fish’s column relies, then, might be seen in terms of Kenneth Burke’s model of 
consubstantiality, which attempts to account for the  “elation wherein the audience feels 
as though it were not merely receiving, but were itself creatively participating in the 
poet’s or speaker’s assertion” as a result of the identifactory impulse (58). In this 
rhetorical model, the audience is more likely to assent to the assertion the rhetor presents 
when the audience is made to feel as if they are collaborators in the rhetor’s very creation 
of the assertion, but the distinction between the rhetor and the audience is required in 
order for persuasion to be a viable option within the context of the discourse. Burke 
describes this sense of partial identification in the following terms:  
A is not identical with his colleague, B. But insofar as their interests are 
joined, A is identified with B.  Or he may identify himself with B even 
when their interests are not joined, if he assumes they are, or is persuaded 




person other than himself. Yet at the same time he remains unique, an 
individual locus of motives. Thus, he is both joined and separate, at once a 
distinct substance and consubstantial with another. (21) 
Burke here addresses the means by which rhetorical motivation allows for a sense of 
identification, an aligning of oneself with another based on shared views. This 
consubstantiality encourages distinct individuals with distinct perspectives to focus on the 
points at which their beliefs and motivations converge.  
Importantly, the alignment to which Burke points is not all-consuming. Integral to 
Burke’s notion of identification is the idea that identification both maintains and requires 
individuality. Although the first figure identifies with the second, the first figure is still 
the first figure and not wholly subsumed by the second. This sense of remaining distance 
between the two figures is particularly significant to note given Burke’s later discussion 
of how such rhetorical forms “would involve ‘identification,’ first by inducing the auditor 
to participate in the form, as a ‘universal’ locus of appeal, and next by trying to include a 
partisan statement within this same pale of assent” (59). Identification, then, becomes a 
means of achieving the Aristotelian middle ground between rhetor and audience that 
subsequently allows for movement forward, movement that ultimately depends upon the 
remaining degree of difference between the rhetor and the audience. If there is no 
difference, there is no movement, and identification would be the end goal rather than the 
transitional step.  
 Given that the particular demand that Fish’s piece meets comes directly from an 
underlying question of what accounts for The Hunger Games’ popularity and mass 




authority becomes his central rhetorical project. Being able to assess the appeal of the 
novel requires experiencing the appeal as the audience has experienced it, as well as 
being able to draw on a wide range of knowledge that the average reader might not be 
able to access on her own. It is within this context that the “hunger” for authenticity on 
which Fish bases his assessment of the series’ far-reaching attraction structures the power 
of Fish’s own work in a similar way. The title “Staging the Self,” for instance, would be 
an apt description of the rhetorical model under which Fish himself is operating. The way 
in which Fish convinces his audience that his professional assessment of the books has 
merit is by foregrounding his own authentic interest in the series. Without convincing his 
readers of the authenticity of his experience of the books, his assessment could easily 
come across as just another out-of-touch academic’s attempt to explain a popular text he 
knows nothing about, holding it at a distance so as to not confuse it with the “real” 
literature he studies. This approach would be a sure way for the academic public 
intellectual to fail. To succeed, the public intellectual’s interest in the subject must be as 
authentic as his readers’. At the same time, Fish, like Katniss, understands that more is 
expected of him, that he has another version of his self to stage: the academic. 
Authenticating his academic self, however, requires additional construction, hence the 
references to other literary works and to the pastoral tradition as representative elements 
of the body of knowledge to which such specialized academics have access. By these 
means, Fish stages a dual self to structure the column in a way that supplies the exact 
type of public -intellectual work that its audience demands.  
 Moving from this first column to the next, the ways in which Fish’s active 




The second column, “What Do Spoilers Spoil?,” was published online in the same forum 
on May 21st, 2012 and responds directly to the reader commentary that Fish’s previous 
column about The Hunger Games elicited. Fish opens the column by stating that “Over 
10 percent of the comments on my “Hunger Games” column brought up the question of 
spoiler alerts,” and he then quotes directly a few of the comments that account for this 
percentage: “‘Haven’t you heard of a spoiler alert?’, one exasperated reader asked. 
Another reader, Jim, reported that he was ‘trying rapidly to withdraw my forward of the 
article to my wife who’s in the midst of the 2nd book.’” While Fish’s first column 
encourages identification on the basis of shared experiences and aligning interests, the 
second column opens with an even more direct and explicit consideration of the 
relationship between the writer and his audience. Fish here describes and emphasizes the 
degree to which the reader commentary, a feature for which the online forum allows, 
plays a central role in shaping the public-intellectual work he publishes there. In this 
sense, he is actively constructing himself as a public intellectual who is, to use his own 
term and emphasis, “the public’s intellectual.”  
By responding to the reader commentary as he does, Fish characterizes his public-
intellectual work in the online forum as a dialogic discourse, a conversation in which 
readers productively participate. This characterization is further emphasized in the way 
that Fish incorporates reader comments directly into his text, including actual reader 
voices in a way that, at least momentarily, obscures the divide between writer and 
audience within the context of the public-intellectual act. The public, then, is represented 
as actively participating in the production of the column, and the public-intellectual work 




Reconsidering the earlier discussion of Burke’s concepts of identification and 
consubstantiality, the persuasive nature of such a representation is certainly at work in the 
opening of this second column.  
 Despite his initial willingness to share discursive space with his audience, 
however, Fish is once again quick to differentiate himself from them and to reclaim a 
sense of authority. Citing a study conducted at the University of California at San Diego, 
Fish suggests that his reader Jim’s assumption about spoilers negatively affecting his 
wife’s reading of Collin’s trilogy “may be incorrect.” Based on the study’s findings that 
spoilers can, in fact, make the reading experience more enjoyable, Fish here counters 
Jim’s more emotional reaction to the effect that the forwarded article might have had on 
his wife with a more scientific, fact-based alternative. By “correcting” Jim’s assumption, 
Fish steps back into an authoritative role from which his address takes an instructional, 
rather than collaborative, tone. The majority of the column remains in this realm, offering 
a number of more scholarly accounts of the tension between suspense and certainty for 
readers of literature. Fish finally offers Richard J. Gerrig’s “paradox of suspense” 
alongside Fish’s own reading of Milton’s “Lycidas” in order to argue that in such 
understandings of the reader’s relationship to a work, “the supposedly deleterious effect 
of a spoiler is diminished. Either spoilers give back more than they take away or they 
take away nothing because suspense and surprise survive them.”  With this strategy, Fish 
divorces the concept of a “spoiler” from the negative connotation of the root “spoil” and 
troubles understandings of the functional binary of “suspense” and “certainty” as 
necessarily oppositional terms.  His model neutralizes the threat of spoilers, as they either 




 While there is certainly more to say about the internal rhetoric structuring the 
argument that Fish makes about spoilers within the context of the column, the way in 
which the column is functioning in relation to the first is of additional interest. 
Essentially, the column on spoilers can be seen as meeting a demand that Fish himself 
created in the column on The Hunger Games. By not including the spoiler alerts that 
readers expect to find in online discussions of books, movies, or television shows that 
reveal significant plot points, Fish’s first column created demand for the second. Rather 
than adhering to elements of epidictic rhetoric and functioning as a solidarity good as the 
first column did, however, the second column necessarily functions as a different type of 
good based on the particular nature of the audience’s demand. Given that Fish’s second 
column essentially responds to charges brought against him on the basis of his first 
column, namely accusations that it was irresponsible of him to reveal so much of the 
series’ plot without offering spoiler alerts, the second column might be considered as a 
form of judicial rhetoric. Here, Fish is called upon to defend his own actions, and he does 
so by arguing that the charges brought against him are based on a reductive 
misunderstanding of literature and its function, invoking his role as a literary scholar as 
he does in the first column. In this sense, Fish’s second column is rhetorically structured 
to respond to a very specific audience demand, a demand that differs from the demand 
the first column meets.  
Of particular interest is the way in which the relationship between the two 
columns characterizes Fish’s public-intellectual work as self-perpetuating and self-
sustaining. The demand for the second column is the direct result of the first, and Fish 




the commentary. In this way, the two columns illustrate the means by which Fish’s 
sustained public intellectualism can be read as depending upon his ability to make 
himself more and more central to the ongoing conversation in which he participates. In 
the first column, he positions himself as one voice among many, but as voice who just so 
happens to possess a body of knowledge that authorizes him to speak to the group’s 
shared experience; in the second column, however, his own work is the shared experience 
providing the impetus for the public-intellectual act, effectively making him inextricable 
from the public discourse in which he then participates as if by necessity. If it is, in fact, 
as difficult for academic intellectuals to secure positions as public intellectuals as Fish 
and others contend, it follows that Fish would be particularly aware of maintaining the 
position he has achieved, which seems to be exactly what the strategies used here allow 
him to do. 
In relation to the first two columns considered here, the third marks a more 
significant shift in both tone and topic. The column, which was published online on June 
4th, 2012, is titled “The Harm in Free Speech,” and provides an account and assessment 
of Jeremy Waldron’s recent book The Harm in Hate Speech. In essence, the piece 
adheres to Posner’s description of public-intellectual work that responds to other public-
intellectual work in the sense that Waldron’s book, despite being published by Harvard 
University Press, has garnered public attention and that Waldron, himself an academic 
and professor of law and political theory, has been making the rounds of radio and talk 
shows as a result. Fish provides a relatively straightforward overview of the book’s basic 
premise and is, for the most part, convinced by Waldron’s argument. Given that 




in relation to hate speech and interrogates blind adherence to and support for notions of 
“free speech,” Fish’s agreement symbolically marks his support of Waldron’s project. 
Based on the fact that so much of Fish’s column merely restates Waldron’s own 
argument and offers additional support of his points, it is as if Fish is making use of the 
column to further Waldron’s agenda, channeling the public-intellectual force he has 
accrued in the previous columns into Waldron’s project. Ultimately, Fish’s employing the 
space of his column for these ends illustrates the degree to which public-intellectual work 
can be seen in terms of a collaborative network among academic intellectuals, much like 
Mailloux’s characterization of the role of rhetoricians in examinations of public-
intellectual work suggests. While the role of public intellectual is not necessarily 
transferable, Fish’s spotlighting Waldron’s book here does speak to the ways in which the 
position functions as a site of potential for fostering connections among academics and 
their readerships.  
Fish’s column itself strikes a tone of relative neutrality in the sense that it is 
describing an argument made in another context rather than actively constructing an 
argument of its own, but the column can be seen as operating in the realm of deliberative 
rhetoric in the way that Fish’s support of Waldron’s project aligns Fish with Waldron’s 
call for legal action. Fish, then, is advocating a particular course of action in response to 
the problems Waldron identifies, albeit tacitly. Following the two previous columns, both 
of which participated in a greater degree of audience structuring and priming, this 
particular column seems to draw on the sense of ethos established previously rather than 
directly engaging the strategies for constructing authority and encouraging identification 




as participating in Burke’s notion of moving from an established sense of identification to 
a moment of functional persuasion. Having aligned himself with the audience in The 
Hunger Games column and defended his judgment in the column on spoiler alerts, while 
simultaneously positioning himself as an integral element of public discourse, Fish here 
can make policy suggestions that draw their force from the reputation he has constructed 
through his previous work. In this sense, no individual piece of public-intellectual work is 
isolated, as each contributes to the nature of the public intellectual himself as an active 
voice within the public sphere, a voice the public cannot, or will not, ignore.  
Although my analysis of Fish’s work here is by no means exhaustive and would 
certainly benefit from more in-depth rhetorical analysis across a larger portion of his 
body of work, particularly as a means of assessing how his model has evolved 
chronologically, what I hope to have offered is a starting point. If academics in general, 
and composition scholars in particular, endeavor to secure positions as public 
intellectuals in order to actively address the public’s misconceptions about academic 
work, conceiving of such positions as Posner does and approaching them as careers 
influenced by conditions of the market for public-intellectual work is an important first 
step. As careers, such positions necessarily require constant participation in public 
discourse in order to sustain them; a compositionist who writes a single op-ed piece for a 
single publication only when a controversy related to his discipline arises cannot expect 
to garner the attention or secure the audience that Fish does. Similarly, public-intellectual 
work will attract an even smaller audience if it is not rhetorically structured to meet 
public demand, to fill a need that the public recognizes and desires to have filled. By 




successful public-intellectual work engages strategies related to audience construction, 
identification, ethos-building, and other rhetorical elements, academics have an 
opportunity to arrive at an understanding of such work that would allow them to use it to 
their advantage. Engaging analytically with public-intellectual work can easily lead to 
models for its production. It is, thus, that composition scholars who wish to answer 
Butler’s and Galin’s calls for discipline-specific public academic intellectuals can learn to 
do so by observing rivals like Fish. Rather than be overwhelmed by his voice and run to 
seek cover in specialized publications and private online list-servs, we might then be able 
to talk back, this time loudly enough to reach audiences beyond those who have to listen. 
In the end, all contemporary public intellectuals must be aware of how their work 
determines access to discursive forums and debates. While an assessment of Fish’s work 
shows the means by which he creates demand for his work, the question of whether his 
work facilitates meaningful and productive public discourse is a separate issue. 
Responsible public-intellectual work could use its reach and rhetorical structuring to 
create a healthier public sphere, particularly when it comes to more participatory digital 
and social media forums. In a world where sustained engagement with a single topic is 
rare, public-intellectual intervention might seek to transform the very nature of public 
discourse by modeling thoughtful, deliberative modes of speaking to and deciding with 
others. In many ways, this type of public-intellectual work is a pedagogical process, and I 
turn finally to theorize the relationship between the public-intellectual function and the 






CONCLUSION: THE PUBLIC INTELLECTUAL AS  
PUBLIC-LITERACY PEDAGOGUE  
In all of the preceding chapters, the public-intellectual work discussed sought to 
characterize public discourse needs and to conceive of literacy models that spoke to these 
needs. For Du Bois, the widely held assumption that black men and women should 
prioritize economic production over direct civic engagement meant that their voices and 
perspectives were absent from public discussions of the race crisis. This absence left 
public discourse impoverished in the sense that the black experience only existed in the 
collective consciousness as it was rendered by white allies or by the black speakers who 
advocated for such accomodationist models. In order to adequately address the influence 
of racism and discrimination in national life, Du Bois argued, the black men and women 
needed the skills and the space to speak publically. Such a shift required both different 
approaches to literacy education and the creation of discursive venues capable of 
sustaining discussions of race. Du Bois’s public-intellectual work sought to address both 
of these requirements in its direct argumentation, in its rhetorical modeling, and in its 
discursively productive function. He advocated for a different approach to public action 
and education, he employed argumentative strategies that spoke to the potential of open 
public discourse, and he engaged audiences in ways that generated interest and additional 
discussion. In these ways, Du Bois was able to negotiate a public-intellectual position 





For the feminist public-intellectuals of the 1970s, similar issues were at play in 
terms of the inclusion and exclusion of particular voices in the public realm. In the 
process of reacting to and pushing against patriarchal ideology, movement women 
developed alternative discursive modes that were more appropriate for expressing their 
experiences and ideas. The feminist literacies developed during this time through the 
creation and circulation of small-press periodicals, pamphlets, and other written materials 
provided women with new ways to participate in public discussion. The challenge, 
however, was that mainstream venues and publications adhered to more traditional 
literacies and were not always attentive to the limitations of these literacies when it came 
to feminist issues. Despite the movement’s own preference for group-based leadership, 
Betty Friedan and Gloria Steinem were identified as key figures, and their very different 
literacy practices speak to the ways that counterpublics, and the public intellectuals 
representing them, interact the mass public. While Friedan adhered to mainstream 
discursive norms in order to reach a larger and more diverse audience, Steinem resisted 
these norms in favor of the movement’s own. Friedan’s strategy succeeded in garnering 
attention for feminist issues, but it failed in terms of creating space for the multiple 
female voices making of the movement. She became a singular spokesperson, and her 
mode of publicity effectively overwrote much of the movement’s work. By contrast, 
Steinem’s strategy endeavored to create space for more voices and for the literacy 
practices more characteristic of the movement’s work, but her reluctance to engage the 
mainstream press limited her reach.  
The feminist periodicals and public intellectuals discussed worked within a non-




questions about what types of literacies citizens needed in order to participate in the 
public realm. Against the backdrop of wartime and “Space Race” rhetoric and in the 
shadows of a looming Soviet threat, public intellectuals like Glenn T. Seaborg and 
Mortimer Adler confronted anxieties surrounding the public character of the American 
populace. While scientists and humanists alike agreed that educational reform was 
needed to defend the nation’s place in the global system, these reforms varied greatly in 
how they imagined the ideal American citizen. On one side, brainpower and scientific 
literacy dominated, but on the other, philosophical engagement and civic literacy were 
the only course. Intellectuals on both sides, however, faced a fearful public gearing up to 
fight an as-of-yet invisible enemy. Seaborg and the scientists offered this public 
something more solid and more tangible than Adler and the humanists did. Documents 
like A Nation at Risk provided numbers and statistics and advocated for programs that 
would create jobs and motivate technological innovation. For this reason, they were able 
to speak to the crisis moment as the public understood it and to ease their fears. Adler’s 
Paideia Proposal advocated for educational reforms founded on the history of liberal arts 
and invested in civic leadership, but his program was not packaged for a forward-thinking 
public. In failing to recognize the needs of his audience, Adler failed, too, to model the 
types of rhetorical engagement that his program suggested American students could 
deploy in the public realm as national and global citizens.  
For contemporary public-intellectuals like Stanley Fish, the needs of the audience 
are harder to ignore given that they can post comments and speak back in real-time. 
While these aspects of new and social media forums might seem more likely to create 




always the case. The public intellectual still has a responsibility to institute and maintain 
the conditions required for meaningful deliberation. In the case of Stanley Fish versus the 
compositionists, Fish did introduce an issue to public discussion. His particular mode of 
crisis rhetoric, however, largely foreclosed such opportunities in the way that it placed 
responsibility on educators who were unable to defend themselves in similarly public 
forums and excluded a large number of voices and perspectives on the basis of the 
definition of literacy that his critique employed and on which it depended. A closer look 
at Fish’s regular op-ed column gives some insight into the rhetorical strategies that an 
intellectual can use to earn the attention of a large public audience, but public 
intellectuals hoping to make use of these public positions for the good of public discourse 
must be more attentive to the ways in which their interventions conceive of and model 
public participation.   
While not all of the public intellectuals included in the chapter discussions were 
directly tied to educational or academic contexts, they nonetheless took on pedagogical 
projects in the sense that their work endeavored to shape the public realm and, 
consequently, the training required for participation therein. If education is seen as a 
means of preparation for real-world contribution, then it follows that the evolution of 
public discourse practices would require that educational contexts adapt to account for 
new approaches to communication and discussion. This rhetorically resonant public-
intellectual influence functions alongside any more direct, topical interventions. A public 
intellectual concerned with public discourse or literacy might speak to his or her audience 
about the issue directly, but her influence will be limited if the form of the intervention 




for such approaches. If a public intellectual hopes to see change in the public realm, then 
her work must produce the conditions that this change requires. It is on this front that the 
rhetorical design of the public-intellectual work itself becomes important. 
On the other hand, however, change is slow and difficult. As discussed in the first 
chapter, it is always easier to go with the flow than it is to swim against the current. In 
many cases, a public intellectual is only as good as her audience. If she endeavors to 
create space for a particular kind of rhetorical action or deliberative orientation, she hopes 
that her audience is able to make use of this space, that the audience is both able and 
willing to do so. For this reason, we might also consider how classroom practice could 
anticipate such changes in public discourse. How could the strategies that we use to teach 
student to read, write, and participate prepare them for a flexible and ever-adapting public 
realm? In what follows, I consider some of the ways that classroom engagement with 
public-intellectual work and literacy crisis narratives might begin to help students 
conceive of themselves as public actors responsible for the health of public discussion. In 
particular, composition courses that expose students to the constructive nature of public 
address and to the possibilities of rhetorically minded intervention might better prepare 
them to be the type of audience members that public intellectuals need.  
One of the most challenging aspects of going public with composition instruction 
is the limiting force of a discourse community confined to the classroom. In his defense 
of public education, Quintilian contended that “there would be no such thing as 
eloquence, if we spoke only with one person at a time” (Institutio Oratoria 1.2.35). While 
concerned with the performative elements of oratory that require a wider audience or else 




challenge that carries over into the modern-day writing classroom, namely the student’s 
assumption that she writes for the teacher and the teacher alone. If rhetorical performance 
is limited by the audiences students have available, then the walls of the classroom must 
remain permeable so as to encourage students to imagine the public audiences beyond 
them. As public debates over the role of higher education rage on, these audiences 
respond to imagined versions of our students, our instruction, and ourselves, as well. To 
contend with the bilateral force of this imagining, students must interrogate the 
representational products which circulate through public discourse and which structure 
access to these debates and to the communities invested in them. Studying literacy-crisis 
narratives cultivates an awareness of how public representations of groups and 
individuals are linked to language-use and discourse practices. In such narratives, the 
force of crisis underwrites a critic’s choice to select for certain modes of discursive 
engagement while discounting, or demonizing, others. Analyzing these narratives shows 
students that debates over literacy determine the public sphere’s capacity to facilitate 
meaningful deliberation. Exposing the multiple discursive frames comprising a seemingly 
unitary “public” draws attention to the fact that students themselves are already included 
in certain discursive groups and excluded from others. If students are to imagine a public 
audience, they must realize that this audience is also imagining them; when imagining 
becomes a two-way enterprise, our students are better equipped to intervene in public 
discourse and to produce work that thrives outside the classroom.  
On the other side of the issue, approaching public-intellectual engagement as 
literacy stewardship asks that intellectuals writing for public audiences consider the 




rhetorical engagement that their public participation models for audiences, and the effects 
that these elements of the work might have on the shape and structure of the public 
forums in which they intervene. If the point of public-intellectual work is to move the 
work of academics beyond ivy-covered campuses and student-filled classrooms, it might 
seem strange for me to end by returning it to those very contexts. In the course of my 
research, though, I have been struck by the pedagogical opportunities that critical 
engagement with public-intellectual work and crisis narratives might offer. Situating this 
work and these models as objects of study within classrooms across the curriculum gives 
students the chance to reflect upon the discursive strategies that different disciplines rely 
upon when speaking to less specialized audiences, and this reflection might facilitate a 
critical distance from the in-house discursive modes of disciplines in which they write 
that will allow them to be more attentive to the fact that their rhetorical choices in this 
context connect them to a specific intellectual community. I would mention, too, that 
there is no better preparation for discipline-specific writing than confronting a 
discipline’s recurring crises and recognizing that they are, in fact, from where the 
discipline derives its identity and polices its epistemological boundaries. Engaging crisis 
in this way, then, serves a significant initiatory function.  
Additionally, if public-intellectual work oriented toward literacy stewardship is to 
succeed, it requires an audience capable of making use of the discursive space it creates, 
an audience comfortable with the discomfort of real, meaningful deliberation. Sometimes 
it is just easier to let others speak for us. But the public sphere is susceptible to the 
vacuum effect. When a topic is opened for discussion, something or someone will always 




dominant voices and perspectives will likely come rushing in and reconstruct the status 
quo.  We can, however, work to prepare our students to rise to the deliberative challenge 
by modeling such discursive processes in our classrooms as often as possible and in 
encouraging them to pay as much attention to the conditions of argumentation as they do 
to their arguments. Finally, we want to consider how new media models are shaping the 
discursive practices by which our students assume their identities as public participants. 
That so many public platforms now exist is often read as evidence of a more democratic 
public sphere to which more voices have access and which destabilizes traditional notions 
of authorship. The reality, though, is that audience-contact within these contexts can be 
just as superficial as in print media and more conventional circulation models. Learning 
to exploit these medias for their deliberative potential is key, and audience demand can 
be a major factor. Again, then, asking students to pay attention to how the structure of 
new media forums is shaping their engagement with the issues discussed in these forums 
and can help them to make more informed choices about the rhetorical modes they find 
persuasive and the ones they use to persuade.  
Finally, the examples of literacy-crisis narratives discussed here emphasize the 
degree to which these narratives might influence how public audiences perceive the 
students in our classrooms and the work that they are doing there as it intersects with 
public discourse. Based primarily on their assessments of students’ discursive abilities, 
these narratives represent a youth population that threatens democratic discourse with 
laziness, anti-intellectualism, and an alarming disregard for rules and the stability they 
offer. In the absence of any real or concrete referent, representations thus derived from 




which “a number of cognitive models combine to form a complex cluster that is 
psychologically more basic than the models taken individually” (74). The shadowy mob 
of youth that embodies the cumulative threat to the public practice of democracy today is 
a much more persuasive imagining than one invested in a more nuanced engagement with 
student populations based solely on the ease with which it can be cognitively processed. 
Henry A. Giroux works from a similar understanding of youth’s instrumental role in 
political discourse in America’s Education Deficit and the War on Youth. Giroux, 
however, offers youth populations themselves as the ones who might be capable of 
rehabilitating the democratic public sphere. Importantly, language-use, one of the very 
markers often deployed in negative characterizations of youth and student populations, is 
central to Giroux’s program of “radical imagination.”  
Claiming that “language is crucial,” Giroux emphasizes the need for “language 
that addresses what it means to sustain a broad range of commitments to others and build 
more inclusive notions of community…There is a need to invent modes of 
communication that connect learning to social change and foster modes of critical agency 
through which people assume responsibility for each other” (19).  In the process of 
imagining and then writing for a public audience invested in certain notions of literacy 
and public participation, our students will necessarily confront the points at which 
competing value systems or epistemological preferences threaten to exclude them or 
others from public discourse. At these points, we might ask them to imagine beyond 
today’s audiences, to imagine an audience invested in a purely inclusive model of 
democratic deliberation. Asking students to look beyond today’s audiences in this way is 




to encourage an ethical co-responsibility focused on the socially viable construction of 
public discourse. In seeing audiences’ potential, students might begin to ask themselves 
how their own discursive interventions might help transform their real audiences into the 
ideal audiences they imagine, and their engagements with these audiences will be all the 
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